Water shortages have long been a serious problem in Central Asia. They will become even worse when Afghanistan completes a canal diverting significant volumes of water from the Amu Darya River for irrigation purposes. The lack of a water use agreement with the countries of Central Asia—particularly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—could end up increasing regional tensions.
The Taliban government in Afghanistan began work on the Qosh Tepa Canal, one of its most ambitious infrastructure projects, immediately upon regaining power in 2021. Construction has progressed remarkably quickly since then, with almost half the planned 285 kilometers complete. The canal is due to be fully operational by 2028, when it will take as much as 10 cubic kilometers of water every year from the Amu Darya—about a third of its flow.
The Taliban hope the canal will help rejuvenate the country’s drought-stricken agriculture sector, which employs about 90 percent of Afghans. At present, Afghanistan is obliged to import food (including wheat, vegetables, fruits, and legumes) that it could grow itself. Taliban officials are also counting on the canal helping to reduce the economy’s dependence on the illegal drug trade, which in 2021 accounted for about 15 percent of the country’s GDP. One reason that poppy cultivation is so profitable for farmers is that poppies require far less water than other crops. The extent of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has fallen since the Taliban returned to power, but developing the country’s irrigation system should help convince farmers to switch to other crops.
Afghanistan suffers from particularly severe water shortages. In some areas there is not only not enough water for irrigation, but even for drinking. In 2023, an argument over the flow of the southern Helmand River led to an armed confrontation between locals and Iranian border guards. Shortages are even more severe in Afghanistan’s northern provinces—particularly Balkh, Faryab, and Jowzjan—where about a third of the country’s 40 million inhabitants live. People there have to buy water for household needs.
Once it is finished, the Qosh Tepa Canal will immediately disrupt the delicate balance of water use in Central Asia. Previously, the Amu Darya was mainly used by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Now its water will have to be shared with Afghanistan. There are already serious water shortages in Central Asian countries. Previously, they tended only to affect agriculture, but there is increasingly insufficient water for household use, and even drinking.
This summer, people in some parts of Tajikistan (traditionally considered the country in Central Asia with the most abundant water reserves) were forced to buy water that was delivered in jerry cans. There have been similar problems in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In the summer of 2023, the two countries saw “water wars,” with people taking to the streets to demand access to water. And in 2021, water shortages were one of the reasons for armed clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
A major reason for Central Asia’s water shortages is that large tracts of land, particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are given over to the water-intensive cultivation of cotton (one kilogram of purified cotton fiber needs up to 17,000 liters of water). The irrigation of cotton fields was one of the main factors in the drying out of the Aral Sea, once one of the largest lakes on the planet. Despite attempts to diversify agricultural production, cotton remains one of the region’s most important exports. Neither Uzbekistan nor Turkmenistan is prepared to stop growing it.
At the same time, there is a whole host of other factors exacerbating water shortages, such as population growth, urbanization, and industrial development. Water infrastructure in Central Asia (reservoirs, canals, and pipes) is also worn out, and aging infrastructure means a lot of wastage. No one seems in a hurry to make the necessary repairs—instead, countries seek to blame each other.
No one disputes Afghanistan’s right to harness the waters of the Amu Darya. After all, about 30 percent of the river’s flow originates in the Afghan mountains, and decades of war means Afghanistan has hardly tapped this resource. The country uses just 2 cubic kilometers of water a year: eleven times less than Uzbekistan and five times less than Turkmenistan.
Instead, there is more concern about the Taliban’s lack of regional coordination, and their out-of-date construction methods. Without concrete-lined walls and reinforced banks, the Qosh Tepa Canal will inevitably lose large amounts of water to the sandy soil. Shortly after the launch of the first part of the canal in 2023, a section of the canal wall collapsed, sending water flooding into the surrounding land and creating an artificial lake covering more than 30 square kilometers. The Afghan authorities never publicly admitted there had been an accident.
Although the Taliban are not officially recognized as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan by the Central Asian nations, there have been informal efforts to engage them in water usage discussions. But the country’s neighbors have no real leverage over the Taliban. And while the Taliban say publicly that they are open to dialogue, they also stress that the canal is a domestic issue—and that they will decide how to use their own water.
As a result, the Qosh Tepa Canal risks escalating regional tensions. The situation could be alleviated by Afghanistan adopting modern construction methods and water-saving technologies. But the Central Asian states are hardly world leaders in these areas themselves.
The only option for Afghanistan’s neighbors is to try to maintain a working relationship with the Taliban and involve them in the regional agenda. At regional conferences and other similar events, Taliban officials are treated as honored guests in the hope they can be persuaded to engage in joint decisionmaking, including over water use. Central Asian states have also invested in Afghan infrastructure projects: Uzbekistan has put money into the Afghan energy sector and power lines; Turkmenistan has invested in gas pipeline construction; and Tajikistan supplies electricity.
However, none of this has changed Kabul’s position when it comes to the canal. For now, the situation is developing through inertia toward some sort of confrontation. If this year’s drought-ridden summer has shown anything, it is that water shortages have the potential to spark political, social, economic, and ecological upheaval.
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