Russia’s pro-war bloggers are increasingly falling under the state steamroller of repression, finding themselves labeled “foreign agents” or charged under extremism laws. It seems that support for the war and public loyalty to the country’s leadership are no longer a reliable defense against persecution.
It might appear that the Kremlin has come to see the “ultra-patriots” as a serious and overly autonomous force and is trying to curtail their influence so that they don’t hinder negotiations to end the war. But a closer examination of each case of repression against the war bloggers reveals that the root is not Kremlin fears, but individual conflicts over the allocation of dwindling volunteer resources. Meanwhile, it is to the Kremlin’s advantage to create the impression of a fight against pro-war radicals, thereby reassuring the war-weary public.
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new type of social media personality has emerged in Russia: that of the pro-war blogger. Though often dubbed “war correspondents” in Russian, they are not employed by media organizations and far from all of them are based on the front lines: some either visit the troops occasionally, or simply analyze the latest developments from afar. They act as volunteer propagandists, criticizing Ukraine and its allies, and also help collect money, equipment, ammunition, and food for the front.
Now, however, a series of events in the last few months has given rise to speculation that a wave of repression has begun against the pro-war blogging community. In early September, the Justice Ministry designated the blogger Roman Alyokhin—an ardent supporter of the war who has frequently visited the frontlines and raised funds for soldiers—a “foreign agent.” Then, in late October, the blogger Tatyana Montyan, who has also raised funds for the Russian military, was added to the register of extremists. In November, Oksana Kobeleva, who authors a popular pro-war Telegram channel, was fined for “discrediting the army” after criticizing the head of the Akhmat volunteer battalion, the Chechen general lieutenant Apti Alaudinov.
Coming as they have at a time of rumored possible progress in negotiations with the United States over Ukraine, these developments might appear to indicate that the Kremlin has decided that, given its improved relations with U.S. President Donald Trump, the efforts of the “ultra-patriots” are now counterproductive.
The content on these channels can be very critical of individual Defense Ministry employees or specific commanders for taking insufficient care of their troops or making mistakes on the battlefield. The actions of government officials—such as blocking the use of messaging apps or increasing taxes—are sometimes questioned too. But whatever else, the war bloggers always make a show of supporting President Vladimir Putin.
Typically, the war bloggers only call for tactical changes: for allocating more resources to supply the front, helping volunteers, strengthening censorship, and so on. But some occasionally stray into the realm of strategy, demanding a general mobilization and a complete transition of the economy to a war footing.
For the Kremlin, the radical pro-war bloggers serve a similar purpose to that of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in the pre-war years, whose extremism made them a convenient scare tactic for ordinary Russians and the opposition alike. All the opinion polls indicate that Russians are tired of war and would like peace: they are opposed to mobilization and are unlikely to welcome the onset of a fully militarized economy. Compared to the extremely militant bloggers, therefore, Putin’s policies appear quite balanced—just as they did when compared to the demands of the NLM. Meanwhile, denunciations of “insufficiently patriotic” cultural figures and opposition activists are also useful to the authorities.
So far, there’s nothing to suggest that the Kremlin sees any threat from the “angry patriots”—even if a peace agreement is signed. Some of the most popular pro-war blogs have over a million subscribers, but the audiences of the largest channels overlap, and not all subscribers support the war. True supporters of the pro-war bloggers only make up a small part of Russian society, and even that segment is largely passive, as the war bloggers themselves are the first to admit when complaining about a lack of donations, for example.
Accordingly, it’s hard to imagine the pro-war bloggers inciting mass protests. Russian ultra-patriots are more paternalists than rebels: they may grumble about the state, but they submit to its will and will continue to support Putin no matter what.
A closer look at the series of attacks on pro-war bloggers this fall reveals not some coordinated Kremlin campaign to neutralize the potential threat they pose, but that each case of persecution was preceded by its own unique circumstances.
Tatyana Montyan was very vocal in her criticism of the prominent TV anchor Vladimir Solovyov—often dubbed “Russia’s chief propagandist.” The extremism case against Montyan was opened after she used language that a court deemed hateful to attack a fellow pro-war blogger, Oksana Kobeleva, whose Telegram channel is part of Solovyov’s media network. Kobeleva, in turn, was fined for “discrediting the army” after criticizing Alaudinov, who had threatened criminal charges against those who “destabilize the country” from within, write about the failures of the Russian army, and criticize his battalion Akhmat—and that is a significant proportion of Russia’s war bloggers.
The root causes of these conflicts are purely economic. The pro-war bloggers and Solovyov all vehemently support the war, but they are fighting over resources: in this case, dwindling donations for the front.
Roman Alyokhin has also been involved in fundraising for the front and clashed with Solovyov. Alyokhin, who lives in the Kursk region bordering Ukraine, also has ties to the region’s former governor Roman Starovoit, and in particular to his successor, Alexei Smirnov (Alyokhin served as Smirnov’s official advisor).
After Smirnov’s resignation, Alyokhin continued to speak very highly of him (to the detriment of the new regional governor, Alexander Khinshtein). After Starovoit’s untimely death earlier this year, the blogger also spoke fondly of him, and publicly disagreed with the official narrative that the incursion by Ukrainian troops into the Kursk region in August 2024 was made possible by the poor quality of the fortifications erected under Starovoit and Smirnov. The issues Alyokhin raised were inconvenient for the authorities, and now he has been assigned the stigmatizing status of a “foreign agent.”
In other words, these are individual, isolated cases, made possible because one side in an internal conflict has patrons or partners in Russia’s security forces and can therefore call in a favor against their opponents.
By highlighting the problems of individual “repressed” bloggers in the media, the Kremlin is urging their colleagues to consider their own fates and refrain from criticizing the government. It’s also a clear signal to the general public that the country’s leadership is prepared to clamp down on the “ultra-patriots” at any moment.
The Kremlin’s supposed fight against corruption is structured in much the same way: there’s no prospect of graft truly being eradicated any time soon, but state-run and pro-government media regularly report on the arrests of officials. As a rule, these bureaucrats have simply fallen victim to internal squabbles and similarly targeted repression. But the state finds it more advantageous to pretend that these are not isolated incidents, but a full-scale, planned campaign.
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