After four full years of war in Ukraine, peace talks are beginning to seem as endless as the war itself. The negotiations have been divided into several tracks: military, political, economic, territorial, and security guarantees, but these various threads remain disparate, while the success of any track depends on that of the others.

Details are scarce, but everyone agrees that so far, the military track appears to be making the most progress, with negotiators discussing how a ceasefire would be implemented in practical terms: what positions troops and equipment would be withdrawn to, who would observe the ceasefire and how, and what would constitute a violation. However, the success of the military track only has any meaning if agreements can be reached on the other tracks.

Territory and Security Guarantees

The territorial negotiations, meanwhile, are described by representatives of both sides as difficult and tense, and they caution against expecting any breakthrough. Russia refuses to agree to a cessation of hostilities without Ukraine surrendering the remnants of the Donetsk region, while Ukraine refuses to agree to one without clearly defined security guarantees.

Moscow’s position is that it will in any case take this territory: if not through negotiations, then by force, in which case, its territorial demands may increase. But Russia’s position on the battlefield is not convincing enough for the Ukrainian armed forces to agree to simply retreat.

Therefore, Russia is trying to win the war by regularly leaving the civilian population of large Ukrainian cities without heat, electricity, and water during this freezing winter. Public patience is wearing thin, and there are occasional protests, but they are not translating into demand to capitulate to Russia.

Kyiv has long been prepared to cede territory along the de facto line of contact without formally recognizing it as Russian. In the current round of negotiations, it seems the Ukrainians are seriously considering withdrawing from the parts of Donbas under their control for the first time.

Behind closed doors, it is being reported that the Ukrainian side is divided on this issue. Some, associated with the new head of the presidential administration, Kyrylo Budanov, believe that Ukrainians’ patience may be running out, and that failure to concede now could result in greater losses later. Others insist that the voluntary surrender of territory to the enemy will demoralize the army and society, and so also ultimately lead to bigger losses.

Kyiv is considering a compromise that would involve withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the remaining parts of Donbas without giving Russia full control. А special economic (and political) zone has been proposed as a neutral strip under Western control. But Moscow insists on having its own sovereignty recognized there—with no international peacekeepers.

After all, part of Russia’s justification for the invasion was that if it didn’t act now, Western troops would be in Ukraine tomorrow. Accordingly, it’s hard to imagine Russian President Vladimir Putin signing a peace agreement that would lead to Western troops being stationed in Ukraine. Selling Russia a “Trump zone” in the Donbas is only realistic as part of a larger economic and political deal that goes beyond the territorial issue.

Economics

On the Russian side, the economic track has been assigned to Kirill Dmitriev, the president’s special representative. His task is effectively to persuade U.S. President Donald Trump of the material benefits of siding with Russia during the negotiations, and to distract him from continuing hostilities in the meantime.

Russian negotiators went from offering to provide the United States with rare earth metals last spring to proposing to buy hundreds of Boeings last fall. Now they have put forward a $14 trillion deal that would encompass the return of U.S. companies’ Russian assets, joint hydrocarbon production and transportation, the rebuilding of Ukraine, aviation, and an intercontinental bridge across the Bering Strait.

Yet the $14 trillion figure sounds like pure fantasy. That’s more than six times Russia’s GDP, almost forty times the Russian annual budget, and hundreds of times more than the combined profits of all Western companies operating on the Russian market in the year before the war (estimated at $30–$50 billion by The Economist).

Negotiations on the economic track are taking place between Moscow and Washington, with neither Ukraine nor Europe involved. Therefore, the same problem arises as with the territorial and military tracks: how to convert a potential economic mega-deal into an end to the war if Russia and Ukraine take different views of the economic aspect of the negotiations.

Politics

Political negotiations on a broad range of issues were intended to provide a common framework for reconciling all differences and tying together all negotiating threads: a sort of political grand bargain. Shortly before the full-scale invasion, Russia laid out demands far beyond its dispute with Ukraine, and it hasn’t dropped those demands. Even then, Ukraine was both an end and a means to something bigger.

After four years and countless casualties of war, an outcome of several thousand square kilometers of scorched, uninhabited land—even accompanied by a formal commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO—will look somewhat pathetic. The only thing that can save Putin in this situation, given the impossibility of seizing all of Ukraine by force right now, is a kind of political takeover. That would be complemented by expanding the scope of the peace agreement far beyond Ukraine.

The ultimate goal of the political part of the negotiations for Russia is regime change in Ukraine and the neutralization of Ukrainian statehood in its current form. After four years of equating Ukraine with Nazi Germany, ending the war—even with territorial gains—will be difficult if the current demonized government in Kyiv remains in power.

The real task for the political bloc in the negotiations is to make Russia a participant in processes within Ukraine and, more broadly, Europe—hence Moscow’s recurring demand to be included among the guarantors of post-war Ukrainian security. Moscow’s vision is that as a guarantor, it would have the right to armed intervention and further annexations if Kyiv failed to obey its domestic political demands regarding the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, media, interpretations of history, and the holding of elections. It would like to begin this new state of affairs right away with elections—which should be held before, not after, the end of the war. Based on their results, Russia will decide whether to cease hostilities.

Peace or Escalation

Right now, the war is harder than ever for both sides, and both countries are experiencing difficulties in recruiting military personnel. On the Russian side, there are signs of exhaustion in the form of budget deficits, new taxes, rising prices, and new repressive measures—even for loyalists. In Ukraine, there are more serious discussions about territorial concessions and holding elections before a peace agreement is signed—along with a referendum on making concessions to Russia.

Russian negotiators, however, see Ukraine’s flexibility as a sign that Trump has finally succeeded in pressuring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and that he needs to keep on doing so, giving rise to a vicious circle in which as soon as Ukraine’s position weakens under pressure, Russia increases its demands.

Many in Ukraine fear that the war will be forgotten as soon as it ends. For this reason, Kyiv is bargaining hard to secure the best possible terms, including maximum aid for reconstruction, binding guarantees, and EU accession.

Similarly, Moscow suspects—and not without reason—that over the past four years, the war has become its most important asset. The fear of this primary currency devaluing after the fighting ends is pushing Russia to maximize its demands, from new territories and changes to Ukrainian laws to NATO’s retreat to the borders of the 1990s and the lifting of all sanctions.

Moscow still can’t decide whether it even needs a deal at all. If, as Putin believes, Ukraine will collapse any day now, the last thing he wants to do is sign the deal and legitimize the enemy’s existence forever, all because he couldn’t just wait a little longer.

Meanwhile, Russia wants to extract concessions—not in exchange for Ukraine, but in addition to it. Putin is stalling, waiting for a breakthrough on the front lines or a grand bargain in which Trump will give him something more than Ukraine in exchange for concessions on Ukraine.

And if he doesn’t, the conflict could expand beyond Ukraine. Having failed to get what he wanted even after a long, bloody war, Putin may deem it simpler to hide his failure by escalating the conflict. That risk is compounded by the fact that Trump, having failed to make good on his own lofty boasts, could follow suit.