The Ferghana Valley, divided on the political map between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has resembled a battlefield ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of people have been killed in skirmishes and armed clashes in the region over the past three decades. Agricultural conditions rendered any kind of resolution seemingly impossible: resources are limited in this predominantly agrarian, densely populated, arid region. In addition, officials in all three states used the border conflicts for domestic political purposes.
On March 31, however, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan assembled in the Tajik city of Khujand to solemnly declare an end to all of their territorial disputes. Future conflicts cannot be ruled out completely. But for now, Central Asia’s leaders see far greater benefits from cooperation than from aggression. That might be the only guarantor of stability in the Ferghana region.
National borders in Central Asia were only demarcated in the 1950s, and the republics remained dissatisfied with the outcome. Regular conflicts occurred between the Central Asian republics even during the Soviet era, when the borders between them were purely administrative. When the Soviet Union fell, each newly independent state began to interpret discrepancies on old Soviet maps in its own favor, which only exacerbated the problem.
There were plenty of attempts to resolve those contradictions. Immediately following independence, the Central Asian states signed the Almaty Declaration recognizing and respecting each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. That did little to stop conflicts in practice, however: all countries maintained territorial claims against their neighbors.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan agreed on their border relatively quickly. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, behaved as inflexibly as possible for many years. Islam Karimov, its first president, was simply uninterested in compromise. Tashkent unilaterally demarcated its border, installing barbed wire and checkpoints on territory disputed with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It even laid mines along some parts of the border when a terrorist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, broke through to the Ferghana Valley in 1999.
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who succeeded Karimov in 2016, overhauled Uzbekistan’s foreign policy strategy and actively engaged in building relations with its neighbors. As a result, all disputes concerning Uzbek borders were resolved by the early 2020s. The confrontation between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continued, however. Strained relations between the two leaders, Emomali Rahmon and Sadyr Japarov, overshadowed Central Asian summits, and the border conflicts called into question the stability of the entire region.
The situation deteriorated as both sides increasingly used nationalist-populist rhetoric to mobilize the population. Kyrgyz representatives issued ultimatums to their Tajik counterparts and conducted military exercises on the border. Tajikistan’s leadership responded harshly and even belligerently, resulting in major border clashes in 2021 and 2022. This fresh round of fighting marked a dangerous escalation in important ways: armed militants in civilian clothing began to take part in clashes alongside professional soldiers, and each side progressed from small arms to a full spectrum of weaponry, including artillery and drones.
When push came to shove, however, Bishkek and Dushanbe did not want bloodshed. When the conflict flared up in April 2021, representatives of their respective State National Security Committees immediately began de-escalation talks. A return to conflict in September 2022 took both presidents by surprise: they were at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in the Uzbek city of Samarkand when shooting on the border began, and swiftly agreed on a ceasefire.
For political regimes like those in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a state of constant threat is a good pretext for consolidating control over society. However, overuse of bellicose rhetoric had transformed the abstract specter of the enemy into a tangible threat of serious internal destabilization.
The growth of nationalism, as well as increased discrimination against Tajiks in Kyrgyzstan and against Kyrgyz in Tajikistan were signs of imminent danger. Central Asia’s gradual recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic only added to the risks for ruling regimes: public discontent was already simmering because of poor medical care and economic fragility.
Russia has been slow to intervene in disputes between its two Collective Security Treaty Organization allies, and after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it lost interest in the topic altogether. After meeting with Japarov and Rahmon in October 2022, President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted that Moscow “has no intention of playing a mediating role.” Instead, the Russian president promised to pull Soviet maps out of the archives that were supposed to help the sides “find a solution.”
The Kremlin’s withdrawal from mediation has its roots in past disappointments. In 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry tried to offer its services, but received a note of protest from the Tajik diplomatic service. Russia’s failure to resolve the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia must also be taken into consideration. Moscow decided that it did not need another high-profile failure in the post-Soviet space, which the Kremlin still regards as its zone of exclusive influence.
Russia’s helplessness makes Uzbekistan’s role as mediator even more apparent. Tashkent launched the process of regional integration back in 2018, when Mirziyoyev resumed Central Asian summits without the participation of external partners such as Russia or China. By 2025, Uzbekistan’s leadership had succeeded in resuming dialogue between Rahmon and Japarov, who refused even to shake hands until recently. Tashkent’s diplomatic engagement was evident in early 2025, when the prime ministers of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan held a meeting devoted to border issues.
For all the progress that has been made, major obstacles to delimitation remain ahead. For one, it is unclear how smoothly the new agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will be implemented. The clause on unimpeded access to water management facilities and irrigation canals for the local population is particularly critical given the economy of the border areas: 74 percent of the economically active population on the Kyrgyz side and 75 percent on the Tajik side are engaged in agriculture. Disputes over water have previously led to clashes on a regular basis. It also remains to be seen whether border demarcation will proceed smoothly in areas where Kyrgyz and Tajik houses are staggered.
Opposition to the current border resolution scenario certainly exists, but the Kyrgyz regime is working hard to suppress it. Exemplary verdicts in the cases of Kyrgyz activists who opposed the border agreement with Uzbekistan in 2022 have dampened the prospect of protest activity. Rare critics of the treaty with Tajikistan have already felt the consequences too: one parliamentarian, Sultanbai Aizhigitov, was stripped of his mandate.
Further difficulties cannot be ruled out, therefore, but for the first time since the Soviet collapse, none of the five Central Asian governments have any political grievances against each other. Both political and economic factors indicate that this arrangement is sustainable.
In Tajikistan, Rahmon, who has ruled since the early 1990s, is approaching the moment when he must hand over power to the next generation: his son Rustam. The last thing he will need then is simmering tension on the borders. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is trying to replicate the model of its more prosperous neighbors Kazakhstan and, in particular, Uzbekistan.
The economic factor is inextricably intertwined with politics. The peaceful coexistence of Central Asia’s two smallest economies—Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—creates an opportunity for them to join their wealthier neighbors’ economic boom. As Western sanctions against Russia caused trade flows to be diverted, internal trade turnover for the five Central Asian countries exceeded $20 billion in 2023. It was less than $9 billion as recently as 2017. The same applies to trade with countries outside the region.
Russian aggression against Ukraine has prompted many states to take a fresh look at Central Asia, and now they are ready to actively develop relations with it. The most recent proof of that was the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit on April 3–4 in Samarkand. In these circumstances, it would be foolish for the five states to pass up such unique opportunities for the sake of border disputes.
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