Belarus has been subjected to near-total isolation since the violent suppression of mass protests following the 2020 presidential election—an election widely condemned as fraudulent. The forced landing of a Ryanair flight in 2021 to enable the arrest of a Belarusian dissident prompted unprecedented sanctions, including the closure of Belarusian airspace. Although EU citizens are formally exempt from visa requirements, travel to the country has become virtually impossible. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, launched in part from Belarusian territory, further deepened Minsk’s estrangement from the West.[1]
In Brussels, discussing Belarus policy has become fraught. The European Union has locked itself into a normative framework built around its logical partners: the Belarusian opposition, civil society organizations, and independent media in exile. This institutional alignment provides both moral clarity and bureaucratic comfort, enabling EU officials to assert that their policies serve the Belarusian people. Yet many Belarusians—especially those who have very limited opportunity to travel to Europe—would likely see things differently.[2]
State of Play
As the war in Ukraine enters a decisive phase, Belarus—marginalized since the 2020 protests and the 2022 invasion—is returning to the strategic foreground. Domestically, the Lukashenko regime is signaling its desire to put the brutal memory of 2020 protests behind in order to get some space in dialogue with the West – this effort is marked most visibly by the slow release of political prisoners. Internationally, shifting U.S. policy under the Trump administration, including efforts to end the war in Ukraine through a diplomatic thaw with Russia, has introduced new variables.
Belarus’s internal political landscape has largely stabilized. The duality that briefly emerged after the 2020 mass protests has dissolved, with contested president Alexander Lukashenko reasserting control through repressions. The opposition in exile retains significant influence over Western discourse but has little presence or traction within Belarus. This disconnect highlights a persistent flaw in Western policy: the overestimation of the opposition’s domestic leverage.
At the same time, Minsk faces growing dependence on Russia, both economically and militarily. The war in Ukraine has only reinforced this alignment even further. While Belarus remains Moscow’s closest ally, it is acutely aware that a decisive Russian victory could erase what little autonomy Minsk retains. In this context, Belarus has shown signs of seeking limited re-engagement with the West, driven by domestic weariness with the war, growing discontent with Russian dominance, and looming economic challenges.
The proposed constitutional reforms intended to resolve the 2020 crisis have stalled, frozen by the prioritization of security over political reform.[3] Minsk’s unwillingness to re-engage with the diaspora, despite severe labor shortages, reflects a regime still committed to deterrence through fear.[4] Criminal cases linked to the 2020 protests continue to be used to suppress dissent and discourage returnees.
Sovereignty remains both a rhetorical anchor and a real concern. Belarusian officials routinely emphasize their country’s independence, underscoring that no Belarusian troops have entered Ukraine. Despite Kyiv’s increasingly hostile posture, Minsk has preserved humanitarian and security dialogue, including support for prisoner exchanges—a rarely acknowledged channel of facilitation.
Concerned Neighbors
Belarus’s strategic anxieties are heightened by the assertive posture of its Western neighbors. Following the unprecedented Belarusian protests of 2020, Lithuania has provided sanctuary to the opposition,[5] and has adopted a staunchly hawkish approach. Poland, while a major economic partner, presents a problem for Minsk. Its rapid military buildup, driven by fears of Russian aggression and concerns that the Kremlin can use Belarus territory for military purposes as happened in 2022, complicates Minsk’s calculus. Lacking the capacity to match Warsaw militarily, Belarus instead seeks to project strength to reassure Moscow and forestall deeper Russian deployments.[6]
Within the EU, the dominant, morality-based policy framework remains unchanged. Institutional inertia, bureaucratic comfort, and long-standing narratives continue to dominate. Lithuania and Poland provide steadfast support for the Belarusian opposition and oppose any engagement with the ruling regime. While France and Germany have demonstrated greater flexibility, they have effectively ceded the initiative on Belarus policy to Lithuania and Poland. This reflects both the relatively low priority status of Belarus in foreign policy agendas of Paris and Berlin and their overarching commitment to maintaining unity on Ukraine.
Even some exile opposition actors are beginning to shift toward a more pragmatic line, focusing on prisoner releases and the preservation of Belarusian statehood.
U.S. Shift
The recent evolution in U.S. policy reflects a broader strategic reassessment, initially launched under the Biden administration and now advanced under Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The conclusion of that review was sobering: the existing approach, centered on supporting the democratic opposition, had not delivered meaningful change. A recalibrated strategy emerged, driven by the State Department, focusing on stabilization of ties with Minsk instead of democratization of Belarus.
This shift stems from several motivations: the desire to end the war in Ukraine; concern over China’s increasing role in Eurasia, including in Belarus; and Trump’s transactional foreign policy instincts. The aim is not normalization with Minsk, but securing humanitarian outcomes via diplomatic means, curbing Russian leverage, and preserving space for future diplomacy.
Washington’s approach has been more flexible and discreet. It has offered sanctions relief in exchange for prisoner releases, distinguishing between two categories: sanctions under the Belarus Democracy Act, which are negotiable, and those related to Belarus’s support for the war in Ukraine, which are not. Direct engagement with Lukashenko, emphasizing respect and firmness, has yielded limited but tangible results. Next chapter of high-profile engagement with official Minsk may be opened by visit to Belarus of general Keith Kellog, President Trump’s special envoy on Ukraine.
The U.S. is also exploring further incentives, including reopening airspace and supporting potash exports, pending coordination with EU partners. A key objective is limiting Russian military use of Belarusian airspace—a symbolic and strategic move. Minsk has also taken modest steps to curb migration flows via its territory such as limiting visas and no longer facilitating access of migrants from the Middle East to the border with the EU.
The Belarusian Balcony
Sustainable EU policy on Belarus cannot be built without considering its evolving security posture. Belarus is no longer a soft flank. The so-called “balcony” has been militarized: tactical nuclear deployments (still controlled by Moscow), expanded air defenses, and a more capable army now underscore its deterrent posture.
Lukashenko’s overriding aim remains to avoid direct involvement in the war: a goal that a, ligns with the interests of European leaders, as well as Ukraine. Belarus also holds important assets: a critical transit corridor, a conduit for Chinese trade, and, as officials in Minsk claim, a valuable window into Russia’s internal dynamics.
At the same time, Russian influence in Belarus remains deeply entrenched. The upcoming Zapad 2025 joint military exercises between Belarus and Russia, due to be held in September in Belarus, are expected to heighten regional tensions. However, Minsk has already said it will downsize the drills and move them away from its western border, signaling a desire to de-escalate.
Notably, following Lukashenko’s recent visit to Beijing, Belarus indicated it will begin dismantling its unilateral counter-sanctions against the West. The rollback has already begun, starting with certain agricultural products such as potatoes, and is likely to expand to other goods. These measures are not only a gesture toward the West, but also reflect broader geopolitical shifts: in the context of the Israel-Iran war, China has growing interest in securing and expanding the northern transit corridor through Belarus.
For Minsk, Beijing—not Brussels—has increasingly become the main balancing factor against Russian influence. As ties with the West remain frozen, Belarus is increasingly turning to China to diversify its external partnerships and regain a degree of strategic autonomy. This growing reliance on Beijing reflects both pragmatic economic considerations and a recalibrated foreign policy aimed at offsetting Moscow’s dominance without provoking the Kremlin.
Red Lines and Dialogue
Belarusian officials have expressed interest in dialogue with EU, but insist it must be gradual, structured, and aligned with core economic interests. Trade, transit, and transport top the agenda, followed by controlled engagement on political prisoners and civic space. The phased release of detainees, alongside the automatic dropping of prosecutions after five years, signal tentative openings.[7]
Minsk’s goals are clear: it rejects becoming a NATO outpost and doesn’t want to go down the road of turning into a Russian vassal. It seeks strategic autonomy but within the new limits created by Western sanctions and Russia’s war. Relations with Lithuania and Poland remain the most sensitive. Lithuanian policy is viewed in Minsk as rigid and punitive. Poland, despite its security hardening, retains economic relevance and is viewed as as a more pragmatic interlocutor.
Recent signs of potential dialogue offer modest openings, but mutual trust remains low. The continued imprisonment of journalist Andrzej Poczobut, alongside Belarus’s treatment of its Polish minority, continues to strain relations.
Prospects of Engagement
Minsk is signaling a willingness to engage—but on its own terms. Economic strain, political isolation, and rising security threats have created pressure for dialogue, while simultaneously reinforcing the regime’s caution. The slow, calculated release of political prisoners underscores this ambivalence. For Minsk, the unresolved legacy of the 2020 protests remains a source of internal threat; for the EU, Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine remains a political red line.
From Minsk’s perspective, recent choices—including military restraint, quiet diplomatic overtures, and its role in facilitating prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia—represent signs of strategic responsibility. What it seeks is not rupture with Moscow, but recognition of its distinct position within the Russian orbit.
The latest EU sanctions package once again places Belarus in the same basket as Russia, reinforcing Minsk’s perception that differentiation is no longer possible. If this trajectory continues, it risks incentivizing Belarus to drop its careful balancing act, as awkward as it is, and align more openly with Russia’s war effort—an outcome that runs counter to Ukraine’s security interests and undermines the fragile space for diplomatic maneuvering.
Without progress toward ending the war in Ukraine, substantial normalization between Belarus and EU remains out of reach. Full normalization is unlikely to happen on Lukashenko’s watch. Yet limited, sector-specific engagement—on political prisoners, border management, or regional transit—is still possible and increasingly needed. Recalibrating EU policy toward Belarus is not about endorsing the regime. It is about closing a dangerous strategic blind spot. Continuing to treat Belarus as a moral cause rather than a geopolitical challenge risks rendering the EU irrelevant in a region where leverage, not sentiment, will determine outcomes.
Notes
[1] Sanctions targeting its petroleum products and energy-related exports have severely impacted revenues. Prior to 2020, over 60 percent of Belarus’s refined petroleum products were exported to EU countries, bringing in billions of dollars annually.
[2] While most Belarusians maintain positive attitudes toward Russia, they also see themselves as Europeans and place significant personal value on being part of a shared Western commercial and cultural space. The EU’s policy of isolation has not only deepened the regime’s dependence on Moscow; it has also alienated ordinary Belarusians from Europe. Expecting that broad-based Western sanctions will turn the population against the regime is a miscalculation; in practice, they risk entrenching the status quo by reinforcing a sense of abandonment.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-belarus-be-turned
[3] The violent suppression of the 2020 protests also changed patterns of state management: the Interior Ministry has become a more important state agency.
[4] From Minsk’s point of view, the return of a significant number of Belarusians from the West during COVID was a key factor in the unprecedented protest movement in 2020.
[5] Often overlooked in Western policy circles is the fact that key figures in the 2020 Belarusian opposition—such as presidential candidates Viktar Babaryka and Valery Tsepkalo—enjoyed early backing from Russian business networks. Their emergence reflected not only domestic discontent but also intra-elite rivalries within the broader post-Soviet space. This dimension complicates the prevailing Western narrative of a purely democratic movement and underscores the risks of over-moralizing Belarusian politics at the expense of strategic understanding.
[6] Hence the military exercises on the western border serving as both deterrence toward the West and reassurance for Moscow.
[7] This provision will take effect only at the end of 2025, as it applies specifically to cases related to protests under Article 342, which account for a minority of all political prosecutions. Other charges, including those for online comments, media interactions, support for so-called “extremists,” donations, incitement of hatred, calls for sanctions, and defamation of officials, remain unaffected, limiting the overall impact to an estimated 20–40 percent of political detainees.
