Source: Getty Images

Russia-West Prisoner Swap Does Not Herald a Detente

The exchange was not accompanied by any rhetoric of a reset in Russia-U.S. relations—instead, it was like a divorcing couple dividing up assets.

Published on August 2, 2024

Russia and the West have carried out the biggest prisoner swap since the Cold War, with sixteen prisoners handed from Russia to the West, and eight moving to Russia from the West. The deal, which was years in the making, was built around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strong desire to return assassin Vadim Krasikov, who was jailed in Germany in 2019 for the murder of Chechen rebel commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili. Krasikov was the linchpin of the negotiations, which eventually delivered a much bigger trade.

Many have suggested the fact that the two sides were able to come to an agreement is a hopeful sign for peace negotiations in Ukraine. But there’s little justification for such a position.

The most striking aspect of the exchange was its size. Russia gave up sixteen people, including foreigners accused of spying, prominent critics of Putin (like Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin), and less well-known journalists and activists (the artist Alexandra Skochilenko, journalist Alsu Kurmasheva, and Liliya Chanysheva and Ksenia Fadeeva, who were allies of the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny). Russia also freed the U.S. journalist Evan Gershkovich, who was taken as a hostage—and whom Putin linked directly with Krasikov. Gershkovich was sentenced to sixteen years in jail for espionage just two weeks before the exchange took place.

Over the last two years, Russia has gone to great lengths to increase the number of prisoners it holds who could be used in just such a swap. This upped the ante in negotiations with the West, which were derailed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin reasoned that since Washington was actively hunting down Russians (the question of whether they were spies or not was conveniently forgotten), then it would respond by taking hostages.

The message was simple: arresting “our” people would lead to the indiscriminate arrest of U.S. citizens. Of course, the nature of the two political systems means that Moscow can be far more underhand in this regard than Washington.

While the circumstances surrounding the arrest on suspicion of espionage of former U.S. marine Paul Whelan in 2018 were not entirely clear, the detention of U.S. basketball star Brittney Griner in 2022 was purely about her U.S. passport—and Kremlin attempts to sway U.S. public opinion. The gamble paid off: later in 2022, Griner was swapped for the notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout.

Krasikov, however, was a much more difficult prize. Putin’s personal interest in the suspected intelligence operative was clear to see in his interview with U.S. talk show host Tucker Carlson in February. Answering a question about Gershkovich, Putin quickly changed the subject to Krasikov, whom he characterized as a true patriot who had delivered justice to the ruthless bandit Khangoshvili.

There’s no doubt that Putin saw Krasikov as a true patriot. In the Russian president’s eyes, he had carried out his duty, and deserved not only to be returned to Russia, but to be showered with honors and respect.

The main stumbling block to getting Krasikov back turned out to be Germany. Officials in Berlin were adamant that a Russian assassin who had shot another person dead in broad daylight on the streets of the German capital would not be handed back to Moscow.

There were two concrete factors that shaped the outline of the final agreement. The first was the sudden death of the opposition leader Navalny at the age of forty-seven in a Russian jail earlier this year. Although this led to Berlin temporarily freezing negotiations about Krasikov (perhaps because they had sought for Navalny to be freed in an exchange), it also made the humanitarian value of a swap abundantly clear. It was obvious that others could meet the same fate as Navalny. The chance to free political prisoners from Russian jails was a major incentive for Berlin, and one that helped overcome the legal and political hurdles to handing over Krasikov.

The second factor was the uncertainty surrounding the approaching U.S. presidential election, which raised the prospect of all the painstaking work of the last two years being lost. Neither U.S. President Joe Biden nor Putin wished to see that happen.

In all likelihood, the looming elections made both sides a little more flexible: especially Russia, which decided not only to hand the Democrats a foreign policy success before the November vote, but abandoned its usual one-for-one principle for such exchanges. Moscow gave the West sixteen prisoners and received just eight in return (not including two minors).

However, it’s extremely unlikely that Russia will show a similar sort of flexibility when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Expectations that the exchange is the first step toward de-escalation and peace talks are seriously over-inflated.

Even if the exchange can be considered a success, it was a success against all the odds. It was conducted very differently from the 2010 swap in which the United States gave up ten Russian sleeper agents in exchange for four Russians. Back then, the swap was framed as a reset in bilateral relations. This time, it was more like a divorcing couple dividing up their assets.

In the end, Moscow paid a high price for Krasikov, and Putin risks domestic criticism that Russia “overpaid” by releasing high-profile opposition politicians. Russia can also expect some more reputational damage: the exchange was a stark reminder to the world of Russian repression, lawlessness, and its brutal treatment of opposition figures. This is unlikely to make anyone more inclined to come to an accommodation with Moscow.

For the West, the deal had a double significance: first, to free its nationals from incarceration in Russian prisons, and second, to underline that Russia is dangerous and cruel. There will no longer be the same need for the intelligence services of Russia and the United States to maintain such close contact.

Finally, there are far more important factors—which have nothing to do with the exchange—that determine the dynamics of the war in Ukraine. The outcome of the U.S. election, domestic political changes in Ukraine, the situation on the battlefield, and the military resources available to both sides carry far more weight when it comes to possible peace talks. The recent exchange was just the end of a particular phase of confrontation. The contours of the next phase are still being formed. 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.