Toby Dalton is a senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.
Dalton’s research and writing focuses in particular on South Asia and East Asia. He is author (with George Perkovich) of Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016), which provides in-depth analysis of conflict in South Asia. He also wrote (with Ariel Levite) “The Nonproliferation Regime is Breaking” (Foreign Affairs, January 2022).
From 2002 to 2010, Dalton served in a variety of high-level positions at the U.S. Department of Energy, including as senior policy adviser to the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security. He also established and led the department’s office at the U.S. embassy in Pakistan from 2008-2009.
Dalton previously served as professional staff member to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a Luce Scholar at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, a research associate at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and a project associate for the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program.
He has authored numerous op-eds and journal articles in publications such as Survival, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Washington Quarterly, Asia Policy, Politico, the National Interest, the Diplomat, Dawn, the Wire, Force, and Dong-A Ilbo.
There is a persistent question over how to communicate U.S.-ROK alliance deterrence posture, particularly in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea.
To navigate the twin problems of dealing with Iran and preventing the nuclear threshold from becoming a desirable status for others, policymakers ultimately will need to reconfigure nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy.
The U.S. could cooperate with foreign partners on uranium enrichment to wean nuclear power plants off Russian fuel. But should it?
As Russia’s calculus shifts in response to its war in Ukraine, U.S.-Russian alignment to manage global nuclear risks, especially from Iran and North Korea, is unraveling.
South Korea has long been on the list of potential over-the-horizon proliferation challenges, but growing debates in Seoul about its nuclear options are quickly moving it toward the front of the U.S. nonproliferation agenda.
Although the geopolitical rationale for the arrangement is understandable, the parties have failed to come to terms with its core problems.
If the steps today encourage South Korea to fixate on nuclear weapons, they will end up like past nuclear assurance measures—just more water poured into the bucket and out the hole in the bottom.
Under what conditions does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion? And what are the consequences of using nuclear and rocket technology as a bargaining tool in world politics?
In the complex calculus of security risks, especially those involving nuclear weapons, sometimes getting what you think you want is the worst possible outcome. Politicians, political pundits and the public in South Korea are talking increasingly about the country going nuclear.
Yoon’s comments have fueled a debate in Washington over how to handle a problem that policymakers cannot wish away.
