Ongoing uncertainty in the Middle East allows Moscow to both increase its influence in Tehran and continue to enjoy the financial windfall of higher oil prices.
Nikita Smagin
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}REQUIRED IMAGE
Top 3 Upcoming Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime
Top 3 Best New Policy Proposals
Top 4 High Impact Ideas to Implement by 2010
Source: Conference Results
Participants at the June 2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference were asked to identify top solutions to current and future nonproliferation challenges. Based on their responses and our review of the conference proceedings, we describe:
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Ongoing uncertainty in the Middle East allows Moscow to both increase its influence in Tehran and continue to enjoy the financial windfall of higher oil prices.
Nikita Smagin
Governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want to ensure that a U.S. military withdrawal would not leave them dangerously exposed to a Russian attack.
Sergejs Potapkins
Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.
James D.J. Brown
The Russian leadership wants to avoid a dangerous precedent in which it is squeezed out of Iran by the United States and Israel—and left powerless to respond in any meaningful way.
Nikita Smagin
Lukashenko is willing to make big sacrifices for an invitation to Mar-a-Lago or the White House. He also knows that the clock is ticking: he must squeeze as much out of the Trump administration as he can before congressional elections in November leave Trump hamstrung or distracted.
Artyom Shraibman