A look at how public opinion influences the credibility of coercive nuclear threats,and how it enables and constrains strategies of nuclear coercion.
Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Lauren Sukin a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and associate professor at the University of Oxford.
Samuel Seitz
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.
James D.J. Brown
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
The Kremlin will only be prepared to negotiate strategic arms limitations if it is confident it can secure significant concessions from the United States. Otherwise, meaningful dialogue is unlikely, and the international system of strategic stability will continue to teeter on the brink of total collapse.
Maxim Starchak
The collapse of the Budapest summit is an inevitable result of the Russian system of artificially creating foreign policy crises in order to achieve a desired outcome.
Alexander Baunov
Russia could compensate for “nuclear losses” to its aviation by strengthening other elements of its nuclear triad. At a time when control mechanisms are not functioning, there is a risk of strategic uncertainty emerging over the development trajectory of Russia’s nuclear forces.
Maxim Starchak
