Accusations of fudging figures have dogged the Russian government in recent years. It’s true that researchers have ample reason to question statistical authenticity: a growing amount of data is being classified, and many figures are clearly calculated to please the Kremlin. That does not mean, however, that Russian statistics have become as meaningless as their Soviet predecessors. They simply require more careful interpretation.

Much criticism of Russian statistics is quite justified: official figures demonstrably contain various forms of manipulation. Take the series of presidential decrees issued in May 2012, which seriously distorted mortality data in Russia. Eager to show the Kremlin some sort of success, regional authorities played musical chairs with mortality codes. Thus, suicides became “injuries of undetermined intent” in statistical accounting, and circulatory diseases became death “from old age.” According to various estimates, junk mortality codes now apply to about 10 percent of deaths in Russia.

Coronavirus statistics are similarly lopsided due to shortcomings in regional data collection systems. Despite modest official figures, Russia was one of the world leaders in excess mortality. During this period, the authorities also conducted a census so questionable that most experts distrust its results.

Accounting problems are not limited to demographics. There are similar issues in any area of official statistics. Economists argue that Russia’s record low poverty rate has more to do with a new calculation methodology than any real increase in living standards. Sociologists correctly point out that judicial data reflect the priorities of quota-obsessed security services, not actual criminality. Environmentalists say that data on air pollution in Russia cannot be taken seriously because they are based on enterprises’ own reporting.

Moreover, President Vladimir Putin is not shy about his fondness for figures that refute gloomy Western forecasts. Combined with Soviet traditions of fraud, the government’s increasing authoritarianism, and the rapid expansion of the secrecy regime into new domains, this raises legitimate questions about the value of the figures that are still available.

But when researchers presume that Russian statistics are unreliable, they are doing themselves a disservice. The first question to ask is: How do we know about all these distortions? There are few insiders who are willing to share how things really work. Rather, signs of falsification can be found in the data itself.

Pulling figures out of thin air is harder than it looks: all calculations in statistical accounting are interconnected, so sooner or later traces of interference will be detected. Fabrications may be more subtle or more gross, but they are almost always noticeable.

Distortions have many “tells”: sudden changes in the calculation method; inexplicable jumps in dynamics or regional context; the use of a value as a key performance indicator (KPI) or criterion for allocating resources; the presence of conflicting sources; and so on. None of them is a surefire sign that something is wrong with the data, but any of them requires increased vigilance.

Distortions in statistics also come in many forms. Intentional padding differs from collection errors, and from objective limitations in attempts to record reality. If one company mistakenly adds an extra zero to a line in its accounting, that may cause the scale of the entire economy to be incorrectly estimated. However, it may have been done without any malicious intent or the desire to embellish reality.

Then there is the incorrect interpretation of data. Russia’s continued GDP growth may seem paradoxical in the face of numerous, harsh Western sanctions. It is tempting therefore to write off this statistical paradox as simply the result of deliberate falsification by the Russian authorities.

There is no serious evidence that such falsification actually takes place, however. There are indeed indirect signs of statistical anomalies, but these are more likely due to the fact that traditional measurement methods may not work as expected when the economy is undergoing acute structural transformation.

A simpler explanation for this paradox is that both GDP growth and low unemployment do not so much refute the existence of a crisis in the Russian economy as further confirm it. The never-ending production of weapons and acute personnel shortage provide the Russian authorities with fabulous figures, but they also accelerate inflation without contributing to Russians’ long-term prosperity. Anyone who says otherwise is manipulating data—in a completely different way to an official who pleases their superiors by padding the figures.

Any government calculations should be treated with caution—doubly so when they come from a country without separation of powers or institutions that safeguard the independence of statistical accounting. But statistical reliability is not just a Russia problem: China has been accused of manipulating figures for many years, and the United States joined the club quite recently.

Therefore, total distrust of official Russian data is not so much healthy doubt as a form of intellectual laziness. It’s a tempting approach: it offers a simple formula for quick conclusions unburdened by real data. The problem is that it almost certainly will not help to understand the processes under way in Russia.

Official Russian statistics still aren’t going anywhere, despite the rapid development of digital methods and the emergence of alternative data sources. The state alone is privy to many goings-on within the country: a natural monopoly with which every researcher must contend.

The good news is that even bad or distorted data can be useful, provided we understand exactly how they are flawed. Because of this, researchers can still assess the scale of ballot-stuffing in elections or the actual coronavirus death rate.

Painstaking work with all available pieces of information is the only approach that makes it possible to stay in touch with reality and avoid costly mistakes. While it is true that open data in Russia are becoming more scarce, that process is thankfully not too far along.

Although the Russian regime is sliding into brutal dictatorship, it retains many technocratic institutions and practices, balancing an unpredictable foreign policy with a rational, mainstream economic course. As long as this remains the case, Russian statistics will retain at least some value for researchers. If the government ever decides to create a parallel reality, recording one story in reports and telling the public another, it won’t be built in a day. If it does happen, it will quickly become obvious. In the meantime, it’s essential to keep reading between the lines.