On one level, there was nothing unusual in Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), not attending the funeral of Pope Francis. After all, most of the heads of the world’s orthodox churches were absent. However, the relationship between Kirill and Francis was no ordinary one. Their 2016 meeting in Cuba was the first-ever encounter between a pontiff and a head of the ROC. Back then, many expected the meeting to lead to a reset in Russia-Vatican relations, or even Catholic-Orthodox Church relations. But that didn’t happen. Nor does it seem to be in the cards now—whomever is chosen as Francis’ successor.
The fact that there has not been a papal visit to most post-Soviet countries since the death of Pope John Paul II in 2005 is symbolic of the conflict between the ROC and the Catholic Church, which has fluctuated in intensity in recent decades. Despite much effort on the part of the Vatican, the ROC has blocked all attempts to organize such visits—even though there are large Catholic communities in countries like Ukraine and Belarus.
There are several reasons for this tension. Firstly, the ROC has been vexed by the restoration of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine—which was banned by Stalin but became legal again under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989—and criticizes its re-acquisition of church properties controlled by the Moscow Patriarchate as religious persecution. Secondly, the ROC was angered by the creation of four Catholic dioceses in Russia, and what it sees as Catholic missionary activity on its home turf. Finally, there has traditionally been a strong anti-ecumenical wing in the ROC, and the Church leadership remains wary of improving ties with the Vatican.
When Kirill became patriarch in 2009, there were hopes in some quarters of the ROC of a rapprochement between the new patriarch and Pope Benedict XVI, who had been elected four years earlier. The tenures of the two men saw the emergence of a mooted “conservative alliance” based on a common struggle against ideas like secularism, feminism, and gender equality. However, this was brought to an end by the election of Francis, who was not particularly interested in Russia, and who preached inclusivity, peace, and dialogue.
It was Francis’ belief in dialogue that led to the 2016 meeting with Kirill on neutral ground in Cuba. However, the main result of the meeting was simply the fact it took place—and the photos of the pope and patriarch together.
As time went on, the differences in rhetoric between Francis and Kirill only deepened. While Francis allowed gay couples to be blessed, for example, Kirill banned ROC priests from christening children born to surrogate mothers, and said the possibility of gay pride parades in eastern Ukraine was one of the reasons for Russia’s full-scale invasion. During a call with Kirill in May 2022, as battles raged in Ukraine, Francis said he urged his counterpart to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.”
That is not to say that Francis was an unambiguous supporter of Kyiv. As an Argentinian citizen, he came from the Global South, and was sympathetic to anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism. In three years of war, his rhetoric did not align completely with that of either the West or Russia. He tried to chart a different course and to build bridges—but he failed.
In the first year of the war, Francis issued more than a hundred statements decrying the violence and calling for help for the victims. He kissed a Ukrainian flag brought from Bucha, where Russian troops had carried out atrocities, and called Mariupol, which was seized by Russia after months of devastating fighting and thousands of deaths, a “martyred city.” However, he resisted efforts to label one side “good,” and said Ukrainians were the victims of geopolitical interests and the arms industry. This caused anger among some Ukrainians because it seemed to echo Russian propaganda.
Unlike the ROC, the Vatican understood the war in the context of its own, universal identity—which dictated a principle of neutrality. And that was how the Vatican sought to carry out its wartime diplomacy, helping to return prisoners, particularly children, back home. This did not anger Moscow, with Russian officials continuing to meet with representatives of the Vatican. And Kyiv has acknowledged that the Vatican’s mediation saved many Ukrainian children.
All this means that—at least on paper—the formal relationship between Russia and the Vatican, like the relationship between the ROC and the Catholic Church more broadly, has not worsened during the war. Paolo Pezzi, the Metropolitan Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Mother of God at Moscow, for example, is still invited by the Patriarchate to attend all major services in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
Nevertheless, the funeral of Francis was imbued with a great deal of symbolism: in the midst of negotiations about ending the war in Ukraine, world leaders gathered in Rome, listened to the funeral mass, exchanged “kisses of peace,” and took part in spontaneous negotiations. Russia was nowhere to be seen.
When it comes to whether a new pope will be able to improve relations with Moscow, much depends on whether he is from Europe or the Global South. Ideological convictions will also be important. If he is close to the Church’s more traditionalist wing, then the ROC will likely return to its offer of a conservative alliance, which has been gathering dust since the papacy of Benedict XVI. If the new pope is more inclined to support Europe, however, he will have to pause efforts to seek a dialogue with the ROC—and that will require the Vatican to reassess its position on many other issues, including its relationship with other orthodox churches.
It’s possible that the new pope will continue the Vatican’s current efforts to be neutral. This would mean it would focus on humanitarian work in Ukraine, including helping refugees and returning prisoners, while also maintaining ties with the ROC.
Either way, the relationship between the ROC and the Catholic Church will be defined by events in Ukraine. If there is an end to the fighting, the two churches will have to decide how to take part in a process of reconciliation. In any case, it’s very unlikely the ROC will work closely with European churches. Francis’ papacy showed that the differences in language, rhetoric, and approach are far too great.
