Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently made a historic trip to Istanbul: the first official visit by an Armenian leader to Türkiye. He was received at Dolmabahçe Palace, once a symbol of Ottoman power and now a hub of regional diplomacy, hosting everything from Ukraine talks to Syria outreach. Armenia’s message was clear: it acknowledges Türkiye’s rising influence.
This shift marks a major turn. Armenia and Türkiye lack formal diplomatic ties and have long distrusted each other. Earlier efforts at rapprochement collapsed amid the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan from the 1990s, in which Armenia opposed any Turkish role. In the 2020 war, Türkiye decisively backed Azerbaijan—both politically and militarily—helping to secure Baku’s victory and deterring Russian involvement.
With no Ankara backchannel, Pashinyan watched Turkish drones fly near the Armenian capital. The decision to sideline Türkiye had backfired, senior Armenian officials acknowledged, pushing Ankara squarely into Baku’s camp.
Post-war, Armenia recalibrated. Normalizing ties with Türkiye became a foreign policy priority. Within a year, special envoys met. When a major earthquake hit Türkiye in 2023, Armenia quickly sent aid. That same year, Pashinyan met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, signaling a thaw. Pashinyan also made symbolic gestures, such as recognizing Palestinian statehood shortly after a call with Erdoğan, aligning with Ankara during its tensions with Israel over Gaza.
Armenia’s outreach has also taken a cultural turn. Pashinyan has urged Armenians to move beyond the notion of a “historical Armenia” that includes lands now within Türkiye, including Mount Ararat, long a national symbol. Instead, he is promoting Mount Aragats, a dormant volcano within Armenia, as a new national symbol, and emphasizing reconciliation over resentment.
Despite these steps, the road to normalization remains rocky. Three years ago, special envoys agreed to open the border and launch direct trade, and ministers discussed cultural cooperation. Yet the border remains closed, and even symbolic steps—such as exchanging ambassadors—have not materialized.
Behind the delay lies a deeper political knot: Türkiye wants Armenia to finalize a peace treaty with Azerbaijan first. Baku and Yerevan have reportedly agreed on a draft. But Azerbaijan is demanding that Armenia amend its constitution to remove references to a 1990 declaration that asserts a claim over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia concedes that the clause is outdated and symbolic, but says that removing it will require a referendum, which would likely take two years. After almost thirty-five years of conflict, Azerbaijan appears willing to wait.
Türkiye, meanwhile, is playing a long game. Officials see open borders and trade as a way to deepen Armenia’s economic dependence and boost Ankara’s regional influence. But loyalties are clear: Azerbaijan comes first. Symbolically, Erdoğan hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev just a day before Pashinyan’s visit. The Turkish and Azeri leaders are close: Aliyev even campaigned for Erdoğan during his difficult 2023 re-election bid. Amid economic headwinds, Baku’s investments in Türkiye have become increasingly vital.
Still, both Ankara and Yerevan seem intent on keeping dialogue alive—if only to prevent the worst. The Armenia-Azerbaijan border remains volatile, with some military positions only meters apart. Azerbaijan holds key high ground and enjoys clear military superiority. Analysts warn that a fresh offensive could split Armenia in two within a couple of days.
To avert disaster, Türkiye has been engaging behind the scenes. When tensions have spiked, Ankara has reportedly dispatched delegations to Baku urging restraint. Some Western diplomats view Ankara’s efforts as part of a broader push to rebrand itself as a stabilizing force in the region.
Paradoxically, Türkiye may now be the only regional actor capable of restraining Azerbaijan. Russia’s influence has waned with its Ukraine war, and Iran is distracted by its crisis with Israel and the United States. For Armenia, Türkiye—once seen purely as a threat—is increasingly viewed as the last line of regional deterrence.
These developments may also yield other tangible benefits. One key issue stemming from a possible peace deal is transportation across the South Caucasus. The so-called Middle Corridor aims to link Asia and Europe, and part of it could theoretically pass through Armenia, connecting Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia.
For Armenia, participation is crucial. Its borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been closed since the 1990s, leaving it excluded from major transit and energy routes. After the 2020 war, Yerevan launched the “Crossroads of Peace'” initiative, seeing reopened borders as a chance to overcome its isolation and revive historical transit links.
Azerbaijan wants to begin by opening a southern route, which it calls the “Zangezur corridor,” through Armenia to its Nakhchivan exclave. While the 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire envisioned some form of Russian oversight, Armenia now insists on full control over any corridor, including customs and security. Baku, however, remains skeptical and refuses to invest in a route it sees as vulnerable, for example, to political changes in Yerevan. It is therefore demanding a third-party guarantor to ensure long-term stability. Türkiye reportedly agrees, though Armenia still hopes Ankara will ultimately accept its sovereignty over the route.
The closest the sides came to compromise was under EU mediation. Brussels proposed a model based on the post-2008 Georgia–Russia precedent, in which an independent foreign operator manages the logistics of routes through the disputed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and shares data with all parties. While the context differs, the mechanism was deemed workable. But the EU-led negotiations stalled amid renewed border clashes and the 2023 crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh that ended its existence as an ethnic Armenian enclave.
Today, the only player capable of reviving talks may be the United States. The Trump administration—eager to showcase its global conflict resolution efforts—has reportedly floated a new plan like the EU model but grounded in American strategic logic: U.S. business participation as a stabilizing force, akin to a recent deal on rare metals in Ukraine.
Washington appears determined to push forward. One option is to pressure Baku to drop its constitutional demands—perhaps by inviting Aliyev to the White House. But more realistically, it may lean on Yerevan to accept the U.S. model, even if doing so delays the final peace and leaves the borders formally closed.
Though still early, one U.S. official has expressed cautious optimism. “Maybe President Donald Trump will even win a Nobel Peace Prize for it,” he said—apparently in earnest.
