Commentary
Alexey Malashenko
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Game of Giveaway
Dimitry Medvedev's decision to meet with political liberals suggests he understands that without democracy Russia will not have a successful and stable future.
Published on May 5, 2009
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta
However, there are far more questions. What does this flirting with the liberals mean? Is it the present’s own will or part of a coordinated plan, a kind of play in which each one has his role? Or maybe elements of both have come together whimsically here?
The Kremlin’s relationship with the liberals is ambivalent. On the one hand they have been mercilessly persecuted by the OMON (special-purpose police detachment), on the other they can receive high administrative posts and the president is willing to listen to their advice. You will say it is not a question of ideology but of specific convenient names. Yes, but all the same, Medvedev’s “vigils” are based not on personal choice but on ideological affiliation.
The initiative for the meetings comes from Medvedev. But let us assume that this is a coordinated initiative. Several intentions can be perceived behind it. First, in the context of the crisis it makes sense periodically to let off steam. Of course, the present liberal trickle is not the kind of steam that will move the locomotive of social protest that is standing in the sidings, but all the same. Second, in a crisis the liberals must be fattened up, just in case. After all, if you imagine even for an instant that a new, more energetic opposition, closer to the population, might begin to take shape in the country, then it is the “old men” who could dilute its desperate actions. Who needs an “almost Polish solidarity”? We should nurture our own.
Let me observe that Medvedev hardly needs to obtain any kind of information publicly, in front of the world, least of all advice conveyed verbally. He is already familiar with the standpoint and proposals of his interlocutors. The main point is that he listens to them publicly. Consequently, the authorities are working to seek a way out of the crisis, and working together with society.
In the old times it would have been possible to add to all this that the Kremlin wants in this way to add a dose of democracy to its image, so as not to upset the West. But for some time now, Moscow could not care less about that.
An unbiased observer might get the impression that a kind of division of labor is being worked out between the president and the prime minister the president talks with the intelligentsia, while the prime minister has to talk with the aggrieved workers. And apparently the president feels more comfortable at his meetings than the head of state at his.
The interesting thing is the fear promoted by Medvedev’s meetings among the sovereign democrats, who have begun to think that they could be pushed away from the Kremlin’s bosom. However, their fears are in vain, because, as a certain book once said: We don’t need them smart, we need them devoted. In the present “thaw” nothing is melting, it cannot melt. More refined figures can be carved from pieces of ice, that is all.
However, let us take a risk and assume that the meetings and the president’s interviews for Novaya Gazeta and Tatyana Mitkova (of NTV) are more independent steps, steps that he had to work for, so to speak. (Incidentally, “Medvedevism” really does annoy many people.) Why does he need all this?
Because he himself sincerely understands that without the liberal vector, without the civil society, without—pardon the expression—democracy, you cannot build a normal future for Russia, make the country successful, overcome the crisis, and so on, and so forth. And it is convenient to begin this process of normalization with this kind of dialogue, if, of course, it is a stable dialogue.
In this case the president needs an entourage, and not even an entourage, but an environment that will support him and become a real champion of the idea that economic modernization is impossible without political renewal. And it is precisely this conviction that is expressed by the participants in the president’s get-togethers.
True, the expression “the same, only not so good” certainly applies to many (thank heavens, not all) of the present liberals. But Russia has no others. And no dense new growth has been discovered yet.
If anyone should be worried by Medvedev’s liberal escapades, it is the provincial bosses. Accustomed to imitating their seniors, they are bound to feel a certain confusion: So are they also supposed to start talking to their home-grown critics, who are not as diplomatic as their Moscow counterparts? The oblast and republic leaders are being cautious. And anyway, nobody has yet given them the official go-ahead for meetings of that kind.
Now let us return to the amusing comparison between Medvedev and Gorbachev. If only because they cannot be compared, in any circumstances.
Mikhail Sergeyevich (Gorbachev) opened a new chapter in history, Dmitriy Anatolyevich (if it is not just a game) is trying to go back and re-read a page that was recently turned, a page that, in fact, was not properly understood, but is dog-eared. It is more difficult for him.
Gorbachev was trying to create something new. Medvedev is, in practice, trying to correct and redo something old that was not done properly.
Provided, of course, that he really does consciously want this, and is not just fulfilling a function assigned to him.
The nomenclature failed to see Gorbachev coming.
Today’s guys are much more vigilant.
This article first appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
About the Author
Alexey Malashenko
Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program
Malashenko is a former chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program.
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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