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    "Ashley J. Tellis"
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The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy

The Indian Ocean is an increasingly vital geopolitical space for U.S. interests, and American policymakers take it into account when formulating a U.S. grand strategy.

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By Ashley J. Tellis
Published on Jan 17, 2012

Source: Presentation at the National Maritime Foundation

I am going to speak on the subject of "The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy" this evening, and I am going to divide my remarks into three parts. First, I am going to start by exploring what the traditional significance of the Indian Ocean has been. Then, I am going to explore the question of whether the Indian Ocean is on the verge of becoming more important as a geopolitical space. Third, I will conclude briefly with some remarks about what the United States ought to do with respect to the Indian Ocean. In the course of my lecture, I will elaborate in an extended form on my central thesis: today, the Indian Ocean is on the cusp of becoming an arena of systemic significance.

Let me start by saying a few words about the goals of U.S. grand strategy, because that is really the backdrop within which everything that I say about the Indian Ocean must be taken into account. As a given, the natural object of any country’s grand strategy is the protection of its homeland. Beyond that, however, I would argue that since World War II, U.S. grand strategy has had three basic goals. The first is to prevent external hegemonic control over critical geopolitical areas of the world, and to prevent the rise of other threats to the global commons. The second goal is to expand the liberal political order internationally. Finally, the third goal is to sustain an open economic regime. Everything that the United States has done since the end of World War II can easily be fitted into a matrix that has taken its importance and its bearings at various points from one or more of these three goals. These fundamental goals have not changed, and they are unlikely to change in the future.

About the Author

Ashley J. Tellis

Former Senior Fellow

Ashley J. Tellis was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Ashley J. Tellis
Former Senior Fellow
SecurityMilitaryForeign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesSouth AsiaIndiaEast AsiaChina

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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