Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Follow Carnegie
- Search
- Global Resources
Global Centers
Languages
Tokyo has claimed that the new trade restrictions are the result of concerns over South Korean export controls, which Japan insists could let sensitive materials cross into North Korea or China.
Since the 1950s, the United States has been designated to command South Korean forces in the event that war once again breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. The August 2019 military exercises are a big step toward changing that.
Today’s U.S. trade deficits are driven mainly by capital flow imbalances. Tariffs are less efficient and only work by distorting the real economy and rearranging bilateral imbalances.
Washington has only increased tensions with Tehran and cut off possible avenues for deescalation without achieving any of its goals.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s campaign against colonial-era pro-Japanese collaborators is an overlooked yet critical bilateral issue, linked to the United States and diplomacy with North Korea.
When and if Tehran is ready to talk, the differences between Trump and Khamenei present further obstacles.
The new round of tariffs has put U.S.-China trade negotiations on hold. Just a month ago, a deal to end the trade war was deemed likely. So why did this process unravel so quickly and what is the way going forward?
Washington and Beijing are not in a new cold war yet, but there is definitely a cold-war mentality at work that may diminish both sides’ capacity to manage crises effectively.
Korean unification will pose massive governance and economic challenges that go far beyond denuclearization. To ensure stability, South Korea should work with international partners now, to sketch out how a unified Korea might work.
Many challenges to U.S.-Japan collaboration threaten the effective development of Japan’s newest and most ambitious fighter aircraft program, the F-3.