Ever since the unrecognized republic of Transnistria broke away from Moldova in 1990, it has been described as a “Russian outpost” and “the edge of Russian land.” For decades, Moscow propped up the statelet—only to suddenly leave it without crucial gas supplies from the start of this year when the Ukrainian transit of Russian gas was halted. The act of leaving Transnistrians without heating in the middle of winter may help the Kremlin achieve something decades of negotiations with Chișinău could not: to force Moldova to reunite with Transnistria.
Russian flags and signs are ubiquitous in Transnistria, along with the sound of Russian speech, and monuments to Russian czars and military figures. Russian soldiers man peacekeeping posts, and hundreds of thousands of Transnistrians hold Russian passports. In 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Transnistria “was only able to continue to exist … because of Russian military, economic, and political support,” and that “Russia continued to exercise effective control and a decisive influence” on the region’s authorities.
Yet on January 1, 2025, this part of the “Russian world,” loyal to Moscow, was cut off from Russian gas. Ukraine had long warned that it would stop allowing the delivery of Russian gas to Europe through its territory at the beginning of the year. But a few days earlier, on December 28, Russia’s Gazprom said that it would no longer supply gas to Moldova due to an unsettled debt, which the concern estimated at $709 million.
De jure, neither Russia nor Gazprom distinguishes between Moldova and Transnistria, since Russia recognizes the territorial integrity of Moldova. De facto, however, Gazprom has always supplied gas to the left bank of the Dniester River (Transnistria) for free, while charging the right bank (the rest of Moldova) for its own gas supplies.
Transnistria’s debt was recorded, but payment was never discussed. Since 2005, when Transnistria stopped paying for Russian gas, the amount owed has reached $11.1 billion. Right-bank Moldova, meanwhile, owes $709 million according to Gazprom, though Chișinău denies that and only acknowledges debt of $8.6 million. Chișinău stopped buying gas from Gazprom in 2022.
For decades, Moscow used free gas supplies to subsidize Transnistria. Both the general public and industrial enterprises in the unrecognized republic paid the local authorities for gas, albeit at unprecedentedly low rates, which were reflected in the cost of manufactured products and their competitiveness.
In addition, the Moldovan State District Power Plant located in Transnistria used that free Russian gas to generate electricity, both for the needs of Transnistria itself, and for sale to the right bank. This was a win-win situation for both Tiraspol and Chișinău: the former received a steady flow of foreign currency, while the latter bought electricity at a cheaper price compared with the European market.
That convenient arrangement came to an abrupt halt on January 1. Although Moscow insists that Kyiv, which stopped gas transit, and Chișinău, which did not want to repay its debt, are to blame for the crisis that has engulfed Transnistria, those arguments are at odds with reality.
Firstly, Gazprom could have continued to supply gas to Transnistria from Turkey via the Trans-Balkan pipeline. It’s true that a small section of that pipeline also runs through the south of Ukraine’s Odesa region to Moldova, but neither Russian officials nor Gazprom have ever stated that that was an obstacle in supplying gas to Transnistria.
Secondly, the issue of Chișinău’s debt that Gazprom cited when ceasing supplies was hardly a new one. Nor had Transnistria’s debt of $11.1 billion stopped it from receiving gas until January 1, 2025.
The most popular theory surrounding Moscow’s decision to cut off gas to Transnistria in the middle of winter is that it is a ploy to create a crisis in Moldova overall ahead of parliamentary elections in the fall, with the end goal of pushing the current pro-Western team led by President Maia Sandu out of power. The Moldovan government regularly accuses the Kremlin of such attempts, and if that is indeed Moscow’s plan, it already appears to be working.
Having lost access to cheap electricity, Chișinău is now being forced to buy it from Romania at almost twice the price. The energy price hike for both the public and businesses will also cause the cost of other goods to rise, fueling public discontent that may dent the popularity of the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), whose ratings were already falling.
Another major test for the pro-EU authorities in Chișinău would be any attempt to reintegrate Transnistria, quite simply because the country is not ready for reunification. Moscow has always assumed that that process will eventually happen; it was only a matter of making sure it did so on terms that suit the Kremlin.
In 2003, those terms were spelled out in the “Kozak memorandum,” which envisaged a united Moldova in which Transnistria and Gagauzia, an autonomous region in the south of the country, would be federal subjects with the authority to influence Chișinău’s decisions, Moldova would be permanently neutral, and the Russian military presence on its territory would remain.
That plan failed, but Moscow did not abandon the idea. The last attempt to push Moldova towards reintegration—again under Kremlin deputy chief of staff Dmitry Kozak—was made in late 2021, on the eve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when at Kozak’s prompting, Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky approached Sandu with a proposal to urgently begin substantive negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Chișinău left this proposal from Moscow, poorly disguised as an initiative from Tiraspol, unanswered.
Then the war between Russia and Ukraine began, the issue was no longer a priority for Moscow, and Chișinău ceased all interaction with Moscow over the invasion of Ukraine. While the Moldovan government has not changed its position on Russia, the circumstances right now are more conducive for Moscow to once again try to make use of Transnistria and force Chișinău to reintegrate.
Other than Russia, the only party that can step in to resolve the gas crisis is Chișinău. After all, more than 90 percent of Transnistrians hold Moldovan citizenship. Chișinău has already lent Tiraspol 3 million cubic meters of gas to maintain the functioning of the Transnistrian gas transportation system. The EU has also offered Moldova a grant of 30 million euros to procure electricity and buy gas for Transnistria’s needs.
The rapprochement between Chișinău and the breakaway territory is obvious, and there is already a legal basis for unification with Transnistria in place: back in 2005, the Moldovan parliament adopted a law making Transnistria an autonomy with its own constitution, symbols, parliament, and three official languages—Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Russian—just like Gagauzia.
Moscow would benefit from Moldova’s reintegration in more than one way. The return of Transnistria to the jurisdiction of Chișinău, or even just the launch of that process, will at the very least greatly strain the resources and state apparatus of the impoverished republic, if not plunge it into chaos. That will surely give rise to internal conflicts. Proof of that is Gagauzia, which also declared independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union but has long since returned to the Moldovan constitutional field, yet still has fractious relations with Chișinău.
Another important point is that incomes and living conditions on the right bank of the Dniester have long been higher. Many Transnistrians prefer to work in Moldova because they can earn significantly more there. In the event of reunification, tariffs in Transnistria will have to be raised, and then economic problems will likely become political in no time at all. The Moldovan government is already saying that it will not be able to handle reunification without external assistance. In addition, the issue is not a priority for Moldovan society: many people have a negative attitude toward Transnistria.
Then there is the impact Transnistrians will have on Moldovan elections. In the event of reintegration, Moldova will acquire about 300,000 Transnistrian voters, many of whom oppose EU integration and will vote for forces closer to Moscow than to Brussels and Washington. That suits Russia just fine.
Finally, there is the issue of Russian troops in Transnistria and the depots containing tens of thousands of tons of ammunition that they guard. The Moldovan government wants the troops to leave and the arsenals to be liquidated. But the military presence cannot simply evaporate: any parameters must be agreed upon, which means sitting down at the table with Moscow.
While the economic collapse of Transnistria does not bode well for right-bank Moldova, refusing reintegration is hardly an option for Chișinău either. The opposition would certainly accuse the government of taking an anti-state approach and of being unwilling to make use of a rare opportunity to finally unite the divided country—creating just as many problems as reintegration.
