Governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want to ensure that a U.S. military withdrawal would not leave them dangerously exposed to a Russian attack.
Sergejs Potapkins
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The IAEA must reassert its full authority, particularly its right to conduct special inspections at undeclared facilities, to strengthen the dangerously weakened nonproliferation regime.
WASHINGTON, Apr 7—Repeated violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have been met with ambiguous and inconsistent responses from the international community, creating the impression that states can pursue nuclear weapons programs without meaningful consequences. The IAEA must reassert its full authority, particularly its right to conduct special inspections at undeclared facilities, to strengthen the dangerously weakened nonproliferation regime, concludes a new paper by Pierre Goldschmidt, former deputy director general and head of the department of safeguards at the IAEA.
Goldschmidt explains that the deterrence effect of early detection and swift response to noncompliance, essential to preventing proliferation, is no longer sufficiently credible. He recommends concrete steps for the IAEA to reassert its verification authority and for the UN Security Council to improve enforcement mechanisms that would help prevent future proliferation crises.
Key steps for the IAEA:
Key steps for the UN Security Council:
Goldschmidt concludes:
“The international community must reject the recent tendency to accept the idea that, sooner or later, more countries will possess nuclear weapons, and that we can do nothing to stop it. Those who think the nonproliferation regime is failing and those who think it is too valuable to let fail generally agree that there are practical steps that can be taken to dissuade and deter non-nuclear-weapon states from seeking nuclear weapons, if the international community—particularly the nuclear-weapon states—make this a higher priority, and not just in words.”
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NOTES
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want to ensure that a U.S. military withdrawal would not leave them dangerously exposed to a Russian attack.
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