Talks between Moscow and Washington in Saudi Arabia not only did not result in any breakthrough; they appear to have been an overall failure. The concluding statements from the White House and the Kremlin suggest that the parties agreed to a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, but it is unclear how compliance will be monitored. The United States also announced a ceasefire in the Black Sea, but Russia responded by making it clear that the condition for its commencement would be the lifting of certain sanctions: something Washington cannot achieve on its own.
The agreements do not look like a real prologue to peace. The Kremlin is making it clear that it is first and foremost Trump who needs a quick ceasefire, which means that Putin is in a strong position and can dictate terms. If they are fulfilled, great; if not and the ceasefire breaks down, then it’s hardly critical for Russia. In Putin’s logic, Trump has painted himself into a corner: it’s the U.S. president who has a month to either unveil a ceasefire or find a scapegoat for its failure.
Following the latest round of talks in Riyadh, the White House issued two separate communiqués: one on the outcome of talks with Russia, and the second on the outcome of talks with Ukraine. The content of the two texts is the same. Each states that the parties agreed to return to safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and not use commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.
The documents also state that the parties agreed to develop measures to ensure compliance with the moratorium on strikes against energy facilities and, in general, to continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace. Finally, Washington commits to “help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports.”
In the Kremlin statement that followed, Russia said it would agree to a Black Sea ceasefire—but only if a number of conditions were met. First of all, the West must lift sanctions against Rosselkhozbank (the state-owned Russian Agricultural Bank) and reconnect it and other Russian banks involved in the food trade to the SWIFT international payment system.
Moscow is also demanding the lifting of a whole host of other restrictions and sanctions, including on exporters of food (including fish products) and fertilizers, on the handling of such cargo by international insurance companies and ports, and on supplying agricultural machinery and other goods to Russia needed by the agricultural sector and fertilizer producers. The timing and tone of the Kremlin’s press release were clearly an attempt to adjust the message of the earlier U.S. communiqué.
This kaleidoscope of divergent positions was then completed by Kyiv in its own summary of the negotiations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s comments suggested that Ukraine knew nothing about Russia’s condition that sanctions should be lifted. Accordingly, as far as Kyiv is concerned, the ceasefire in the Black Sea is already in effect and applies not only to ships, but also to ports. The moratorium on strikes against energy facilities, according to the Ukrainian side, has been in effect since March 25, while the Russian version dates it back to March 18.
The demands that the Kremlin laid out in such detail in its summary of the negotiations look very much like a slightly edited version of the conditions it put forward before withdrawing from the Black Sea grain deal in 2023. The problem with the demands is that there are no formal sanctions against Russian food producers and exporters. Moscow obtained exemptions from the sanctions regime for food and fertilizers back in 2022 and has successfully used them.
In 2023, Russia exported $15.3 billion worth of fertilizer, making it one of the world’s biggest fertilizer exporters—including to Western countries. The key destinations for those volumes were Brazil ($4 billion), India ($2.6 billion), the European Union ($2.2 billion), the United States ($1.6 billion), and China ($1.3 billion).
Russian grain exports were also record-breaking, amounting to 71 million tons in the 2023/24 season: almost double the 42 million tons exported two years earlier, according to calculations by Andrei Sizov, director of SovEcon, a Black Sea agricultural markets consultancy. In 2024/25 (the agricultural year begins in July), Russian agricultural exports are expected to remain at last year’s levels, despite falling prices. In physical terms, they are even forecast to grow by 10 percent.
What really irritates Moscow is not official sanctions, but the fact that Russian exporters are treated as toxic. Despite the official exemptions from the restrictions, Western companies avoid doing business with Russians because it still increases compliance costs and the risk of sanctions. And for Russians, this attitude has pushed up transaction costs: not all ports want to accept Russian cargo, it is difficult to find cargo ships and insurers, and they have to enlist the services of intermediaries.
In other words, from a practical point of view, it is now far more important for Moscow to get restrictions lifted on access to Western financial infrastructure: insurance, logistics, and payment systems. And the main requirement in this respect is still the lifting of restrictions against Rosselkhozbank.
Ever since even Gazprombank came under sanctions in the fall of 2024, Russia has no longer had any major credit institution unaffected by Western sanctions. Lifting the sanctions against Rosselkhozbank and returning its foreign correspondent accounts to it would therefore significantly simplify Russia’s foreign trade operations, making it a serious concession from the West.
In reality, however, the chances of Rosselkhozbank getting reconnected to SWIFT are low. SWIFT falls under the jurisdiction of Belgium, which means that its reconnection would require the consent of the EU.
Still, Moscow is making these numerous demands to test how far Washington is willing to go for a symbolic return to the Black Sea grain deal, which in its time itself gave rise to hopes that peace was within reach.
Certainly, a return to that deal could be a good opportunity for Trump to announce the first significant success in ending the war in Ukraine. But for that to happen, the new Trump administration would have to put some serious pressure on Europe, without which a complete lifting of sanctions is impossible.
Washington would have to exert even more pressure on Ukraine, since the current version of the agreements—which does not include a moratorium on attacks on Ukrainian ports—does not give Kyiv anything. Moscow, meanwhile, is only required to make symbolic concessions in exchange for what would be—if implemented—a major compromise by Washington on the sanctions issue.
Even if Moscow’s demands are not met, the situation is still in Russia’s favor. By constantly naming new conditions and dragging out the negotiations, the Kremlin is ensuring that it remains in contact with the United States for as long as possible and retains the attention of the fickle Trump. If a ceasefire were to be reached, the U.S. president could be distracted by something else, which would not suit Putin at all. Accordingly, the Kremlin is trying to keep Washington’s focus on it for as long as possible. In an ideal world, Moscow would like to completely separate Russia’s relations with the United States from the issue of Ukraine, diversifying the relationship with joint economic projects, cooperation in the Middle East and space, and negotiations on strategic stability.
Putin, for his part, was prepared to keep waging war against Ukraine regardless of who won the U.S. presidential election. As far as he is concerned, therefore, Trump needs a ceasefire more than he does. Moscow’s attitude is: if the Americans need it more, let them put in all the effort.
