Renewed diplomatic contact between Moscow and Washington under U.S. President Donald Trump has quickly become economic as well as political. Statements from both sides about wanting to see deeper economic ties have led to speculation about what exactly that might mean.
One possibility is rare earth metals. After noticing Trump’s interest in the subject, Russian President Vladimir Putin called a government meeting and gave an interview in which he said that Russia had rare earth metals to offer the United States. However, it very quickly became clear that this was a red herring. Such projects would take decades to implement.
Another approach would be to look at projects that have already attracted some interest from U.S. investors. ExxonMobil had a long track record in Russia and participated in the Sakhalin-1 venture in the Far East and several exploration projects in the Arctic with state-owned oil giant Rosneft. However, ExxonMobil took a $4.6 billion write-down when it exited Sakhalin-1 in 2022 following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, meaning it’s hardly likely to be in a rush to go back. And the high costs of Arctic oil mean such projects are only viable if oil prices are high—and right now, they are not.
Another option, and probably the only one with some recent interest from American investors, is U.S. involvement in the relaunch of Nord Stream 2, the natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. U.S. investor Stephen Lynch, an investment banker specializing in distressed assets with plenty of experience of working in Russia, is pursuing this idea. Lynch’s previous deals include the foreign assets of Yukos, the oil company formerly owned by tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky that was broken up by the Kremlin, as well as Sberbank (Switzerland) AG, the Swiss branch of Russian state-owned banking giant Sberbank. When it comes to Nord Stream 2, he’s likely hoping that once the war in Ukraine ends, Germany will again have a need for Russia’s plentiful, cheap gas.
Of course, as Nord Stream 2 is currently under U.S. sanctions, Lynch needs special dispensation from Washington even to begin talks over a possible purchase. He submitted such a request at the start of 2024, but it has apparently not yet been approved. As a longtime donor to the Republican Party, Lynch is likely counting on a more sympathetic reception from Trump than he got from the president’s Democrat predecessor, Joe Biden.
From a technical point of view, a relaunch of Nord Stream 2 makes a lot of sense. But there are plenty of political and economic stumbling blocks. First, will Germany ever want to buy Russian gas again? On the one hand, Berlin has taken a principled stand against Russian energy amid the war in Ukraine, even banning Russian LNG tankers from docking at German ports (something not banned by European sanctions). On the other hand, German industry would benefit significantly from Russian gas, and some in Germany are worried about the country becoming too dependent on American LNG. A resumption of supplies would also mean supply would be diversified and prices would fall.
If a ceasefire in Ukraine is signed that is acceptable to Berlin, then the idea of buying some Russian gas—albeit in smaller volumes than before the war—will inevitably return to the political agenda. While German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is about to leave office, has said he opposes a resumption of Russian gas supplies, the CDU/CSU, which won recent elections, is more sympathetic to such proposals.
Second, what would the U.S. attitude be toward an increase in supplies of Russian gas to Europe? Many believe Washington’s priority is maximizing its LNG exports (investment bank Goldman Sachs expects demand for LNG to outstrip supply until at least 2030). And if Russian gas supplies to Europe were resumed, profits from Nord Stream 2 would not come close to covering the lost revenue from LNG exports.
However, in his request to be allowed to seek a deal on Nord Stream 2, Lynch argued that U.S. control over the pipeline could be geopolitically advantageous for Washington. In other words, if the United States can’t stop Russia from increasing its gas supplies to Europe after the end of the war, it should try to control them.
Third, will Ukraine acquiesce to a project that will see large amounts of gas being shipped from Russia to Europe? Theoretically, Europe’s appetite for Russian gas needs could be met by a fully repaired Nord Stream 2 (a sabotage attack in September 2022 damaged one of its two 27.5-billion-cubic-meter-per-year strands, which Lynch estimates can be repaired for less than $700 million) and TurkStream, which connects Russia and Turkey and then carries 15 billion cubic meters to Hungary via Bulgaria and Serbia: in other words, by pipelines that bypass Ukraine (which traditionally carried large amounts of Russian gas to Europe). That would not only mean Ukraine permanently losing a major source of income (from gas transit fees), but Kyiv would have to face the fact that it had been symbolically excluded from the Europe-Russia relationship.
In his application to be allowed to enter negotiations, Lynch sought to head off some of Ukraine’s objections by proposing that Kyiv be given a minority share in Nord Stream 2. However, that would bestow much less political and economic clout than full control over gas supplies flowing through pipelines on Ukrainian territory.
Fourth and finally, would Moscow agree to pump gas through a pipeline that was controlled and managed by a U.S. investor? On the one hand, state-owned gas giant Gazprom has suffered financially from a drop in shipments to Europe since the start of the war in Ukraine, and is in no position to play hardball (even a resumption of supplies via a U.S.-controlled pipeline on less advantageous terms than 2022 would be better than nothing). On the other hand, the Kremlin has shown time and again that it values status over financial gain.
In the final analysis, Nord Stream 2—the only U.S.-Russian business project that looks like a viable prospect after the fighting in Ukraine ends—raises more questions than answers. Kyiv would undoubtedly lose out. But there are at least as many cons as there are pros for all the possible participants.
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