Source: Armend Nimani / AFP via Getty Images

Can Central Asia Secure Growth With Rising Critical Minerals Investments?

As global powers vie for resources, including critical minerals in the region, Central Asia must assert its agency, shaping a development trajectory that turns what could be a resource curse into a lasting blessing.

Published on January 27, 2025

Critical minerals (CRMs) such as copper, lithium, and nickel have become indispensable to global supply chains for their crucial role in technology, aviation, and military sectors, not to mention clean energy technologies. For resource-rich Central Asia, this transformation brings both opportunities and challenges. With China controlling 60 percent of global production and over 85 percent of processing capacity for critical minerals, the United States and other Western actors find themselves dependent on a geopolitical rival. While it is neither feasible nor desirable for Central Asia to position itself as a full-fledged alternative to China for all CRMs, the region offers a valuable opportunity for supply chain diversification.

Recent Chinese restrictions on exports of antimony, a mineral essential for defense and electronics, illustrate the stakes. The United States currently sources 63 percent of its antimony imports from China. Tajikistan has rich antimony reserves, but exports 78 percent of its output to China for processing, constrained by limited infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan, which holds 13 percent of global antimony reserves, presents another promising source.

As demand for CRMs rises, Western actors have taken the lead in involving Central Asian governments in their CRM initiatives. The UK and the EU have signed MoUs on strategic partnership on critical minerals and concluded corresponding road maps with Kazakhstan, while the EU and the United States have reached similar agreements with Uzbekistan. The Danish company FLSmidth has concluded an MoU with Tajikistan’s profile ministry pursuing similar objectives.

Washington has been particularly proactive in advancing CRM cooperation. A 2024 RAND Corporation report advises Western policymakers to aid “the development of mineral resources and production capabilities” in the region comprising the five Central Asian states. Released in September 2024, the study followed the C5+1 Presidential Summit in New York, during which the presidents of the United States and Central Asian countries issued a joint declaration highlighting CRMs as vital to energy security. The declaration also reaffirmed Central Asia’s inclusion in the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue (CMD), which convened in February 2024 to underscore the U.S. commitment to integrating the region into global supply chains. Such efforts are likely to intensify with the new U.S. administration amid cooling relations with Beijing.

Regional leaders recognize the potential of their mineral wealth and are embracing greater investments. Kazakhstan’s president Kassym Jomart Tokayev has referred to rare earth minerals as the “new oil,” while Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev has unveiled plans to develop rare earth metals projects worth $500 million.

The real question is whether CRMs will drive growth or perpetuate dependency, since with substantial critical mineral wealth come development challenges. Experts caution that in emerging economies, the extraction of critical minerals can exacerbate commodity dependence, lead to environmental degradation, and deepen socioeconomic inequalities. Central Asia risks these pitfalls if investments remain focused solely on resource extraction. To realize the region’s development potential, it’s imperative to address structural gaps across the mineral value chain.

Modernizing exploration is a crucial first step. Outdated geological surveys and limited investment have left vast reserves untapped. For instance, most of Kazakhstan’s geological data were gathered during the Soviet era. To put this into perspective, exploration spending in 1990 alone matched the total amount spent between 2003 and 2023. This gap underscores the urgent need for investment in exploration efforts, including from local actors. Foreign technical assistance in adopting advanced technologies, such as using AI for geological mapping and digitizing data, will help improve resource management while building local capacity.

At the extraction phase, persistent issues—including an unfavorable institutional framework, inconsistent tax regimes, and low capacity to mitigate socioenvironmental impacts—complicate the investment climate and hinder development. Progress is evident: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) Forum is a promising step toward improving ESG compliance and addressing governance gaps. However, sustained institutional support, including from the donor community, will be critical to mitigate environmental and social risks while de-risking investments.

Processing remains a key bottleneck. The United Nations highlights that many emerging economies rich in critical minerals lack the processing capacities needed to add value. For Central Asia, expanding processing capacities locally and fostering intra-regional value chains could unlock higher economic returns. For example, the titanium discovered in large quantities at the Kyzyl-Ompol deposit in Kyrgyzstan could be processed in Kazakhstan, which accounts for 11 percent of global production thanks to its Ust-Kamenogorsk titanium and magnesium plant. Building cross-border value chains would enhance development outcomes and bolster regional connectivity.

Addressing structural gaps across the value chain must serve as a blueprint for external engagement with Central Asia. The future of critical minerals in the region will hinge on the ability of governments and international partners to prioritize long-term growth and development over short-term gains. As global powers vie for resources, Central Asia must assert its agency, shaping a development trajectory that turns what could be a resource curse into a lasting blessing.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.