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Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology
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Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology

Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to compel concessions from superpowers. For many others, however, this coercive gambit failed to work. When does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion?

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By Tristan Volpe
Published on Feb 14, 2023

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Oxford University Press

Oxford University Press

About the Author

Tristan Volpe

Nonresident Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program

Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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Tristan Volpe
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Tristan Volpe
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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