Disillusioned with the West over Gaza, Arab countries are not only trading more with Russia; they are also more willing to criticize Kyiv.
Ruslan Suleymanov
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}REQUIRED IMAGE
Negotiations over a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have reached a dead end. International efforts should focus on a short-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that can pave the way for a sustainable armistice.
WASHINGTON, Feb 26—Negotiations over a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have reached a dead end. International efforts should focus on a short-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that can pave the way for a sustainable armistice, concludes a new policy brief by Nathan J. Brown.
The bitter realities on the ground make an immediate and comprehensive solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict unattainable for now. A new diplomatic approach should be based on three steps: first, a properly negotiated cease-fire; second, a medium-term armistice; and finally, addressing the underlying causes of the conflict during the respite.
Key Conclusions:
Brown concludes:
“Acknowledging and working with existing realities must not, however, mean accepting them as permanent. The existing situation is not only short on security and justice; it is also unstable. Things can—and might well—get worse unless the United States and other outside actors couple a realistic view of the present with a serious effort to push for a more promising future. But for the present, they should stop banging their heads against the obstacles to an immediate and comprehensive solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Instead, it is time for Plan B.”
###
NOTES
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Disillusioned with the West over Gaza, Arab countries are not only trading more with Russia; they are also more willing to criticize Kyiv.
Ruslan Suleymanov
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