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All summer, Tajikistan has watched as, one after another, prominent politicians and public figures have been arrested for allegedly conspiring to carry out a coup. The criminal case itself is classified, so the available details are scarce. Indeed, there are many indications that this “uprising” is nothing more than a figment of the regime’s imagination. After three decades at the top, President Emomali Rahmon is preparing to hand over power to his son Rustam Emomali, and it seems likely he is seeking to purge anyone who could feasibly threaten the transition.
One of the oddest parts of the coup allegations is the list of detainees, who range from politicians and activists loyal to the regime to opposition figures, former soldiers, ex-ministers, and those with hardly any public profile. It’s not at all clear what could have united such a disparate bunch and supposedly led them to conspire with the Tajik opposition abroad.
The alleged ringleader was parliamentary deputy Saidjafar Usmonzoda, the former head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, an in-system opposition party that never enjoyed much popular support. According to Tajik prosecutors, Usmonzoda plotted with the National Alliance, a coalition of opposition groups located outside the country. His arrest came as a surprise because he has long been considered loyal to Rahmon. While Usmonzoda sometimes criticized officials, he was extremely circumspect when it came to Rahmon.
Others arrests included Hamrokhon Zarifi, a former foreign minister who was close to Usmonzoda; Ahmadshoh Komilzoda, a well-known journalist and first deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan; Akbarsho Iskandarov, age seventy-three, an acting president from the 1990s no longer involved in politics; and field commanders from the time of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1992–1997 (Yaqub Salimov, Salamsho Muhabbatov, and Nazrullo Naimov). Genuine opposition figures were also detained, including the deputy leader of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Shakirjon Hakimov.
Even the idea of someone trying to topple Rahmon raises questions. Not only do the president and his close relations control almost all aspects of public life in Tajikistan, but the armed forces, security forces, and bureaucracy are also loyal to him. Rahmon’s son Rustam heads the upper house of the Tajik parliament—the second most senior position in Tajik government. He is already assembling a team to take over from his father.
Rahmon’s eldest daughter, Ozoda, is presidential chief of staff, and her husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, is an influential banker. Some of the president’s other daughters are also in top jobs: Rukhshona is a career diplomat, while her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov (who controls transport, trade, media, and finance); Tahmina and her husband, Zarifbek Davlatov, own a firm with a monopoly on airline tickets; and Parvina oversees the pharmaceutical sector.
Of course, not all of Rahmon’s children are thrilled about Rustam being elevated to the top job. In particular, it’s clear that Ozoda and Rukhshona also strive for political power. However, they all understand that if the presidency were to pass to someone outside of the family, they would lose everything. For this reason, the closer the transition comes, the more the family is closing ranks. It would be madness to organize a coup right now.
The allegation that the political opposition—both at home and abroad—was involved in a conspiracy against Rahmon is also difficult to fathom. As president, Rahmon has destroyed or exiled almost all of his opponents. The most recent example was the bloody crackdown in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region in 2022, when many former field commanders from Tajikistan’s civil war were killed or jailed. The opposition in exile is not a serious threat either: not only do they have very limited resources, they have next to no influence inside Tajikistan.
It’s hard to imagine, therefore, that the “coup” has no connection to the regime’s preparations for the transition of power. While Rustam Emomali has been in politics for many years, some fear he is not ready to assume the presidency. He’s regularly accompanied by his father at official events, and when he’s shown on television, his words are often replaced by a voiceover so that his voice is not heard, prompting speculation over his public speaking skills. Emomali Rahmon is accordingly preoccupied with ensuring a smooth handover.
Still, while the arrest of ex-field commanders and the few remaining genuine oppositionists could be explained by the approaching transition, Usmonzoda’s arrest is more perplexing. Despite his evident loyalty, he is accused of masterminding the so-called coup.
It’s possible that Rahmon is using Usmonzoda to sideline other, more dangerous figures inside the regime. Although Usmonzoda has never held a senior post, he is firmly embedded in the hierarchy of regional elites and clans that play an important role in Tajik politics. Usmonzoda is considered to be a member of the influential Farkhor clan, which was key in establishing the Rahmon regime following the end of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1997.
Rahmon himself represents a different clan—the Danghara clan. When he came to power, the Danghara clan was not very well known, while members of the Farkhor clan were already seen as experienced bureaucrats. Initially, the Farkhor clan oversaw government appointments and helped Rahmon reassert order in many areas that had suffered badly during the fighting.
For example, Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloyev, who served as mayor of Dushanbe from 1996 to 2017 and was rumored to have secretly supported the opposition and harbored presidential ambitions, apparently belongs to the Farkhor clan. Although Ubaydulloyev resigned in 2017, he remains an important figure. Another influential member of the Farkhor clan is Saimumin Yatimov, the head of Tajikistan’s powerful State Committee for National Security. His authority is wide-ranging, and he is associated with tightening media censorship, banning political parties, and the kidnapping of opposition leaders abroad.
Both Ubaydulloyev and Yatimov are very familiar with the ugly side of the Rahmon regime, which makes them dangerous. In particular, there is bad blood between Yatimov and Rustam Emomali, who seriously wounded the security chief when he shot him in 2022, apparently for refusing to obey an order. Many believe that, ultimately, Rahmon is likely to remove Yatimov.
Even Rahmon, however, cannot just fire the powerful Yatimov. A more logical approach would be to make Yatimov realize his vulnerabilities—for example, by arresting Usmonzoda, who not only comes from the same clan, but is related by marriage to Yatimov. In this way, Yatimov is given to understand he could also come under suspicion.
Ahead of the power transition, Rahmon is evidently trying to minimize risks. Even so, it’s difficult to imagine everything will go to plan. The experience of neighboring Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan shows that inheriting a whole nation is a process fraught with unexpected complications. Even if Tajikistan’s transition goes smoothly, Rustam Emomali will still need to retain power. The big question is whether he’s up to the task.
