The opulent weddings that Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov organizes for his sons are major events in the North Caucasus republic that expose the political rhythms of the regime. The recent wedding of Kadyrov’s third son, seventeen-year-old Adam, was notable because it was even more extravagant than the festivities for Kadyrov’s eldest son Akhmat just two years ago.
In honor of Akhmat’s wedding, Kadyrov reportedly pledged 100,000 rubles ($1,300) to 100 other couples tying the knot on the same day. But his main gift was arranging for the groom—then also aged seventeen—to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin. The wedding of Kadyrov’s second son, Zelimkhan, a year later—and again at the age of seventeen—was less opulent, but also involved a meeting with Putin.
The third son Adam met Putin a few days before his own wedding day at the end of June. The teenager already holds a series of influential posts in Chechnya, including heading up his father’s personal bodyguard (the same position in which Ramzan Kadyrov—whose own father, Akhmad Kadyrov, also led the republic—began his successful political career several decades ago). Adam Kadyrov’s wedding not only set new records for lavishness, it also had an all-Russian flavor to it, with a roll call of influential guests that included federal ministers, as well as foreign well-wishers and ambassadors.
The meetings between Putin and Kadyrov’s teenage sons on the eve of their weddings underline the direct line of communication that has been at the heart of the alliance between Moscow and Grozny since Chechnya’s two separatist wars devastated the region. Akhmad Kadyrov is reported to have told his son Ramzan: “Talk only with Putin!” The Kadyrovs have always found understanding in Putin’s office, and the Kremlin has always been well aware of the risks that instability in Chechnya could entail for Russia more broadly.
Despite the famous guests at Adam Kadyrov’s wedding, however, the event was not a formal coronation of Adam as a successor to Ramzan Kadyrov (up until that point, many had assumed this would be his eldest son Akhmat). Nor did it signal a major change in the Kremlin’s relationship with Kadyrov, which continues to evolve.
In order to end the fighting in Chechnya in the early 2000s, Putin effectively handed Chechnya to the Kadyrov clan to rule as their personal fiefdom, and in return they provided a guarantee that Putin could largely forget about what was happening there: he would simply no longer have to hear about it.
Under this model, Moscow does not exactly justify the terrible human rights abuses regularly carried out by the Chechen security forces, it simply defends its right to ignore them. Is it normal to force the residents of a Chechen town onto the main square to look at the body of a young man who had supposedly attacked a traffic police checkpoint? Perhaps not—but that’s not important. What’s important for the Kremlin is that Kadyrov has the right to rule Chechnya as he sees fit.
For his part, Kadyrov spins Moscow’s silent acquiescence as active support: an important confirmation of his power. And that arrangement means that the more extraordinary his actions (from allowing polygamy in Chechnya to regulating what type of music can be played), the more effective they are at shoring up his authority.
Kadyrov’s deliberately provocative staffing decisions on which family members or allies he raises up and the different favors he bestows on his sons should be viewed in the same vein. Although it’s tempting to see Adam Kadyrov’s important job titles as the first moves in Operation Successor, what we’re more likely witnessing is just another attempt to confirm the exclusive nature of Kadyrov’s relationship with Moscow.
It’s also notable how speculation about Kadyrov’s health often seems to intensify ahead of the wedding of one of his sons. For at least five years, the Chechen leader’s appearance has noticeably changed (he often looks unhealthy), and he has largely been absent from television screens. Nevertheless, this has not had any major political consequences. It’s very hard to keep secrets in Chechnya, and there appears to be a reliable consensus that Kadyrov requires regular kidney dialysis treatment. There have even been reports identifying the Moscow hospital Kadyrov visits. But so far, his health issues appear to be far from fatal.
Of course, the Kremlin has a vested interest in what happens to Chechnya after Kadyrov. But it doesn’t seem to be an urgent issue. For one, Chechnya is still a black box for Moscow, in which Kadyrov makes all the decisions. For another, the Kremlin apparently has no preferences when it comes to a successor to Kadyrov.
At most, there are those it would not like to see heading up the region. They reportedly include Adam Delimkhanov (Kadyrov’s cousin) and Apti Alaudinov (a member of Kadyrov’s inner circle who has forged a successful federal-level career). These sorts of rumors are likely a combination of leaks, self-promotion, and attempts to smear rivals. But they are interesting because they are increasingly peddled by federal actors in Moscow.
Over the two decades that Kadyrov has been in power, the Chechen elite has evolved, and the fact that the weddings of Kadyrov’s sons attract such interest is illustrative. None of the brides have been identified with any certainty, but reports suggest they are from families linked to Kadyrov through contemporary business projects—not old political ties.
All the attention may be focused on the acquisition of political positions by Kadyrov’s children, but the influx into power of their in-laws and other relatives is just as widespread. Together, these people make up an informal network similar to a clan. And Kadyrov clearly trusts them more than he does his old comrades-in-arms from the early days of his rule.
Just as he has always done, Kadyrov guarantees Moscow it need not worry about what is happening in Chechnya. And, if necessary, he is apparently willing to discuss different options for the future of the republic. But the issue of the succession in Chechnya is not as dangerous today as it was when it was decided by battle-hardened, gun-toting fighters. The Chechen elite is increasingly tied by the mix of kin and business relations, which multiplies its connections with all-Russian structures. And that is what the presence of federal officials at the latest wedding symbolized.
