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  "authors": [
    "Amr Hamzawy"
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REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

In The Media

Al-Qaeda Faces an Ideological Crisis

The strident tone of Osama bin Laden's latest videotape masks an ideological crisis for Al-Qaeda. Arab politics have transcended the legacy of Al-Qaeda. Today gradualism, participation, and democratic reform, rather than radical violence and jihad, set the agenda.

Link Copied
By Amr Hamzawy
Published on May 6, 2006

Source: The Daily Star

Three remarkable aspects of Osama bin Laden's latest videotape suggested that its strident tone masked an ideological crisis for Al-Qaeda. First, in his speech, broadcast on the Arab satellite network Al-Jazeera on April 24, bin Laden betrayed a need to justify his organization's terrorist mission not just to extremists, but to broader Muslim publics. In the tape, the Al-Qaeda leader spoke extensively of what he labeled the "Western and Zionist Crusade" against the Muslim community of believers, or umma. He displayed a distorted reading of events as different as the crisis in Darfur, the situation in Iraq and the Danish cartoon controversy, and attributed these events to a Western hatred of Islam. He called on Muslims to accept this as the "structuring reality" of their contemporary world. Only continuous jihad, he said, could help the umma defeat the "Crusaders."

Bin Laden's panorama of recent events and his prescription of jihad were not addressed to members or supporters of militant Islamist groups, but rather to the wider Arab and Muslim publics, in a desperate attempt to remind them of Al-Qaeda's "just" cause. It is not lost on bin Laden that a clear majority of Arabs has grown less sympathetic to his group's terrorist agenda in the last few years.

The second remarkable aspect of bin Laden's videotape was his addressing, albeit by assailing them, Arab liberals. In previous videotapes, he accused pro-Western Arab governments and official religious institutions of seducing their populations away from the path of jihad. But this time he blamed Arab liberal intellectuals and writers for betraying the true spirit of Islam. For bin Laden, the liberals disseminate "blasphemous ideas" of democracy, human rights, and moderation, and in so doing diminish the degree of popular support for Al-Qaeda's jihad. The Al-Qaeda leader's decision to open a front against Arab liberals may threaten them, but it is also a testimony to their moral and political influence in the Arab world of today.

Since 2001, Arab liberals have become more assertive in pushing for gradual democratic reform and respect for human rights as the only viable strategies to master the severe crises of Arab societies. Over the past years, their message has caught the attention of growing segments of Arab populations. There appears to be an emerging public consensus that democracy is the only viable way ahead. Bin Laden is right in fearing this development, since it undermines the logic of his terrorist agenda. Indeed, liberals in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia have proven as effective in combating terrorism as various "hard" security measures. Al-Qaeda is on the defensive not only because of the geographical but also the political isolation of its leaders: Its radical, militant blueprints have lost a great deal of their appeal as Arabs have had a change of heart.

Finally, bin Laden tried to seize on Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections. His Egyptian deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had taken the exact opposite position. While Zawahiri claimed that Hamas' participation in elections would only serve as an act of submission to Western conspiracies by detracting Palestinians from jihad, bin Laden endorsed the Hamas government and called on Muslims to support it. However, it would be misleading to interpret this new position as an attempt to give sustenance to Hamas. Rather, it was much more a bid to ride the movement's coattails.

Taking note of the changing mood of the Arab public, bin Laden sought to return Al-Qaeda to its roots. The group was founded thanks to the support of sister militant movements. Previously, bin Laden's cadres emerged from the once-powerful Egyptian Jihad and Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. Today, Hamas is the front-runner among militant Islamist movements. But even at this level, bin Laden is destined to earn only minimal success, if any. A day after Al-Jazeera broadcast his videotape, Hamas' spokesman in Gaza, Sami Abu Zahri, told reporters that bin Laden's comments on Hamas reflected his own views and that Hamas was interested in good relations with the West.

Arab politics have transcended the legacy of Al-Qaeda. Today gradualism, participation, and democratic reform, rather than radical violence and jihad, set the agenda. Although it's uncertain whether Arab liberals will see their dream realized, Al-Qaeda's project no longer represents an alternative.


Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

About the Author

Amr Hamzawy

Director, Middle East Program

Amr Hamzawy is a senior fellow and the director of the Carnegie Middle East Program. His research and writings focus on Egypt’s and other middle powers’ involvement in regional security in the Middle East, particularly through collective diplomacy and multilateral conflict resolution

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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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