Source: Vedomosti

The Russian media exploded in anger at the news of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ testimony before Congress on February 7.  Presenting the defense budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Gates argued that Russia and China are “pursuing sophisticated military modernization programs” that could pose a threat to the United States.  Russian commentators grabbed that comment and ran with it, declaring a re-launch of the Cold War at a time when feelings in Moscow are already running high about NATO’s plans to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic.

How times have changed since 2002, when the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States spoke of “having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia.”  The latest NSS, launched only one year ago, spoke of persuasion rather than mutual threats:

The United States seeks to work closely with Russia on strategic issues of common interest and to manage issues on which we have differing interests…Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms…We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom’s path.

So why is Russia suddenly back in the threat category?  One possibility is that Mr. Gates was reflecting a fundamental change in U.S. policy, but that seems unlikely given the lack of a more formal discussion and rationale.  The Pentagon’s own strategy document from 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), stressed that Russia “is unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” The QDR underscored that “where possible, the U.S. will cooperate with Russia on shared interests.”  It listed countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and countering narcotics trafficking—and these remain areas of strong U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Another possibility was that Mr. Gates was simply reflecting his old predilections.  He was the CIA’s chief as the Cold War was winding down, and he has the reputation of one who missed that trend entirely—so maybe he was simply reverting to his old beliefs and preferences.  But this explanation provides no more than cold comfort—perhaps a change in U.S. military strategy toward Russia really is in the offing, and Gates’ testimony was only the first hint of it.

If Russian military planners want to know what is really happening, they would do well to look beyond the Secretary’s sharp words to what the U.S. defense budget actually calls for in Fiscal Year 2008.   The defense budget, at $481.4 billion, represents an 11.3 percent increase over the budget of the previous year.  Is that big jump going to pay for new capabilities against Russia, or is something else going on?

In detailing the budget, Gates underscored the need for an increase in ground forces, including the Army and Marine Corps as well as Special Operations Forces—$12.1 billion of the total.  His rationale had nothing to do with Russia, but with the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Paying for the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan was another major category, $70 billion, which provides for pay, supplies, transportation, and maintenance and logistical support.

A related category of the defense budget, “Quality of Life,” focuses on creating the conditions that make it attractive for American soldiers to serve:

$38.7 billion for health care for active and retired soldiers;

$15 billion for housing allowances, so troops don’t have to pay for housing;

$2.9 billion to improve barracks and family housing;

$2.1 billion for a 3 percent pay raise for all the members of the armed forces.

So over $140 billion in the budget is devoted simply to hiring, paying and providing decent living conditions for the troops who will serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Then there is the problem of equipping, training and protecting U.S. soldiers once they arrive in the war zone.  Repairing and replacing equipment that has been lost in the war takes up $37.6 billion of the total, and another $13.6 billion goes to enhancing training and readiness.  Another $15.2 billion is slated to develop new body armor, hardened vehicles, and electronic devices to interrupt enemy attacks on U.S. forces.  The task of defeating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by itself takes up $4 billion of the 2008 request.  And training military and policy forces in Iraq and Afghanistan take up another $4.7 billion.

Thus, over $200 billion—nearly half of the 2008 defense budget, is devoted to supporting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Not a word is spoken, in real money terms, about a threat to address in Russia.  But what about the rest of the budget?  Certainly military modernization will show a big jump in expenditures on weapon systems designed against the Russian Federation?

Here is the bizarre situation—the strategic investments to be made in modernization, including missile defense, do not contain any surprises: $177 billion in procurement and research and development, for major weapons systems that have been on the list for a long time—the joint strike fighter, for example, and a new aircraft carrier and amphibious transport ship. The missile defense budget, for all the complaints about it in Moscow, is $9.9 billion, not a significant increase over the amounts in recent budget years.

In short, the $481.4 billion defense budget for Fiscal Year 2008 is a big increase, but the increment is to pay for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  There is not any big new anti-Russia focus in the U.S. defense budget.

Of course, it is possible that the Defense Department is hiding some new anti-Russia programs among its secret “black programs,” which do not get aired in the public presentation of the budget.  If that is the case, however, they are dwarfed by the budget demands of the Iraq war, which are hanging around the neck of the American military community like a giant albatross.

Bob Gates’ budget 2008 testimony might have been a surprise for the Russian political establishment, but it is not a cause for panic.  Since Russia and the United States are well beyond the communication gaps of the Cold War, it’s a good idea simply to ask Gates what he meant—how could Russian military modernization programs pose a threat to the United States?  It’s a question worth posing, and an answer worth having.

Rose Gottemoeller is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and a former U.S. deputy undersecretary of energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation.