In response to civil unrest in 2022, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched both a violent crackdown and a program of reform. But little has actually changed in Kazakhstan. As Tokayev has succeeded in consolidating his grip on power, he appears unafraid of tightening the screws even further. Society has descended into apathy that has been fostered by fear and disappointment.
Handpicked by his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Tokayev was elected as president in 2019. However, he only became a powerful figure in his own right in 2022. During the unrest in January that year, demonstrators demanded the full removal of Nazarbayev from the political scene—and Tokayev seized the opportunity to emerge from the former president’s shadow.
In the subsequent months, Tokayev rid himself of those considered close to Nazarbayev. Prime Minister Asqar Mamin, parliamentary speaker Nurlan Nigmatulin, and State Secretary Krymbek Kusherbayev resigned. Karim Massimov, the head of the powerful National Security Committee, was arrested along with his two deputies for plotting a coup. Even several members of Nazarbayev’s extended family were arrested as part of criminal investigations. The purges also reached regional elites, security officials, and executives at state-owned companies.
No one now questions Tokayev’s authority. He is firmly in control of Kazakhstan’s “power vertical,” and all top officials are loyal to him personally. However, in order to cement his victory, Tokayev was also obliged to seek a degree of popular support. To this end, he announced a program of reforms in March 2022 to deliver a “New Kazakhstan.” The plans included the liberalization of Kazakhstan’s party system, electoral reform, and limits on the powers enjoyed by the head of state. They were supposed to foster democratization and rid Kazakhstan of Nazarbayev’s toxic legacy.
At the time, Tokayev stressed he was pursuing the path of reform against the advice of officials and experts urging him to preserve the status quo. This sort of rhetoric was very much in sync with widespread demand for change, justice, and accountability.
Tokayev was not only addressing a domestic audience—he was also looking abroad. His promises to build a “new Kazakhstan” helped him craft a reputation as a reformer in the West. Many saw the regime as relatively progressive, particularly amid democratic backsliding in other parts of Central Asia.
It would have been naïve, however, to expect systemic change. Real democratic reforms would have undermined Kazakhstan’s authoritarian system—the main beneficiaries of which are Tokayev and his inner circle.
The essence of Tokayev’s reforms was on show during a June 2022 referendum on constitutional change, and during snap presidential and parliamentary elections (November 2022 and March 2023, respectively). All three of these votes were accompanied by traditional violations: electoral fraud and pressure on independent observers. There was no real political competition, nor any proper representation of the interests of ordinary people.
There has been no significant shake-up of serving officials. Almost all cabinet ministers and heads of local government have been recruited from managers trained during the Nazarbayev era. The current prime minister, Oljas Bektenov, is a veteran official who most recently spent five years as head of the Anti-Corruption Agency. Many of the current heads of security and law enforcement agencies previously served in more junior roles in the same agencies. External appointments (like that of Kanat Sharlapaev to the Industry and Construction Ministry) are exceptions to the rule that do not change the overall picture.
Nor has there been any genuine redistribution of authority within the political system. Despite an announcement that parliament would be given more powers, it’s still the president and his staff who take key decisions. Tokayev has admitted he provisionally approves candidates for prime minister put forward by the ruling party—even though he’s not a member of the party. In other words, he is clearly exceeding his remit.
Indeed, Tokayev has not only assumed all the powers that were wielded by Nazarbayev, he has also taken on Nazarbayev’s symbolic role. Like Nazarbayev, Tokayev often gives policy speeches in which he admonishes “his” people, and telegraphs ideological messages. At a recent meeting of the National Kurultai (a consultative body chaired by the president), for example, Tokayev addressed a whole range of issues from national identity to social development. He opined on how young people should behave, how the spring holiday of Nowruz should be celebrated, and which version of Islam is most appropriate for Kazakhs.
At the start of his presidency, Tokayev appeared pliable and modest. But he has evolved into a typical autocrat-patriarch, and there are signs his regime could become more authoritarian still. In 2023, the opposition activist Marat Zhylanbayev was jailed for seven years for “financing an extremist organization.” The journalist and activist Duman Mukhammedkarim, whose blog became popular after the 2022 unrest, was sent to prison for seven years for the same offense in 2024. And Janbolat Mamai, the leader of the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, was handed a six-year suspended prison sentence for “organizing mass unrest” in 2023, and banned from taking part in any public activities.
It seems that now that Kazakhstan’s new authorities feel more confident, they are more willing than ever to use both rhetoric and repressive tactics that are familiar from the Nazarbayev regime.
Seeking to justify the underwhelming achievements of the reform program, senior officials have been suggesting that the system is impossible to change overnight. Surveys carried out by polling agency Paperlab in April 2024 show that this explanation has been widely accepted. Many Kazakhs blame inept implementation at the local level, and external factors (the war in Ukraine, natural disasters, and others) for the failure of reforms. However, many also understand the fictive nature of the reform program. “Only the leaders have changed; the direction of travel is the same,” said one participant of a focus group.
Other polls paint a contradictory picture. While Tokayev remains relatively popular, 64 percent of respondents in one survey said they had not noticed any significant changes to the political system. This contradiction can be explained by the effectiveness of state propaganda, the lack of a real political alternative, and a persistent belief that the president will deliver what he has promised—he just needs more time.
Over the last two years, Tokayev’s regime has learned how to create the illusion of change while doing little of substance. Big ideas—like that of a “new Kazakhstan”—have turned out to be simply efforts to fill the vacuum left by years of political stagnation. Genuine reform would entail the introduction of meaningful constraints on the power and privilege of Kazakhstan’s rulers. But the regime is obviously not ready for such a step.
