Ultimately, Zelensky sided neither with the reform camp nor with the military establishment as such, but with political control.
Balázs Jarábik
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Although important, development assistance aimed at reforming the security sectors in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen has achieved only limited results. The bulk of such aid has consisted of military training and equipment, which does nothing to ensure that security forces answer to legitimate civilian leaders.
WASHINGTON, Oct 28—Although important, development assistance aimed at reforming the security sectors in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen has achieved only limited results. The bulk of such aid has consisted of military training and equipment, which does nothing to ensure that security forces answer to legitimate civilian leaders, contends a new paper by Yezid Sayigh.
Whether by design or default, the United States and European countries have a narrow focus on counterterrorism in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen—all countries with weak and quasi-democratic governments. Without an integrated approach that includes support for democracy and the rule of law, security sector reforms are not sustainable and can reinforce local power struggles.
Five Lessons for the United States and Europe:
“To enable real reform, the West must adopt a comprehensive approach which treats security reform as only one part of a broader political strategy, and encourage governments and security commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen to buy into such a strategy,” says Sayigh. “Pursuing counterterrorism in the absence of the rule of law perpetuates the undemocratic governance of the security sector and undermines state building and post-conflict reconstruction.”
###
NOTES
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Ultimately, Zelensky sided neither with the reform camp nor with the military establishment as such, but with political control.
Balázs Jarábik
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