Calling for renewed broad engagement and for rebuilding the relationship on a more realistic basis, this work sets key points in the agenda for U.S. and Russian policy makers.
President Clinton is correct that the decision to grant China permanent most-favored-nation trading status will have a historic significance equal to Richard Nixon's opening to China and Jimmy Carter's normalization of relations. But if that's true, why is the president rushing Congress to make a hasty decision, with almost no time to consider the merits and consequences of this momentous step?
The present danger is that the United States will shrink from its responsibilities as the world's dominant power and--in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony or indifference--will allow the international order that it sustains to collapse. The present danger is one of declining strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world.
Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference
China's White Paper on Taiwan and Jiang Zemin’s desire to make reunification his legacy indicate that Taiwan will be attacked soon. A massive, coordinated air strike using short-range ballistic missiles could cripple Taiwan's air defenses and early warning systems, neutralizing its air force as well as naval ports. The U.S. military has no capabilities for defending Taiwan in such a scenario.
These are not happy days for global arms-control advocates. As far back as the early 1960s, policymakers warned that the true threat to the United States was not only that third-world despots might acquire the bomb but that advanced industrial countries might do so.
Time is running short for Russia to engineer a sustained economic recovery. Putin's first term, the next four years, may be its last chance. If Putin does not do noticeably better than Russia, then we might in fact be facing a world without Russia, without Russian power, and with all the geopolitical and geoeconomic complications that would entail.