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Issues in U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

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Issues in U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

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By Sharon Squassoni
Published on Nov 7, 2007

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123 Agreement Table (PDF)
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In October, the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement -- a foreign policy priority for the Bush Administration -- hit a snag in Indian domestic politics. In response to heavy criticism by Indian leftist parties, which threatened to call for early elections, Prime Minister Singh put negotiations on safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on hold. Since the safeguards agreement is a likely prerequisite for a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) decision to make an exception for India -- both of which must be completed before the deal comes back to the U.S. Congress -- this delay provides some much-needed room for reflection. In particular, Congress and the NSG should use the time to resolve significant ambiguities.
 
One ambiguity is whether the nuclear cooperation agreement is consistent with the Hyde Act, passed last December to provide certain waiver authorities to the President. On October 4, 2007, Representatives Berman and Ros-Lehtinen introduced a resolution (H. Res. 711) in the House, which noted that it remained to be seen whether the nuclear cooperation agreement was fully consistent with the Hyde Act, and urged the Administration to resolve all outstanding questions raised by Congress. H. Res. 711 also urged the Administration to propose a NSG exemption that clearly calls for the termination of all exports should India test a nuclear explosive device.
 
Although it might seem like common sense to halt nuclear exports to a state that violates the international norm of not testing, the U.S.-Indian agreement is rather ambiguous on the matter, as the table above illustrates. It's not clear what would happen if India tests another nuclear device -- do U.S. exports terminate? Will the U.S. encourage or discourage other states from supplying India in that event? Would U.S. consideration of mitigating factors surrounding an Indian test lead to continuation of exports? 
 
At this stage, it is remarkable that there continue to be so many uncertainties. It will be important to take every opportunity -- for example, when the NSG consultative group meets in November and in congressional hearings -- to clarify and resolve issues before the NSG opens up nuclear commerce to India.

Sharon Squassoni is senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

About the Author

Sharon Squassoni

Former Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Squassoni came to Carnegie from the Congressional Research Service. She also served for nine years in the executive branch. Her last position at the State Department was director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau.

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Sharon Squassoni

Additional Links

123 Agreement Table (PDF)
North AmericaUnited StatesSouth AsiaIndiaNuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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