Paper
- +4
George Perkovich, Ariel (Eli) Levite, Lyu Jinghua, …
{
"authors": [
"Lyu Jinghua"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie China"
],
"collections": [
"Major Power Tech Relations"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "TIA",
"programs": [
"Technology and International Affairs"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Iran",
"East Asia",
"China"
],
"topics": [
"Technology",
"Economy",
"Security"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
The Race of Chinese Companies in the 5G Competition
With the potential of enabling not only significant economic growth but also the innovation of critical technologies in various fields, both the United States and China view 5G as one of the key influencing factors in the “great power competition.”
By Lyu Jinghua
Published on Sep 18, 2020
Source: Italian Institute for International Political Studies
With the potential of enabling not only significant economic growth but also the innovation of critical technologies in various fields, both the US and China view 5G as one of the key influencing factors in the “great power competition”. While the US believes that “the race to 5G is a race America must win”, China views it as representing the major leapfrog of its position in ICTs by describing the progress as “1G behind, 2G follow, 3G breakthrough, 4G synchronization, 5G leading”. Differently from competition in other traditional areas, companies rather than governments – the Chinese company Huawei as the most noticeable one – have played a significant role and become the pawns of the geopolitical game. Despite the obvious benefits such as lower costs and higher efficiency in using Huawei’s products, the company is now under huge pressure of being excluded from 5G networks by more and more Western economies – especially following Britain’s reversal of its decision.
All the declared concerns supporting the ban of Huawei, including the risks of surveillance and data collection and the potential vulnerabilities to cyberattacks or installed kill switches, sound reasonable at first. However, it is fair to say that these are inherent risks embedded in all ICT products. Why is Huawei so alarming, then? The frequently heard answer is that Huawei has much closer relations with the Chinse government than the usual ones, with three main accusations. Are they convincing enough?
This article was originally published in the Italian Institute for International Political Studies.
About the Author
Lyu Jinghua
Former Visiting Scholar, Cyber Policy Initiative
Lyu Jinghua was a visiting scholar with Carnegie’s Cyber Policy Initiative. Her research focuses primarily on cybersecurity and China-U.S. defense relations.
- China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability
- What Is the U.S. Ban on TikTok and WeChat All About?Q&A
Jon Bateman, Lyu Jinghua
Recent Work
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- The Much-Touted Middle Corridor Transport Route Could Prove a Dead EndCommentary
For the Middle Corridor to fulfill its promises, one of these routes must become scalable. At present, neither is.
Friedrich Conradi
- Why Is Belarus’s Approach to Online Censorship So Different From Russia’s?Commentary
For Lukashenko, abandoning Western internet services and embracing Russian equivalents would mean tying himself even closer to Moscow.
Artyom Shraibman
- What Does Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia Mean for Russia?Commentary
Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.
James D.J. Brown
- Who Is Responsible for the Demise of the Russian Internet?Commentary
The Russian state has opted for complete ideological control of the internet and is prepared to bear the associated costs.
Maria Kolomychenko
- Russia’s Coal Industry Is Running on Borrowed TimeCommentary
Powerful lobbyists and inertia led to Russia’s coal-mining sector missing an excellent opportunity to solve its structural problems.
Alexey Gusev
