Shortly after “winning” a seventh term in presidential elections in January, contested Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko fired his prime minister and the head of the central bank. Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko, a former security officer appointed in 2020, was replaced by Alexander Turchin, governor of the Minsk region, while Golovchenko was sent to head the Belarusian central bank, replacing technocrat Pavel Kallaur.
The changes capped a year-long reshuffle of the top tier of the Belarusian government. Lukashenko has called this process a “generational shift,” hinting that these are the officials who will be running the country when he finally relinquishes power. However, the new appointees have not yet been trusted with any significant authority. And Belarusian economic policymaking is drifting in the same direction as the regime as a whole—toward increasing consolidation and Soviet-style management practices.
Under Golovchenko’s premiership, the Belarusian regime managed to weather the dual shocks of mass opposition protests in 2020 and major Western sanctions imposed in 2022 as a result of the country’s participation in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Just like in Russia, the recession triggered by the initial wave of sanctions passed quickly, and Belarus successfully adapted. The Belarusian economy grew 3.8 percent in 2023, and 4 percent in 2024.
Of course, there are economic problems—but these are either down to external factors (like Western sanctions, the war, and mass emigration), or decisions taken by Lukashenko (like price controls). It’s hard to imagine how Golovchenko could have done any better with the cards he was dealt.
The fact that Lukashenko appointed Golovchenko to head the central bank, rather than giving him a sinecure, suggests there have been no issues with his work. The only obvious reason for replacing him seems to be Lukashenko’s preference for making regular changes to the upper echelons of Belarusian officialdom. Lukashenko believes such rotation prevents the formation of political clans, and too much power from becoming concentrated in one person’s hands. This Stalinist approach is very different to modern Russia, where President Vladimir Putin’s favorites can remain at their positions for decades.
Golovchenko had been prime minister for almost five years, making him independent Belarus’s second longest-serving premier. In other words, embarking on his seventh presidential term, Lukashenko was faced with a choice: either allow Golovchenko to set a new record for time in office, or go ahead with his regular reshuffles. Old habits die hard.
The appointment of Golovchenko to the central bank is likely a more important shift than his departure from government. For a decade, his predecessor, Kallaur, was the most competent person in this role since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kallaur successfully modernized the Belarusian central bank, introducing inflation targeting, a free-floating currency, and regular contact with independent experts. He was completely different from his predecessors, who were mostly managers who unquestioningly followed Lukashenko’s orders (including printing money in the run-up to elections).
It appears that Lukashenko was satisfied with Kallaur’s monetary policy and had become accustomed to the idea that the central bank should be run by professionals. However, there was some backsliding in the last couple of years, with the reemergence of Soviet-era practices like price controls and allowing local officials to sign off on appointments of those running major private companies.
The removal of Kallaur looks to be part of this trend of re-Sovietization in the Belarusian economy. The new head of the central bank, Golovchenko, is an effective manager, but his background is in the security services and defense industry: he’s never been employed in the financial sector. As prime minister, he echoed Lukashenko’s calls for state companies to get subsidized credit lines to help meet GDP growth targets.
When it came to discussions within the elite, the central bank under Kallaur was able to push back against some demands from the government. Now, however, the central bank will be headed by someone who is entirely loyal to Lukashenko, has no relevant experience, and likely doesn’t understand the macroeconomic risks of his own pliability.
The country’s new prime minister, the forty-nine-year-old Turchin, has risen steadily through the Belarusian bureaucracy from the humble position of tax inspector. In 2018, he was appointed deputy prime minister, and a year later he was made governor of the Minsk region. Just like Kallaur, Turchin was seen as a reformer in the late 2010s. He promoted economic liberalism and greater freedom for business (including massive tax breaks for IT companies).
However, when Belarus’s experiment in authoritarian modernization collapsed in 2020 amid the brutal crackdown on opposition protests, reformers inside the system were faced with a choice: accept that reform was impossible, or resign from the system altogether. Turchin is one of those who accepted the regime’s new political direction without any outward expression of dissent.
Despite Turchin’s more liberal background, it’s difficult to imagine he will run the government any differently than Golovchenko. Power is so centralized in Belarus that there’s little room for officials—even the prime minister—to show much initiative.
The only reason Belarus’s economic approach might change under Turchin would be events abroad—and that may well happen. The main drivers of economic growth in Belarus over the last two years—wage growth fueled by consumer demand and Russian defense spending overheating the industrial sector—are gradually fading. This will exacerbate the problem of Belarus’s negative trade balance and put pressure on the Belarusian ruble. At the same time, experiments with price controls have increased the number of loss-making companies and lowered the profitability of trade.
Lukashenko acknowledges the existence of all these problems, but he still does not want to unfreeze prices because he knows this will cause a spike in inflation. So, Turchin, a believer in markets, will have to find new ways to deliver the very Soviet goal of controlling prices.
It’s difficult to imagine that Lukashenko could have found a better candidate for prime minister than Turchin. In different circumstances, Turchin could have achieved a lot in this post. But the nature of the Belarusian regime means this young technocrat will be forced to spend his time dealing with self-inflicted problems rather than reforming the economy.
