With the fall of Syria’s Moscow-supported regime, a large chunk of Russia’s leverage over Türkiye is gone. But Erdoğan will not take the risk of challenging Russia. Rather, he will continue acting as an intermediary between Putin and the West.
Both Moscow and Kyiv are counting on being able to use the grain market to inflict damage on the enemy without sustaining any losses themselves. In this situation, the resurrection of the grain deal is a far less likely outcome than escalation.
Moscow has failed to turn the grain deal to its advantage, but Türkiye has plenty of leverage to convince Russia to return to its implementation.
As the Turkish president shifts his focus toward Kyiv, he is essentially testing Moscow’s new red lines. How firmly is Russia prepared to react in a situation where it is simultaneously fending off a Ukrainian counteroffensive and recovering from the Wagner mutiny?
Having declined to join Western sanctions against Russia, Turkey has become the only remaining window to Europe for Russian companies and individuals.
The war with Russia has forced Kyiv to take a more realistic view of Turkish foreign policy. Ukraine no longer views its relationship with Turkey as part of its partnership with the West.
And how Russia’s war has upended ties in China, Turkey, and the Arctic.
