Russia’s fertility rate is one of President Vladimir Putin’s obsessions because he sees boosting the population as a way to help restore Russia’s greatness. Putin regularly talks about the sort of demographic trends he would like to see, and sets targets for officials, who inevitably try to solve the problem with financial incentives and new bans. To gain the president’s favor, officials seeking demographic results are even willing to damage the economy and the social order.
In recent months, Putin has spoken repeatedly about the population issue. In 2023, Russia’s fertility rate was 1.41 (in other words, an average of 141 children were born to every 100 women over the course of their lifetime)—its lowest level for seventeen years. According to Putin, a target for 2030 of 1.6 is insufficiently ambitious, and Russia should be striving to hit 2.3.
At a meeting of the State Council in December 2024, Putin referenced the Russian chemist Dmitry Mendeleev (father of the periodic table), who in 1906 predicted there would be 600 million people in Russia by the end of the twentieth century. While modern demographers believe Mendeleev’s thinking was flawed, Putin has said repeatedly that it was only catastrophes like world wars, a revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union that prevented the 600 million figure from being achieved.
In Putin’s mind, boosting the fertility rate is closely linked with his other obsession of regaining territory once controlled by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Indeed, these two issues are the twin pillars of the whole Putin project, which sees itself as healing Russia’s historical trauma.
The references to Mendeleev are sufficient proof, however, that Putin’s demographic dreams are just that—dreams. Nevertheless, bureaucrats and members of the Russian elite have to be seen to be trying to make his dreams become reality.
There are two main schools of thinking when it comes to Putinist demographic policy: ultraconservative and pragmatist. The former is made up of the Russian Orthodox Church and its head, Patriarch Kirill, as well as businessmen and officials (such as the influential tycoons Konstantin Malofeyev and the Kovalchuk brothers). They promote radical ideas—in particular, a full ban on abortion. In Putin’s eyes, many of their solutions are simple, understandable, and potentially effective.
The ultraconservatives have already been quite successful in advancing their agenda. For example, Russia banned “childfree propaganda” in 2024. However, a full abortion ban is more controversial. Such a step does not have broad support, and would likely therefore dent the popularity of the regime.
For this reason, Kremlin political managers have tried to stifle such discussions. Instead, Russia has opted for regional-level restrictions. For example, some local authorities have banned women from getting abortions in private clinics, and new punishments were introduced for doctors found to have encouraged women to end pregnancies. The governor of the Vologda region has even pledged to ban abortions entirely.
As well as the stick, however, officials are also offering carrots. As many as eleven regions have introduced payments for students who give birth. This is in addition to payments made to mothers under Russia’s Maternity Capital program (which pays out a bigger sum for a second child). It has also been made illegal to fire single parents with children under the age of sixteen.
One of the reasons Russian officials are so keen to try to reverse demographic trends is because the fertility rate is now one of the official KPIs on which their bosses are judging them. And this is an issue where it’s difficult to massage the figures: you can’t just pluck newborns out of thin air.
Of course, there is a simple solution to Russia’s demographic problem. The fertility rate dropped precipitously after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russian men are dying every day on the front lines. In addition, fears about mobilization and general instability have an impact on whether or not people decide to start a family; the prices of essential goods are rising thanks to Western sanctions; and record-high interest rates make it extremely difficult to get a mortgage. But Putin doesn’t see these problems because they give the lie to his optimistic vision of Russia’s imminent return to a “golden age.”
Nor does Putin appear to believe that social and economic issues can hinder population growth. At the December State Council meeting, Putin said that “well-off” countries in Europe and Asia with higher incomes and more support for mothers have even lower per capita birth rates than Russia.
Instead, Putin likes to point out that the two Russian regions with the highest birth rates—Chechnya and Tuva—have incomes far below the national average. The conclusion he draws from this is that the most important factor in demographics is “traditional values.” This obviously plays into the hands of the ultraconservatives, who have tacit approval to lobby for more unpopular measures—like a ban on abortion, or a tax on childlessness.
The president’s demographic plans are a perfect example of the destructive contradictions of late Putinism. While Putin wants to go down in history as a ruler who dealt with the traumatic consequences of the twentieth century, trying to achieve a higher birth rate at the same time as fighting a major war is clearly irrational.
Putin underestimates the importance of economic problems, and attributes too much significance to “traditional values.” And this means he will continue to sympathize with the ultraconservatives. At the same time, attempts by officials to meet unrealistic demographic targets—even at the cost of damaging the economy—will end in failure. Increasingly coercive attempts to push families into having children will only increase anxiety in society. All the while, nobody inside the system will dare to explain to Putin the real reasons why the country’s fertility rate is so low.
