• Research
  • Politika
  • About
Carnegie Russia Eurasia center logoCarnegie lettermark logo
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Dmitri Trenin"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "Russia",
    "Eastern Europe",
    "Ukraine"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

21st Century Great Game as a New Normal

The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off. A new normalcy is setting between Russia and the West resembles the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia.

Link Copied
By Dmitri Trenin
Published on Jun 30, 2014

In my discussions about Russia and the West in London last week, a sense of the end of an  era was palpable. The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off, at least for the foreseeable future, everyone agreed. Russia is pivoting to itself, to its partners in Eurasia, and to Asia. Ukraine symbolizes the new period of intense rivalry between Russia and the West.

Interestingly, this conclusion is accompanied by some regret, but not too much alarm. While "Mr. Putin's motives and strategies" are often believed to be a mystery, there is no fear of an impending armed conflict involving Russia and the West. Ukraine is seen as  remaining unstable for some time. Vladimir Putin has certainly won no friends in Western Europe, but a new cold war is not believed to be on the cards unless Russia goes on to destabilize the Baltics, which everyone, except the Balts themselves, thinks is a very long shot.

There is a general rejection of the Russian moves in Crimea and Ukraine. The official position is amplified by the media and its pundits, but despite the uniformity of condemnation, it rarely reaches the emotional peak. The U.S.-UK experience in Iraq is not forgotten, and too much self-righteousness is not appreciated.

Appetite for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova drawing closer to the EU is very light. The disappointment which followed the 2004 Orange revolution has made people more cautious. There is particularly little willingness to foot Ukraine's bills. And there is absolutely no support for Ukraine's NATO membership. The business community is concerned about the effect of the sanctions, but it also tends to be pragmatic. It is now time to buy, while the Russian stock is low.

Russia and Ukraine no longer dominate the foreign policy debate. Other issues have come to the fore, such as the rise of extremists in Iraq and Syria, and most recently Britain's relations with the European Union. This does not suggest that things will get back to where they were between Russia and the West, but rather that a new normalcy is setting in, which will probably resemble the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia, and under conditions of globalization—than the 20th century Cold War between communism and capitalism.

About the Author

Dmitri Trenin

Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space

      Dmitri Trenin

  • Commentary
    What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed

      Dmitri Trenin

Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Foreign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesRussiaEastern EuropeUkraine

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Who Is Funding Russia’s War in the 2027 Budget?

    For every ruble allocated to social policy, health, and education in 2027, double that amount is earmarked for the army, the police, and the security services.

      Alexandra Prokopenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    International Demand for Russia’s Arctic Shipping Route Is Unlikely to Last

    Cargo traffic through Russia’s Northern Sea Route has increased because of the disruption caused by the conflict in the Middle East, the Ukraine war, and U.S.-China tensions.

      • Mikhail Korostikov

      Mikhail Korostikov

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What Traffic Accident Numbers Reveal About Russia’s Gasoline Crisis

    An analysis of traffic accident data suggests that Ukrainian drone attacks caused a material but not disastrous fall in Russian gasoline consumption over the summer.   

      • Sergey Vakulenko

      Sergey Vakulenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    How the Kremlin Achieved Its Latest Implausible Election Results

    Sergei Kiriyenko used Russia’s parliamentary vote to further hone his strategy of corporate mobilization that is designed to maximize votes for United Russia.  

      Andrey Pertsev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Belarus Wants More From the West Than a ‘Massive Deal’ on Potash

    Trump has promised Belarus a massive potash deal. But Minsk is seeking something greater: restored Western transit and greater room for maneuver from Russia.

      Balázs Jarábik

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Carnegie Russia Eurasia logo, white
  • Research
  • Politika
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.