Introduction
Traveling throughout Syria in the immediate aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in December 2024, as I did in February of this year, one cannot help but feel the excitement and hope among Syrians in Damascus, Latakia, Aleppo, Suweida, and Homs. Yet this is combined with concerns regarding security and the risk of monopolization of power by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Sunni Islamist group at the helm of the rebel coalition that toppled Assad after ruling the governorate of Idlib in an authoritarian manner for seven years. Since the group took control of Syria, its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has officially dissolved HTS, concentrated decisionmaking powers in his own hands, and relied on close allies from his inner circle to help him govern.
Moreover, social tensions are brewing in parts of the country, and spoilers are on the lookout to exploit weaknesses to derail the transition process. The attacks by regime remnants in March against forces aligned with the new authorities triggered a massive campaign of revenge killing by the latter against civilians primarily of the Alawite sect (to which Assad belongs). This exposed unresolved grievances and the difficulties in overcoming the legacy of the war, something that could lead to more violence.
Nevertheless, the current moment represents a unique chance for Syrians to repair a society fragmented by Assad’s sectarian policies and thirteen years of war, as well as an opportunity to establish a new political system that guarantees the equality of Syrians, representation for all components of the diverse population, and the rule of law. The National Dialogue held on February 25, 2025, and the Constitutional Declaration on March 13 marked important yet incomplete initial steps in the transition. To achieve durable peace in Syria, something to which virtually all Syrians aspire, it is critical that the interim authorities deliver on promises of inclusion, accountability, transitional justice and reconciliation.
Whereas much of the international analysis of Syria focuses on meddling in the country by regional states, which is admittedly a threat to its stability and unity, I have adopted a different approach. Recognizing that internal dynamics will play an important role in the direction Syria takes, and that ordinary Syrians have both agency and a desire to shape its future, I have placed them front and center. Ultimately, the more Syrians are united and coalesce around a way forward for their country, the less likely it is that its trajectory will be shaped by external actors.
Toward a Shared Identity
The mood among Syrians when considering their future is optimism and enthusiasm on the one hand, and concerns over security and the dire situation of the economy on the other. Many talk about the unexpected end of dictatorship as a “dream” come true and enjoy their new freedom to discuss politics, debate the course of the transition, and criticize the interim leadership. In conversations I had with Syrians across the country, they unanimously emphasized to me that they wanted to rebuild the state around the concept of citizenship—which does not differentiate between religion and ethnicity. In this regard, the Constitutional Declaration, which provides a legal framework during the transition until a new constitution is adopted, aligns with Syrians’ expectations. It states that “citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties, without discrimination based on race, religion, gender, or lineage.” But it remains to be seen whether this is translated into practice.
The gaps between Syrians are obvious. For example, people refer to “Assad’s fall” if they are wary of HTS, and “the liberation of Syria” if they support the new leadership. The fault lines arise in part from the fact that different areas have a different population makeup and that Syrians have been affected by the war differently, based on whether they lived in regime or opposition-controlled areas or as refugees outside the country. Many vie for the status of victims. Syrians who were persecuted by the former regime consider that they bore the brunt of the war. Similarly, residents of Idlib believe that because they endured bombing by Assad’s army and air force for years, they deserve rewards in the new Syria.
Meanwhile, individuals who remained in regime-controlled areas stress that they suffered from state oppression and difficult living conditions due to the economic collapse, and were not necessarily able to leave. They perceive refugees as having had more opportunities and having returned to Syria richer. The lack of information and communication between Syrians with different experiences partly accounts for these diverging perspectives and highlights the need for dialogue. It is necessary to develop a shared narrative to reconcile views, overcome fragmentation, and unify society. Finding common ground is a prerequisite for Syrians to move forward together.
With this in mind, Syrians of diverse backgrounds told me that they reject viewing their society through a majority/minority lens. They consider the notion of a majority and minorities to be a tool of division used by Assad to maintain his control, resent foreigners for using the term, and have expressed a fear that it could fuel tensions. Most Syrians with whom I spoke also oppose the inclusion of religious or ethnic quotas in their state’s future institutions, with many pointing to Lebanon and Iraq as proof that such an approach to ensuring proportional representation inevitably backfires.
Sharaa, the interim president, who was in Iraq in the early years of the Iraqi transition after Saddam Hussein’s toppling, shares this opinion, having seen the damaging consequences of the sectarian power-sharing arrangement that the United States and elements of the Iraqi diaspora established there, according to a conversation I had with a member of his personal entourage in Damascus in February. Meanwhile, even though they do not advocate quotas, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, which control northeastern Syria, have called for a decentralized governance model, one that would allow them to control decisions affecting local issues and grant them a large degree of autonomy. However, a majority of Syrians reject decentralization, which they regard as a threat to the unity of the country.
Although the transitional period theoretically provides Syrians with the chance to agree on the principles and values that underpin citizenship, this particular issue was not discussed during the recently concluded National Dialogue. Instead, the emphasis was on future institutions, the new constitution, the economy, transitional justice, individual freedoms, and the role of civil society. It is imperative that future discussions delve into the details of the rights and duties of citizenship, as well as the larger question of how to again forge the Syrians into a nation, all the more so because sectarian tensions endure in parts of the country.
The Danger of Sectarian Tensions
In the months since Assad’s downfall, security forces aligned with the interim authorities have raided the homes of former members of the army, the intelligence services, as well as regime loyalists, conducting numerous arrests in central and coastal regions. The interim leadership has admitted that, in the process, individual transgressions have occurred. Worse yet, dozens of kidnappings and killings have taken place in the city of Homs and its rural environs, as well as in Hama Governorate. It is difficult to determine the identity of culprits, as not all members of the security forces wear clearly marked uniforms. This means that they can more easily evade accountability for their actions, and also that criminals may pose as members of security units. According to a Damascus-based foreign official with whom I had a conversation in February, the interim authorities have taken steps to replace officers suspected of committing violations, but the security forces are stretched thin and are needed for a multitude of assignments.
The massacre committed in the coastal region in early March revealed the urgency of rebuilding social cohesion. The dynamic that led to this outburst of violence had been brewing in the neighboring governorates of Homs and Hama over months. In these religiously mixed areas, several Sunni villages were subjected to massacres by pro-regime militias in 2012–2013. Some inhabitants of these villages have reportedly sought to take revenge and took part in the recent killings. In reaction to the violence, Sharaa promised to punish the perpetrators, and appointed a fact-finding committee tasked with investigating violations. However, he fell short of acknowledging the responsibility of the security forces, and the Syrian Defense Ministry even appointed Saif al-Din Boulad, the head of an armed group accused of having participated in the massacres, to a position of responsibility in the new Syrian army. Moreover, the vigilante violence continues—albeit at a much-reduced rate.
In Homs city, locals told me that security forces sometimes demand to know people’s sectarian affiliation when checking their identity at checkpoints (something that is not mentioned on Syrian identification documents). In February, a local peace group planned a march of local Sunnis, Alawites, and Christians through various neighborhoods of the city to call for perpetrators of the former regime’s crimes to be held accountable for their actions. The group had to cancel the march at the last minute because some locals—mostly Sunnis—threatened in messages on social media to violently disrupt the march, which they believed would call for immunity from prosecution for the perpetrators of the former regime’s crimes. In addition, after Assad’s departure, the idea that Alawites are not welcome in Homs spread, whether in private conversations or on social media. This prompted some Alawite families to leave the city, with an acceleration following the killings in coastal regions. Locals warned me that if something is not done quickly to address the tensions, they could easily turn into a direct confrontation, as happened on the coast.
In parallel, certain early decisions by the interim authorities have fueled distrust among Alawite communities in Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Tartous. One of the first decisions of the new leadership was to lay off thousands of security members and civil servants, either to assess their participation in the former regime’s crimes or because they were deemed “ghost” employees (people who are on the payroll but do not show up for work). This decision deepened a fault line among Syrians and raised questions in the coastal and mixed regions, from which the Assad regime army and police drew many members of the Alawite community. The newly unemployed men may prove amenable to being recruited by actors who want to derail the transition and oppose the new authorities, even more so following the massacres perpetrated on the coast. This risk is compounded by the fact that demobilized men are not joining the new army. While in theory nothing prevents them from registering in recruitment centers, the deep mistrust between Sunnis and Alawites has resulted in relatively few of the latter signing up.
A Transition Grounded in Inclusiveness and the Pursuit of Justice
What is needed in Syria is a comprehensive transitional justice process. This process should include criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes under the former regime, a truth and reconciliation mechanism, and reparation for victims. In addition, it is equally crucial to ensure that Alawites and all other communities are integrated into the political and economic rebuilding of Syria. In parallel to efforts toward achieving justice, the process should ensure Syrians’ participation in each and every political step of the transition, in order to reflect their aspirations and foster stability in the longer term.
First and foremost, criminal prosecution will ensure that the perpetrators of crimes during the thirteen years of war are held accountable. Transitional justice should also include a truth and reconciliation component, one that involves dialogue sessions at the local level. This will allow for the full exposure of violations committed during the war and the sharing of personal experiences. Some victims have expressed the need for recognition by other communities of their suffering during the war. It is essential for these victims, a majority of whom belong to the Sunni community, to reach a sense of closure and be able to move forward.
In addition, Alawites who did not take part in the former regime’s crimes should not be discriminated against. Because the Alawite heartland remained underdeveloped during Assad’s reign, something that ensured the community’s dependence on the regime, it is not just former rebel-held areas that are in need of economic support. And Alawites should have access to the same employment opportunities as other citizens, including in the public and security sector. In parallel, members of the security forces affiliated with the caretaker leadership should be held accountable for violations they have committed since it took power.
The National Dialogue, during which the caretaker leadership held public consultations in the presidential palace in Damascus over key political and social issues with hundreds of Syrians from all over the country was admittedly unprecedented in Syria. It represented progress that was unthinkable a few months ago. But the hasty preparations, the opaque manner in which participants were selected, the incomplete representation of the Syrian people’s various components, and the short duration all limited its impact. In conversations with me, ordinary Syrians, who strongly desire to take part in future decisionmaking and shape the future of their country, often criticized the lack of transparency and absence of detail in the transition process, as well as its short timeframe, all of which has limited their engagement. A lack of engagement carries the risk of eroding Syrians’ support for the new leadership and the new institutions, making the fragile transition process even more perilous.
In my conversations with them, many Syrians also criticized the current caretaker government as being of “one color,” a reference to HTS’s Sunni Islamist makeup. Some revealed to me that they believe that it is more difficult for such a government to address the aspirations and needs of all of Syria—not just its sectarian and ethnic groups, but also women, youth, and civil society. Some activists said that the revolution that started in 2011 has not been completed yet and that they believe that the glass is only half full. Others expressed worry about the risk of a new dictatorship replacing the previous one, given the illiberal political track record of HTS when it governed Idlib, and the fact that Sharaa has plucked people from his close circle for key leadership positions since taking over the country. For instance, Sharaa appointed Asaad al-Shaibani, his closest associate and former director of Idlib’s political department, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Murhaf Abu Qasra, a former senior HTS commander who led the rebels that ousted Assad, is the Minister of Defense. And Sharaa chose his brother, Maher al-Sharaa, for the key position of Secretary-General of the Presidency.
The interim government, which was appointed on March 29, shows encouraging signs of inclusivity, with an Alawite, a Christian, a Kurd, and a Druze among the ministers. In addition, eleven ministers have a civil society background and five held senior government positions under Assad before the revolution started. But as Sharaa has kept the most important positions in the cabinet for his close associates, it remains to be seen how much power other ministers will have. In order to move beyond the impression that they are engaging in a perfunctory box-ticking exercise, the interim authorities should organize consultations at the local level. This will give more people the chance to contribute to discussions about the future of Syria. It is crucial to foster the inclusion and participation of all Syrians.
Conclusion
Experiencing freedom for the first time, Syrians are seeking to move away from a fragmented society and to rebuild their nation around a shared notion of citizenship. This process is fraught with challenges. A comprehensive transitional justice process, with a truth and reconciliation component, is essential to enable Syrians to transcend the era of war and Assad’s dictatorship, and to ease sectarian tensions. In parallel, political freedom should translate into a transition process that is Syrian-owned and ensures the inclusion of all the diverse components of Syrian society.
For this endeavor to succeed, foreign countries need to be supportive. The United States and the European Union can positively influence the transition by fully lifting sectorial sanctions they imposed on Syria in response to the Assad regime’s repression of protests. The Syrian economy cannot recover as long as these sanctions remain in place. In fact, a lack of economic improvement is likely to derail the transition, regardless of the political decisions that are made. The Gulf countries, Syria’s immediate neighbors, and Iran should refrain from interfering in the establishment of a new political system and from supporting potential spoilers. Instead of pursuing narrow, short-term interests, they should work toward stabilizing the new Syria—for the good of their own countries, as well as for the Syrian people.
