International Perspectives on Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

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    "George Perkovich"
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    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
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Testimony

International Perspectives on Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

The international community must adopt and enforce three new, stronger nonproliferation rules: 1) Limit the spread of fissile material production capabilities; 2) States not in compliance with NPT obligations may not withdraw from the NPT without penalty; and 3) Agreement that states will provide nuclear cooperation to others only if the recipient is implementing the IAEA additional protocol.

By George Perkovich

Published on Jun 27, 2007

Source: Testimony by George Perkovich before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affars

In testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Carnegie's George Perkovich says that the international community must adopt and enforce three new, stronger rules: 1) Limits on the spread of fissile material production capabilities to states that do not now possess them; 2) Clearer delineation of states not in compliance with their safeguards and/or NPT obligations may not withdraw from the NPT without penalty; and 3) Agreement that states will provide nuclear cooperation to others only if the recipient is implementing the IAEA additional protocol.

Nuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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