Commentary
The main source of Russian aggression is a profound mistrust of the West and the firm belief that it intends to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. As long as this fear persists, the war will not end.
Tatiana Stanovaya
{
"authors": [
"Detlef Waechter"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy",
"Global Governance"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
Thinking Beyond Theories: Concrete Proposals to Make NATO's Future Nuclear Policy Work
As NATO debates its future nuclear policy, it should focus on concrete measures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent in the medium term and avoid abstract debates over complete disarmament or the need to keep nuclear weapons indefinitely.
Published on Apr 8, 2011
With NATO again debating its future nuclear policy—including the role of its tactical nuclear forces—it should focus on concrete measures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent in the medium term and avoid abstract debates over complete disarmament or the need to keep nuclear weapons indefinitely. Policy makers should seriously consider a fuller range of options to develop a credible nuclear deterrent and to explore Russia’s interest in reducing short-range nuclear forces alongside other categories of weapons. Although quick breakthroughs on a new round of arms control arrangements are highly unlikely, it is worth making a concerted effort to reach an agreement on NATO’s nuclear posture before the next NATO summit in 2012.
At its most recent summit in Lisbon last November, NATO’s members tasked the North Atlantic Council—the principal decision-making body—with a general review of the Alliance’s “overall defence and deterrence posture.” Rather than focusing specifically on nuclear issues—which many observers had sought—this overall posture review will look at the interconnections of nuclear weapons, missile defense, and conventional capabilities.
As the Council undertakes this review, it must approach its work carefully. Otherwise, thorny nuclear issues could revive the Alliance’s fierce pre-Lisbon dispute—and derail an important opportunity to move toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining credible nuclear deterrence in a nuclear-armed world. Specifically, NATO should avoid theoretical debates about disarmament, the principles of deterrence, or the potential strategic effects of European anti-ballistic missile defense.
Instead, NATO should focus its efforts on developing a concrete nuclear posture. Its nuclear assets are aging. Disarmament by default is not a sound option for a serious and coherent military alliance. NATO must carefully examine whether the present posture is technologically, financially, and politically sustainable and, if not, what changes are necessary to guarantee credible deterrent capabilities.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Signs of an Imminent End to the Ukraine War Are Deceptive
- Russia’s Unspoken Condition for Ending the War Is Zelensky’s ResignationCommentary
Insisting on Zelensky’s resignation is not just a personal vendetta, but a clear signal that the Kremlin would like to send to all its neighbors: even if you manage to put up some resistance, you will ultimately pay the price—including on a personal level.
Vladislav Gorin
- For Putin, Increasing Russia’s Nuclear Threat Matters More Than the Triad’s ModernizationCommentary
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
- Japan’s “Militarist Turn” and What It Means for RussiaCommentary
For a real example of political forces engaged in the militarization of society, the Russian leadership might consider looking closer to home.
James D.J. Brown
- Why Is Ukraine Extending a Hand to the Belarusian Opposition-in-Exile?Commentary
The risk posed by Lukashenko today looks very different to how it did in 2022. The threat of the Belarusian army entering the war appears increasingly illusory, while Ukraine’s ability to attack any point in Belarus with drones gives Kyiv confidence.
Artyom Shraibman
