On November 5, the Supreme Court heard the most globally consequential oral arguments in years as Trump’s trade war faces a final legal reckoning. The Court will either strike down most of Trump’s tariffs, undercutting him in trade talks, or else hand U.S. presidents previously unimagined new powers over the global economy.
Peter Harrell is a top trade expert and lawyer fighting the tariffs on behalf of 207 members of Congress. He joins host Jon Bateman on The World Unpacked to take stock of the ever-changing tariffs, peer into the Justices’ decision-making process, and predict the fallout for America and the world.
Transcript
Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors
Jon Bateman: The Supreme Court has just heard arguments in a historic case that could shift the tides of the global economy and redefine the power of the American president. And you're about to hear from one of the only people in the world who can authoritatively explain the case itself and its international stakes. I'm talking about Trump's tariffs. We all remember Liberation Day, that fateful Wednesday in April. When the president shocked the world with sweeping global duties. But the story only got stranger from there as Trump began fighting a two-front tariff war, negotiating with up to 90 countries on new trade terms while simultaneously fighting in court against a raft of lawsuits claiming that most tariffs were legally invalid. So will the Supreme Court ratify Trump's actions? And thereby hand him and future executives unprecedented new power? Or will they invalidate this signature economic initiative of this president and in the process, scramble negotiations with dozens of countries? Peter Harrell is a lawyer who's been fighting these tariffs in court on behalf of Democrats in Congress. He also worked in Joe Biden's White House, overseeing the very same tools that Trump is using now. In a conversation recorded shortly before oral arguments, we unpack what the president's defenders and critics have both gotten wrong about tariffs, and we figure out what happens next. I'm Jon Bateman, and this is The World Unpacked. Peter, welcome to the show.
Peter Harrell: It's great to be on. Thanks for having me, Jon.
Jon Bateman: So we've got a lot to unpack today, and I want to get into this blockbuster Supreme Court case that could tell us a lot about the future of presidential powers and how these Trump tariffs might or might not change going forward. But before we do that, I want to give you an impossible task, which is to give us a clear story of where the hell we are with tariffs right now. People will remember there was this very flashy Liberation Day in April. And there have been so many twists and turns since then. Different types of tariffs, different deals being negotiated, delays, turning them on, turning then off, court cases, the numbers are bouncing around. What is the tariff situation that we're living in today?
Peter Harrell: Well that's a great question, Jon, and as you say, there have been many twists and turns and ups and downs. When Trump came into office, if you put aside China, the average good that was coming into the U.S., whether it was a Samsung phone that was made in Vietnam or whether it was garment made in Bangladesh, there's probably an average tariff, overall a lot difference between products, an average tariff of maybe three and a half percent was being paid. Today it's closer to 15, so we have seen a four or so fold increase in the average tariff rate, which is the highest increase in tariffs, the largest increase in tariff since 1930, since the famous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act that you may have heard about if you've watched Ferris Bueller the movie some years ago.
Jon Bateman: And just to clarify, these 15% tariffs, these are tariffs that are actually being paid by importers today. They're not just threats. They're just things being held in abeyance by the regulatory apparatus. These are real, effective rates.
Peter Harrell: Yeah, that is the average tariff being collected today, but there's really a lot of variation within that average depending on exactly what the product is, what country it's coming in from and that kind of thing. So historically high tariffs, the first thing I would say is we have historically high tariffs. The second thing I think I would I would say on where we are is that Trump has now struck, I wouldn't quite call them trade deals because trade deal to me means something with a hundred pages of detailed, you know, rules and tax, but I call them like trade MOUs with most of America's largest trading partners. So we have them with Japan, we have been with Korea, we had them with European Union and the MOU is in addition to kind of potentially providing some stability in rates. You know, Trump is sort of promising, I'm not going to go above 15% on the European Union, they've also gotten some of these countries to make other promises to the U.S. For example, they might have promised to offer more market access for U.S. firms abroad. Some of that's a little bit vaporware-y, I'm not sure it'll actually come to fruition, but they have made some promises. And then there are these promises that Trump likes to tout of foreign investment in the U.S., much of which is also in the nature of vaporware. But some of which may actually come to fruition. So, you know, we are seeing him try to use trade deals to drive investment into the U.S.
Jon Bateman: Let's dig into this, because we've got these deals or memorandums of understanding, these vague frameworks, these agreements, leader to leader. Some of them have been used to bargain for leverage and reduction in trade barriers on the other side. But my sense is, Trump still has settled on a kind of floor for tariffs that he does not want to go below, that part of what's happening with these deals is There's a legitimation and a agreement that tariffs will actually continue at a base level. Is that fair?
Peter Harrell: I think the thing that Trump has accomplished more than anything else here, and where I do give him some credit, now, I'm not saying I'm in favor of the tariffs, or as a diplomat, I have to give him some credit, is he has gotten our trade partners to kind of legitimize and accept tariff rates that are several times higher than they were, you know, at this time last year. And if you had asked me, this time last year, would Trump get the European Union, would Trump get Japan to sort of accept and legitimize the U.S. could quadruple its tariff rates and also have an unequal tariff rate. Our tariff rights on their products are much higher than their tariff rate on our products. I would have said, no, you know, our major trading partners will never accept that regime. They have now accepted that regime, at least for the time being. And you know I got to give him some grudging respect. Now, to be clear, like these tariffs are actually being paid by the American importers, right? That it's not that like the European Union, there's some bureaucrat in Brussels who writes a check, you know, $10 billion U.S. treasury every month, right, these tariffs were actually being played by the guys in the U.S. who are importing the stuff. But but still like the Europeans have accepted it.
Jon Bateman: And maybe one way to understand this, Peter, is the clearest way in which Trump has won, so to speak, is diplomatically. He had more leverage than many people expected, and lots of countries have somewhat acquiesced to these tariffs and not retaliated to the same degree that many people had feared. So that's a kind of diplomatic win. But what about the economic and strategic consequences? When these tariffs were first rolled out, there were a variety of different justifications given for them. Sometimes the administration and its defenders would say this is an attempt to re-industrialize the United States by putting up protectionist barriers that would allow manufacturing to return here. Sometimes they would say, this is about raising revenue that could offset some of the tax cuts that Trump has pursued. Sometimes they will say this about reciprocity so that we could pressure other countries into reducing their barriers. Now, the dust has settled somewhat. I guess we're still kind of in a dust storm, but there's been a little settling. Now where we are, do you have a sense of which of these arguments has borne out? What are the areas in which there really have been economic and strategic victories? And which of the arguments have kind of fizzled?
Peter Harrell: I think the thing that they have been most successful in, the objective they have been most successfully in, has been tariffs as a source of revenue. They're raising, call it 200 billion in change of new tariff revenues. Now, you know, that is mostly being paid by, according to the economic analyst by Americans, right? Goldman is estimating 55% of that cost gets passed on to consumers in the form of, you now, higher costs. About 30% of that cost gets eaten into the margins of the American companies and maybe 15%, one-five, gets eaten by the foreign suppliers. So, you know, think of it as kind of like a sales tax on imported goods, but it is right as a sales on imported good, it is raising money for the federal government.
Jon Bateman: Just to dive in on this in the first second, because it's so intriguing how it's not easy to raise taxes in the United States, right? Whether we're talking about personal income taxes, corporate taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, people have talked about all kinds of ways of closing the massive revenue hole that Democrats and Republicans have both created and struggled with. Miraculously, if you're a supporter of these tariffs, you might say Trump has snuck in a major tax increase on the American people in economy. It's kind of striking to realize that.
Peter Harrell: Yeah, so I agree. And you know, I'd said that this is the highest tariff increase since 1930. It is the biggest tax increase of any kind since at least the 1990s when Clinton raised taxes to try to move towards a more balanced budget. So it is a very significant tax increase. Now that said, it's not going to accomplish the goal of eliminating the deficit. I mean, I said, you know, we're maybe raising $200 to $250 billion of additional revenue every year from the tariffs that federal deficit this year, I think is going to be on the order of one and a half trillion dollars so it's not me these are large sums of money but they are not actually you know sort of materially solving the fiscal problem the U.S. government as that says it is contribution. It's a contribution.
Jon Bateman: And Republicans actually cited this tariff revenue in the big discussion over the Trump tax cuts in this Big, Beautiful Bill. They would often comment and say, okay, you're claiming that we're adding to the deficit, but we're actually getting this tarif revenue to offset it. Of course, the net effect of all of this is still a massive increase in the deficit.
Peter Harrell: Now, I do think the revenue is also going to be important, again, assuming it sticks as we think about the long-term future of U.S. trade policy, because as you say, Jon, it is very hard in American politics to raise taxes. And I do that, you know, if we get to two or three years from now where the government is kind of counting on $300 billion a year of tariff revenue, you're not going to be able to just say, you know what, I want to restore the trading relationship with Japan and the European Union, make these tariffs go away because you're going to need the money. And so you're going to find some other tax somewhere if you're gonna make these tariffs go way, which I think will make some of them stickier than you might, I might have a year ago, I might not have thought about that side of the stickiness of these.
Jon Bateman: That's fascinating because, and we'll get into the politics of this, but the Democratic Party has broadly opposed the tariffs, not entirely and not always strenuously. So there is some debate amongst Democrats about that. But one could imagine a future Democratic Congress, a future democratic administration, maybe looking to turn the page on tariffs and go back to the status quo ante, but then facing the question of how will you pay for that? Which is a remarkable question to ask about something so disruptive and controversial as tariffs, how will you pay for getting rid of them?
Peter Harrell: Completely agree. I think that is going to be a debate that will will play out again assuming they survive court challenge.
Jon Bateman: So the fiscal hawks have something to like about these tariffs, even though they're probably unhappy with the overall fiscal direction of the United States under this administration. What about this other claim that tariffs can lead to a reindustrialization or return of manufacturing base to the United states? You know, we're six months in, you know, although the tariffs haven't always been fully enforced during that time, is it too early to assess how that has transpired or do we actually have data on that?
Peter Harrell: So far, we have not seen evidence in the data that these tariffs are driving reindustrialization. In fact, if anything, we've seen manufacturing investment in the U.S. decline this year, particularly if you exclude investment in data center construction. As you know, Jon, there's a huge AI-driven data center boom in this country. The results are driving investment in energy. But if you If you sort of take out the data center side of this, we are seeing investment in manufacturing in the U.S. decline this year. Now, that is being driven in part by the repeal of the Biden administration's Inflation Reduction Act green subsidies, right? A lot of projects are getting canceled because those went away. Also, the very chaotic nature of Trump's tariffs has you know, if anything, not gotten companies to invest yet, because a lot of companies were taking a view of they want to see where it settles before making investment decisions. So we're not actually seeing the tariffs drive U.S. onshoring yet. What we are seeing, what the Trump administration will point to is, A, there are various promises that companies have made to invest in the United States. The White House maintains this running log of, you know, promises of investment I think there's a big difference between a promise of investment and actual investment but you know the White House will point to this investment is coming you just have to give it more time.
Jon Bateman: Before we move on to this Supreme Court case, which is really the issue du jour, I think there's one kind of critical question remaining on the tariffs themselves, and that is we've been looking at the benefits, the strategic arguments for them so far. It's kind of a mixed picture. We're getting some revenue, you know, not as much as we need. We could be getting some onshoring in the future, hasn't happened yet. We had a bit more leverage on the international stage than maybe people had hoped, but It's unclear how we're using that. What about the cost side of the ledger? Because this is honestly a mystery to me. When the tariffs were first announced, there was a huge reaction in the markets. U.S. stock market suffered a substantial correction. People were expecting supply chain disruptions, inflation, possible recession was predicted. Most of that hasn't happened as far as I can see. I mean, there's been softening in the job markets, but not only is the U.S. not in a recession right now, but I actually look around the world and I'm struggling to find any major trading partner of the United States that is facing a recession due to these tariffs. And of course, the stock markets are back again near all time high. What's going on here?
Peter Harrell: You know, if you look at most economic models of the tariffs in the United States, they would show that the tariffs have been a modest drag on the economy. There has been some slowdown in growth as a result of the tariffs, some erosion of corporate profits, particularly in corporations that import a lot of stuff, but that, that, you know, hasn't been a large enough effect to overcome underlying other factors that are driving growth. The other thing, Jon, to keep in mind is the U.S. like trade just isn't that important to the U.S. I mean, are the trade share of the U.S. economy is well under 20%, which which is very different from some country like Singapore has a more than 100% trade share of the economy, because there's so much goods coming through, right? And so you're looking at like a 15%, call it a 15% tax hike, but on 10 or 15% of the economy, right, which is kind of the equivalent of a one, one and a half percent, 2% overall tax hike. So, so like the fact we're just not that trade dependent means that you can whack the trade part of the economy fairly hard it slows growth but there's a lot of other stuff going on uh in the economy that over overcomes that so that's my take on the real economy. Stock market is a different, stock market story to me is just an AI story you know we're now in a world where the largest AI companies you know from Nvidia to Microsoft now make up I think 40% of the entire U.S. stock market value. Nvidia alone has a larger market cap than the entire German stock market, right? So it's like the stock market is being driven by this AI story, and that is kind of overcoming the adverse results on other companies that are maybe more impacted by tariffs. And one example on this, just to bring it home, you know, so GM, General Motors, has been, and the car companies like Ford, have been among the worst hit from the tariffs. Because even if they're making cars here, they're re-importing parts. But the entire market cap of General Motors, like all of it, all of the entire market cap, of General Motors is now smaller than the daily change in the market cap you often see in Nvidia, right? So like GM could go poof. Entirely out of business and from a stock market perspective, it might be entirely overcome because, you know, Nvidia has a reasonably good day.
Jon Bateman: One of my takeaways from this conversation so far, Peter, is that the tariffs are seen broadly as one of the most disruptive economic and foreign policy events of our lifetimes, and yet they have had a less an impact so far than both the proponents and the critics might have imagined. But I want to stick a pin in that and move on to this huge Supreme Court case. You and I, Peter, are, we've both got legal training. We're fascinated by legal arcana, we are the kind of sick individuals who will listen to oral arguments and you're even involved in this case. The rest of the world probably would prefer not to have to learn about whatever President Nixon did in 1975 and if that has something to do with a statue called IEEPA. Maybe we could just start with the question of why and how the legal authority that Trump used for these tariffs is unprecedented. I mean, we know that the U.S. has had tariffs before and in the first Trump administration, the president imposed tariffs, but this time he did it in a different way and that's why he's in the Supreme Court now.
Peter Harrell: If you look at the American constitution, U.S. history in a sort of think back to high school civics class here, the Constitution gives Congress in Article One of the Constitution, the power to both levy tariffs and duties. So the power, to impose tariffs, and it also gives Congress the power do quote unquote regulate commerce. So these things like imposing tariffs, very clearly Congress's authority. So then the question becomes, for the president, did Congress delegate to the president? Starting in the 1930s, Congress has over the years given presidents various legal ways to raise tariffs. But those lawful delegations, the tariff authority, would not let Trump impose tariffs sort of overnight on the entire world the way he has wanted to. And so what he did back in April with Liberation Day, he's used this 1977 emergency powers statute called IEEPA, which Congress had passed mostly to let presidents impose sanctions, you know, like Carter imposing sanctions on Iran in 1979 and Obama imposing sanctions on Russia when it took over Crimea in 2014. So Trump used the statute, which had been used many times for sanctions to impose all these tariffs. It had never been used for tariffs before.
Jon Bateman: IEEPA, it sounds like a cartoon character catchphrase or something. So this is the International Economic Emergency Powers Act. It's part of a post-Watergate package of reforms that actually was attempting to restrain and create some set of procedures around the declaration of international economic emergencies, which prior to that had been a bit more of a Wild West situation. And maybe here's how I'm telling the story to myself. Trump styles himself as tariff man, and we know that tariffs have been central to both of his terms so far. In the first term, he also had an unprecedented uncorking of heretofore more abundant statutory powers to employ tariffs under something called Section 301, which a lot of people thought of as maybe at that time, the most flexible and powerful way to impose tariffs had not been used in quite some time. And he used that to start his tariff war with China. And what's fascinating is flash forward to Trump 2. And even this section 301, which Trump was really the innovator on and using it to create new presidential tariff authorities, he's now finding that that was insufficient and now he needs to push the legal envelope so far using IEEPA, that he's actually lost in federal courts, I think four times now, because it's a bit of a stretch. I mean, this is really new terrain here.
Peter Harrell: Yeah, it is it is new terrain and you know, as you as you say, you know he has these other authorities he could use, I think he doesn't like these other authorities not because they aren't flexible, they are flexible, but they they all do require lengthy fact-finding you know investigations that typically take months. Many of them like Section 301 which you which you alluded to that was the basis for Trump's first term trade war on China also require notice and comment of the tariff rates. Like you can't just decide on Tuesday, the tariffs are getting imposed on Thursday. There's a notice and a comment period.
Jon Bateman: It takes tons of time generates hundreds of pages of regulatory material not not the Trump way. So he found this other way through IEEPA and now this has been bubbling up through the courts. The administration keeps losing because it is such an unprecedented use of this power. But now we're at the Supreme Court and I have to say just because he's been losing at the lower courts does not tell us that he's gonna be losing at the Supreme Court. So you're involved in this case. You have been writing briefs on behalf of, I think over 190 members of Congress. I think they're all Democrats. Is that right?
Peter Harrell: So I, yeah, I've been one of several lawyers who's been helping represent a hundred and, at the federal circuit level, it was 191 members of Congress. We'll see how many sign on. We're recording this before the Supreme Court case.
Jon Bateman: I think there's always kind of two levels on which the Supreme Court operates, right? The first level is wrestling with all of the legal issues, looking at the precedents, construing the statute. But then there's the more strategic level, the more institutionally minded level, where you might imagine a justice, someone like Justice Roberts saying something like this - You know, well, on the one hand, this is an unprecedented assertion of presidential power, there's strong legal arguments against it, if we allow this to happen, the president now has so much more economic authority than probably anyone had ever anticipated before. On the other hand, if these acts are struck down, this would be a massive intrusion into the signature foreign policy initiative of the Trump administration. And it's actually hard to think about any previous Supreme Court case in decades in which a signature presidential policy like this has been wholly rejected by the court. How do you think members of the court will deal with this kind of massive dilemma?
Peter Harrell: Well, I should begin by saying, I think that the legal arguments in this case are fairly straightforward. It's clear looking at the legislative history of IEEPA, it was not intended as a tariff statute. The words like tariff aren't in it. Institutionally, I think what the Court could do is note to the president that if they deny him this tariff authority under IEEPA, it's not that he has no tariff authority, it’s just that he as to, you know, undertake the laborious and hard work required by the statutes that have given, you the Congress has given him over over the years. And I think you see the Trump administration kind of grappling with that when you see Howard Lutnick, when you see Secretary Bessent go out and say, well, you know, we have these fallback options if we lose at the Supreme Court. So I think even if the court rules against the president, they would do so in a way that wouldn't mean no tariffs, it would mean a lot more work for the administration, and that may be the way in which they could address this institutional question you put on the table.
Jon Bateman: It's so interesting what you just said, because this has to do with the diplomacy and the negotiations. You might think, naively, if you were a trade negotiator or a prime minister in a foreign capital, and you see this massive legal uncertainty and the DOJ actually losing cases in which federal judges are saying that these tariffs are going against the law. Well, OK, then we no longer need to negotiate. Sit back. Wait for the courts to do their work, we don't need to actually do any kind of deals. But oddly, that's not my sense of what's happening. My sense is all the deals are going forward and the negotiations are still happening despite this tremendous uncertainty. Is that right? And is that because there's an awareness that although Trump tried to hit the easy button with IEEPA, he does have other options available, and he's so fixated on these tariffs that he's not going to give up so easily.
Peter Harrell: So that is exactly what has come up when I have had, you know, sort of friendly discussions with foreign officials looking at this issue. They almost uniformly take the position of, well, yes, you know, Trump may lose these IEEPA tariffs, but you know he could reimpose at least call it, you know, half or two thirds. You know, he could reimpose some decent share of these tariffs under other authorities might take him a few months, you know, might be harder for him, but he can reimpose. It might not be all of them, but he can reimpose many of them under these other authorities. So we are better off simply negotiating and sticking to the deals that we have struck.
Jon Bateman: We've served up one scenario, which is a kind of out for the court. They could strike down these tariffs, but then draw the president's attention to this other way that he can do the same thing, just with doing a little bit more homework. I have to say, though, it would not surprise me if the Supreme Court upheld these tariffs. They've been remarkably solicitous toward the president during his second term. And again, it's very, very historically unusual for the court to strike down anything that is the kind of essence of a presidential mandate, you know, a kind of signature achievement that someone campaigned on. I'm thinking about Obamacare, where Chief Justice Roberts famously switched his vote in secret and came up with a clever, legal bank shot in order to save Obamacare, despite probably every bone in his body being hostile to it. But the other factor here that I want to dive into with you is the courts love of presidential power and the gradual presidentialization of foreign relations. I mean, you mentioned that this is hardly the first emergency declared under IEEPA. There are, I think, 48 national emergencies right now, the last I checked. It's become a growing tool that presidents have used to impose sanctions and do all other manner of things. What's your sense of how the tariffs fit into this accretion of power in the Oval Office over many of the traditional tools of foreign policy?
Peter Harrell: I agree with you, Jon, like we have seen growing presidential power in the area of foreign affairs for a number of years with frankly relatively little pushback. I mean, I look at President Trump's first term tariffs on China and on steel and aluminum, and there was a little bit of congressional angst and hang ringing over it, but they didn't actually do anything about it. Similarly, this time around, although, you know, 190, you know, some, some members, a number of members of Congress are signing amicus briefs against the tariffs and although a handful of Republicans like Senator Paul and Congressman Massey have been publicly critical of the tariffs, you know, we've not seen Congress pass bills trying to take this authority away from the president. I think, you know, Congress has also been complicit in this kind of presidentialization of power we're seeing in the United States. And I, I think ultimately, for Americans who do not like, or who have concerns about this growing use of presidential power, while I certainly hope the anti-tariff view wins at the Supreme Court in this case. Ultimately, you're going to need Congress to stand up for its institutional role if you don't want to see this kind of ever growing presidentialization our system.
Jon Bateman: Yeah, I mean, one way I've heard this described by scholars is our system in the United States has moved from balance of powers to balance of parties, where it's no longer the case that there is a robust institutional prerogative in Congress where members of Congress, regardless of their party, regardless of who's in the Oval Office, will will stand up for their institution. Rather, you're kind of a member of a party team. And so if a Republican is in Oval Office, you support them and you're kind of quiet about violations of the War Powers Act or the workarounds where we don't really have treaties that we sign anymore because those require Senate ratification. So now we do these executive agreements that are done by the president. Trump dismantled the whole USAID apparatus, a congressionally authorized body without going back to Congress. One thing we might ask here is, what does this look like in a comparative lens? Looking to other countries where, when we hear the phrase rule by decree or state of emergency in a place like El Salvador, for example, immediately our hackles go up. We think, okay, emerging autocrat. And yet here we have in the United States, 48 national emergencies in operation. The oldest one, I think, is 1979 against Iran, so basically the emergency is just the existence of the Islamic Republic as an adversary for the United States. Are we moving toward a system where one man or woman essentially has controls over some the most sweeping economic and foreign policy powers of any country on earth?
Peter Harrell: So I do worry we are moving that way. I mean, because it's both obviously, you see a consolidation of power in the presidency, you know, maybe from a global geopolitical perspective in a country like El Salvador, it doesn't matter if there's consolidation. It matters a lot to the people in El Salvador. That's serious. But El Salvador doesn't have a lot of global throw weight, right? The U.S. has a ton of global throwing weight. So this consolidation of power impacts not only Americans but it definitely as we see with Trump’s tariffs impacting the global order as a whole and I do look at you know I think we have seen the judicial branch this year step up at you know, limited times. We've seen them push back a little bit over certain aspects of the immigration policy. We have seen them push back over certain narrow aspects of domestic use of the military. But I think however they come out on the tariffs, what we are seeing big picture is that while the court may push back in discrete areas of domestic law against the presidency, broadly speaking, you know, we, we are not going to have an effective separation of powers if one of our branches of government, our Congress, as you say, prioritizes party over its own institutional responsibility. You're not going kind of solve this growing accretion of presidential power until Congress begins to think of itself as an institution, a separate constitutional entity again.
Jon Bateman: Well, I think, Peter, your point about throw weight is a great place for us to end because the United States is still such a global hegemon that the minutia of inter-branch jockeying within the U.S. government has sweeping implications elsewhere. I mean, we're in a bizarre situation where if a federal district judge is like the butterfly flapping her wings and the tsunami is then felt in Japan, in China, because these tiny little shifts in who has control over these powerful economic tools in the United States are actually things that the rest of the world needs to care about. So thanks for lending us your time and expertise today and we'll have to see how the Supreme Court handles this weighty responsibility.
Peter Harrell: Thank you. This was great. Really enjoyed it.
