Moscow’s anti-immigrant campaign at home is proving increasingly costly abroad. For the first time in years, Central Asian countries are not just openly criticizing the Russian government’s actions, they are reassessing their relations with Moscow. Bogged down in its war against Ukraine, Russia is no longer untouchable or irreplaceable—as its neighbors are making increasingly clear.
Mass raids on migrant workers from Central Asia have intensified in Russia since the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in the spring of 2024. Raids are an almost daily occurrence at construction sites, markets, mosques, and workers’ dormitories, often accompanied by violence and humiliation.
The authorities accuse migrants of being responsible for increasing crime rates, disrespecting traditional values, and overburdening the healthcare and education systems. Statistics say otherwise: only 2–4 percent of migrants commit crimes, and systemic shortcomings, not an influx of new immigrants, are behind problems in healthcare and education.
That doesn’t seem to matter to nationalist officials or their allies in the Russian Orthodox Church and the cultural sphere. The past two years have seen the State Duma pass around thirty laws restricting the rights of newcomers. Migrants have been banned from working in taxis, catering, trade, and delivery services in a number of regions.
Upon the migrants’ arrival to Russia, their biometric data are collected and stored in digital profiles used to track their whereabouts. Russian schools no longer accept migrant children who are unable to pass a language exam. Facial recognition systems using ethnic profiling have appeared in major cities, and people can report migrants suspected of breaking the law using specially designed bots in messaging apps.
Migrants can’t even count on Russian citizenship to be their saving grace. Some of those who have managed to obtain it are now being forced to fight in the war against Ukraine. According to the Investigative Committee, around 10,000 new citizens have already been sent to the front.
Such a massive xenophobic campaign against migrants defies logic, especially given Russia’s demographic problems and acute labor shortage. According to various estimates, the country currently needs between 2 and 5 million workers. However, it seems that the Russian government would rather scapegoat migrants to distract the population from other problems.
Paradoxically, the Kremlin’s intensified pressure on Central Asian migrants coincides with a push to strengthen cooperation with their home countries. The Kremlin wants to demonstrate that Russia still has external partners, despite waves of sanctions by the West over its invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin routinely emphasizes his warm relations with Central Asian leaders at regional summits.
Central Asian leaders played along for a while, motivated by pragmatism. They continued to accommodate Moscow on symbolic issues, such as attending its May 9 Victory Day parade, and generally maintained the image of good relations. After severing ties with the West, Russia began to receive a significant portion of its imports through Central Asia. Regional leaders could turn a blind eye to the abuse of their nationals in Russia and quietly profit from Russia’s economic realignment.
Furthermore, the region remains highly dependent on remittances from migrant workers in Russia. Of the $15 billion transferred to Uzbekistan from abroad in 2024—about 14 percent of the country’s GDP—$11.5 billion came from Russia. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, remittances account for up to 40 percent of GDP.
Then there is the threat of further repression. The Kremlin has demonstrated a willingness to intensify its crackdowns on migrants in response to criticism. This is what happened to Tajik migrants in 2011 when Moscow and Dushanbe argued over the terms for prolonging the operation of a Russian military base in Tajikistan.
Lastly, Central Asian countries remain heavily dependent on Russia in other areas. Moscow is still a key investor, energy supplier, and security guarantor. Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to play a stabilizing role, and the Kremlin is perceived as a guarantor of local regimes’ stability. Left to choose between safeguarding their citizens and their own power, Central Asian leaders prefer the latter.
However, this long-standing status quo is beginning to change. The catalyst was the deterioration of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia—first due to Russia’s accidental downing of an airliner with Azerbaijani citizens on board, then the killing of two ethnic Azerbaijanis by Russian security forces. Discontent had long been smoldering in Central Asian societies over the authorities’ perceived indifference to Russia’s anti-migrant campaign, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s sharp public criticism of Moscow showed Central Asian leaders that such sentiments could be exploited rather than ignored.
For the first time in years, Central Asian governments have shifted from issuing diplomatic notes and summoning ambassadors to more decisive measures in their relations with Russia. After Russian security forces beat up Kyrgyz nationals at a Moscow bathhouse in April 2025, Bishkek demonstratively detained four people, including an employee of Russia’s foreign aid and cultural exchange agency Rossotrudnichestvo, accusing them of recruiting Kyrgyz nationals to fight in Ukraine. The Kyrgyz authorities also criticized Russia for failing to comply with the Eurasian Economic Union’s principles, according to which their citizens are entitled to simplified legalization and freedom of movement in Russia.
Following an August incident in Khimki, near Moscow, in which a Russian man was filmed screaming at an Uzbek taxi driver and calling him a “slave to Russians,” Uzbekistan demanded that Moscow find and punish the offender. A hotline was opened for Uzbek nationals to report violations of their rights in Russia. Members of the Uzbek parliament began to publicly criticize the Russian government for abusing migrants. They also proposed tightening the rules for Russians residing in Uzbekistan and declaring Russian officials who make xenophobic statements personae non gratae.
Tajikistan is urging its nationals to refrain from traveling to Russia and has reminded the Kremlin that there is a difference between fighting terrorism and plain xenophobia. At an intergovernmental commission meeting with his Russian counterpart, Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda listed violations of the rights of Tajik nationals and called on Russia not to justify xenophobia “in the name of security.”
All of these are undoubtedly far more cautious steps than those taken by Baku. Even so, they would have been difficult to imagine just a few years ago.
The changes go beyond rhetoric. As Russia tightens its migration policy, Central Asian states are helping their nationals to find work elsewhere. Workers from the region draw interest from Europe, the Middle East, and numerous Asian countries, including even China, where declining demographics are increasing demand for migrants.
Almost every meeting between Central Asian presidents and foreign leaders these days is accompanied by the signing of agreements on labor migration. Uzbekistan, the most populous country in the region, is particularly active in this area. Over the past two years, Tashkent has concluded agreements with Poland, Slovenia, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia, and Bulgaria. The flow of migrants to these countries is still small—from 2,000 to 5,000 people per country—but it is growing steadily.
Demand for labor also rose in the UK following Brexit. The country currently allocates annual quotas for migrants from Central Asia: in 2024, they were 10,000 for Uzbek workers, 8,000 for Kyrgyz workers, and up to 1,000 for Tajik workers.
Other popular destinations include South Korea, which increased its quota for Uzbek workers to 100,000 in 2024; the UAE, which raised its limit from 15,000 to 1 million; and Saudi Arabia, which opened 100,000 jobs for residents of the region. Turkey remains an important alternative to the Russian labor market, with around 220,000 Central Asian nationals currently working there.
Intraregional cooperation is also on the rise. Kazakhstan is becoming an important labor market for migrants from other Central Asian countries—in 2025, about 330,000 people went there to work. (Before Russia’s immigration crackdown, that number was less than 200,000 annually.) Between 10,000 and 15,000 citizens of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan travel to Uzbekistan each year to work. Relations with Azerbaijan are also developing rapidly: Baku regularly participates in regional meetings and is increasingly involved in joint projects, including on migration.
Neither European nor Asian labor markets can replace the Russian market yet, which in 2024 alone saw the arrival of around 2 million workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. However, this geographical expansion is a sure sign that Moscow’s monopoly is weakening.
By stoking anti-migrant sentiment to distract Russian society from the war in Ukraine, Moscow is alienating its allies in Central Asia. Gone are the days of turning a blind eye to Russian xenophobia: Central Asian countries are ready to confront it and work purposely to reduce their dependence on Russia. It is a bridge that Russia will find hard to rebuild once burned.
