A conversation on how Asia-Pacific countries are navigating U.S.-China trade tensions.
Evan A. Feigenbaum is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees its work in Washington, Beijing, New Delhi, and Singapore on a dynamic region encompassing both East Asia and South Asia. He served twice as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and advised two Secretaries of State and a former Treasury Secretary on Asia. He was also the 2019-20 James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, where he is now a practitioner senior fellow. Initially an academic with a PhD in Chinese politics from Stanford University, Feigenbaum’s career has spanned government service, think tanks, the private sector, and three major regions of Asia.
From 2001 to 2009, he served at the U.S. State Department as deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia (2007–2009), deputy assistant secretary of state for Central Asia (2006–2007), member of the policy planning staff with principal responsibility for East Asia and the Pacific (2001–2006), and an adviser on China to Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, with whom he worked closely in the development of the U.S.-China senior dialogue.
During the intensive final phase of the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative from July to October 2008, he co-chaired the coordinating team charged with moving the initiative through the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then to Congress, where it became the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. He negotiated agreements with the governments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and also has extensive policy experience with North and South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and is an advisory board member of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue. He received three individual and two group superior honor awards from the State Department.
Following government service, Feigenbaum worked in the private and nonprofit sectors: He was vice chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago, and the co-founder of MacroPolo, its digital venture on the Chinese economy; head of the Asia practice at the markets consultancy Eurasia Group, a global political risk consulting firm; and senior fellow for East, Central, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before government service, he worked at Harvard University (1997–2001) as lecturer on government in the faculty of arts and sciences and as executive director of the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative and program chair of the Chinese Security Studies Program in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He taught at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (1994–1995) as lecturer of national security affairs and was a consultant on China to the RAND Corporation (1993–1994).
He is the author of three books and monographs, including The United States in the New Asia (CFR, 2009, co-author) and China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford University Press, 2003), which was selected by Foreign Affairs as a best book of 2003 on the Asia-Pacific, as well as numerous articles and essays.
A conversation on how Asia-Pacific countries are navigating U.S.-China trade tensions.
Too many people in Washington and Canberra presume that the strategic challenge from China alone will make defense coordination within the alliance easy. The reality is that it could sharpen contradictions around the kind of operational planning that will be needed to enhance deterrence. Australian and American defense strategies, while closely aligned, are not identical. To build the alliance will require aligning resources, building complementary regional relationships, and investing in resilience.
Because strategic, economic, and ideological perceptions of China contain multiple, sometimes contradictory facets in Southeast Asia, receptions of and responses to Beijing diverge across and within state lines.
New administrations in Taiwan and the United States offer an opportunity to broaden economic and technological cooperation.
Asia is filled with large, capable, self-interested powers. And increasingly, without looking to either Washington or Beijing, these players are setting diverse and sometimes competing rules on the market and regulatory matters that affect business.
A discussion on how China will speed up indigenizing frontier technology given the pressure from the U.S., while increasingly using technology to transform traditional industries to lock in dominance.
A discussion on the rising risks around the Taiwan Strait.
China has a four-pronged tech strategy to challenge multinationals, bolster Chinese competitiveness, and better position Chinese firms to set engineering standards across a wide swath of emerging and frontier economies.
Most debates about Chinese coercion of Taiwan focus on invasion, and how an international coalition including the United States and Europe might respond. But China’s coercive toolkit is vast and includes both kinetic and non-kinetic measures that fall well short of these dire scenarios.
With Russia using North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine, Kim Jong Un denouncing his father’s and grandfather’s stance on Korean unification, and borders beginning to reopen to the world after over three years of strict closure, North Korea appears poised for big changes in 2024.