Arab diplomacy contradicts U.S. policy, U.S. lacks leverage over Arab allies
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Link Copied
Published on Jul 16, 2008
WASHINGTON, July 16—Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. Even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas, concludes a new paper from the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Marina Ottaway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy in The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Key Conclusions:
While new Arab diplomatic initiatives may contradict current U.S. policy, they may not contravene long-term U.S. interests.
Arab regional diplomacy lacks an overarching vision and is instead based on a desire to reduce imminent threats.
Influence in the Arab world has shifted to the Gulf and the change is likely permanent due to increased oil wealth and the crises engulfing other regions.
The United States and Saudi Arabia, historically close allies, often hope for the same outcome in regional conflicts but pursue different strategies. In trying to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid confrontation through diplomatic engagement, while the United States favors isolation. Saudi Arabia promotes reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas as a necessary step in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, while the United States refuses to recognize Hamas.
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates unexpectedly emerged as extremely active participants in the new regional diplomacy. Qatar’s success in negotiating the Doha agreement between Lebanese rivals prompted other initiatives among other Gulf countries.
Egypt, consumed by domestic challenges and a looming succession crisis, has refrained from intervening in regional issues unless directly affected, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Aid-dependent Jordan remains a quiet ally of the United States, neither opposing the initiatives of other Arab countries, nor embarking on any of its own.
The authors conclude:
“The question going forward is whether the new assertiveness and diplomatic activism, and with them the divergence from U.S. policies, will continue. This is a question of great importance to the new U.S. administration. Except in the case of Egypt, the foreign policies of the countries discussed depend heavily on the position taken by individual leaders, so they could easily change. However, Gulf countries are now richer, more developed, and courted by many for their oil, gas, and investment, and thus are less likely to simply follow the U.S. lead without questions. Whether the policies of these countries will diverge from those of the United States depends as much on U.S. choices as on theirs.”
Marina S. Ottaway, director of the Carnegie Middle East Program, specializes in democracy and post-conflict reconstruction issues, including political transformation in the Middle East and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and African countries. She is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, which analyzes the state of democracy around the world and the efforts by the United States and other countries to promote democracy.
Mohammed Herzallah was the 2007–2008 junior research fellow for the Carnegie Middle East Program. His research interests include democracy and the rule of law, international economic development, and Arab politics.
The Carnegie Middle East Program combines in-depth local knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to examine economic, socio-political, and strategic interests in the Arab world. Through detailed country studies and the exploration of key cross-cutting themes, the Carnegie Middle East Program, in coordination with the Carnegie Middle East Center, provides analysis and recommendations in both English and Arabic that are deeply informed by knowledge and views from the region. The Carnegie Middle East Program has special expertise in political reform and Islamist participation in pluralistic politics throughout the region.
The Carnegie Middle East Center is a public policy think tank and research center based in Beirut, Lebanon. Bringing together senior researchers from the region, the Carnegie Middle East Center aims to better inform the process of political change in the Middle East and deepen understanding of the issues the region and its people face.
The Arab Reform Bulletin addresses political reform in the Middle East. Sent monthly, it offers analysis from U.S.-based and Middle Eastern political experts in English and Arabic, as well as news synopses and resource guides.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
U.S. unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.
Hanoi and Beijing have long treated each other as distant cousins rather than comrades in arms. That might be changing as both sides draw closer to hedge against uncertainty and America’s erratic behavior.
Across Asia, China is better positioned to withstand energy shocks from the fallout of the Iran war. Its abundant coal capacity can ensure stability in the near term. Yet at the same time, the country’s energy transition away from coal will make it even less vulnerable during the next shock.
Malaysia’s chairmanship sought to fend off short-term challenges while laying the groundwork for minimizing ASEAN’s longer-term exposure to external stresses.
