Last year, when Georgia’s ruling party Georgian Dream defied large street protests and criticism from the West to pass a controversial “foreign agents” law, it seemed a very risky political move. Given the strong pro-Europe sentiment in the South Caucasus nation, the government could easily have been toppled—as has happened multiple times in the past. However, Georgian Dream not only survived, it went on to win a majority in the October parliamentary elections.
Even though the opposition alleged massive electoral falsification in that vote and refused to take part in subsequent sittings of parliament, the political crisis did not lead to social or economic upheaval. There was no noticeable effect on the value of the Georgian lari, the rate of economic growth, or export volumes.
Nor did public anger toward Georgian Dream lead to a significant reaction from the West: the European Union and the United States limited themselves to some public criticism, and a few sanctions against officials. Brussels and Washington have bigger problems. And the absence of a credible Georgian opposition means there is a risk that Georgian Dream could weather even tough Western sanctions. If that happened, Europeans would be facing an even more hostile government in Tbilisi.
At the peak of anti-government demonstrations in November 2024, Georgian Dream paused the country’s EU accession efforts. At the same time, it refused all EU grants in an apparent attempt to forestall an EU decision to suspend them. However, as the protests in Tbilisi died down, the energy went out of the conflict between the West and Georgia. Georgian officials have generally maintained that they remain advocates of EU integration—just that they should be able to pursue this path on their own terms.
Following the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, Georgian Dream seized the opportunity to play to his agenda. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze penned an open letter to Trump in May in which he touched on topics beloved by U.S. Republicans: he criticized the “deep state” (including for supposedly pushing former Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili into war with Russia in 2008), complained about LGBT “propaganda,” and criticized ex-U.S. president Joe Biden for his “unfair sanctions” and for trying to foment revolution. Opining on the “ideological affinity” of Georgia and the United States, Kobakhidze expressed surprise that Trump had not given much attention to Georgia in the months following his inauguration.
It’s unlikely that Kobakhidze believes Trump is about to strike a major deal with Georgia. More plausibly, he might be hoping that Trump will stop Congress from imposing new restrictions on the Georgian elite via the MEGOBARI Act currently under consideration by U.S. lawmakers, which includes more sanctions and an obligation on the United States to look into the level of Russian and Chinese influence in Georgia.
At least for the moment, relations with Georgia remain a peripheral issue for Washington. On the one hand, Trump congratulated the Georgian authorities on Georgian Independence Day in late May and expressed readiness to build economic ties; on the other, just a few days later, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio сalled the Georgian government “anti-American.” Rubio also said U.S. policy toward Georgia will be shaped by U.S. diplomats in the region: in other words, the relationship will not be managed by a select group of top officials.
However, Georgian Dream’s rhetoric about a reset in relations with the United States is also aimed at a domestic audience. Anti-Russian feeling in Georgia is very much alive and well, and the ruling party would rather be seen as pro-Trump than pro-Moscow. Indeed, it is hard to accuse Georgian Dream of being anti-Western if it is only doing the same things as Trump’s administration in Washington. Both countries are dismantling liberal NGOs, talking about peace with Russia, criticizing Europe for limiting freedom of speech, and praising local right-wingers.
At the same time, calls by Georgian Dream to redefine the country’s cooperation with the United States and EU are not surprising. Georgia has no realistic alternative to being pro-Western: Russia’s economic prospects are unclear, and territorial disputes with Moscow remain unresolved. In this sense, integration with the EU is the only option when it comes to Georgia’s future prosperity and ability to process the Soviet legacy.
The “low-hanging fruit” of closer ties with the EU—like scrapping visa requirements and providing economic aid—have already been granted to Georgia, and there are few in the country who still believe full membership is imminently possible. As a result, the Georgian government can afford to prioritize a bid to strengthen its domestic authority over standards proclaimed from Brussels. This is reflected in greater control over the media, conservative legislation (e.g., anti-LGBT laws), and a pragmatic approach to economic ties with Russia.
For its part, the West is not yet fully willing to dispense with its only reliable ally in the South Caucasus, even if interest has dipped compared with the early 2000s. Neither Washington nor Brussels is in a hurry to do anything dramatic like suspend visa-free travel or impose sectoral sanctions, not least because there are no guarantees such drastic steps would lead to a course correction or change of regime. The Georgian opposition is fragmented, lacks charismatic leaders, and is without a clear strategy.
In some ways, the situation is convenient for the EU. The bloc’s resources are currently focused on supporting Ukraine and on solving domestic problems, which means there is no bandwidth to offer Georgia major economic aid or a direct path to accession. The conservative leanings of Georgian Dream are a convenient excuse for not trying to breathe new life into Georgia’s EU integration prospects. And the death of those aspirations can easily be explained as a result of the country’s authoritarian backsliding.
In any case, a full breakdown in relations between Georgia and the EU does not appear to be in the cards. Such a cooling of ties is typical for the European periphery, where initial optimism about the EU project tends to fade into pragmatism. That is what happened with Türkiye, Serbia, and other Balkan countries.
Another honeymoon period for Georgia and the West is only possible if Georgian Dream begins to look politically vulnerable—or if Georgia’s strategic importance suddenly increases. For the moment, both scenarios seem unlikely.
