• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "Dmitri Trenin"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "China",
    "Russia"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economy",
    "Trade",
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Bureaucracy and Corruption Stand in Way of Russia’s Shift to Asia

Russia’s “pivot to Asia” is meeting with a number of challenges, such as bureaucratic inertia, lack of workable ideas, and high levels of corruption. However, there are ways of dealing with all of them.

Link Copied
By Dmitri Trenin
Published on Mar 29, 2015

Source: Global Times

Russia's "pivot to Asia" is meeting with a number of challenges. The principal ones are bureaucratic inertia; lack of workable ideas; and high levels of corruption. Deepening economic recession, the dramatic drop in the oil price, and Western sanctions compound the situation. And, of course, Russia's small population east of the Urals makes its Siberian and Far Eastern regional market unattractive to foreign investors. Yet, there are ways of dealing with all of them.

Russia is traditionally run in a top-down fashion. The "pivot to Asia" was originally President Vladimir Putin's idea, which he then imposed on the essentially inert and disinterested bureaucracy. In order to make aides, ministers and governors follow the boss's lead, Putin had to keep the pressure on them. With the outbreak in 2014 of the Ukraine crisis and the incorporation of Crimea, the Kremlin's attention has shifted, and the government's priorities have changed.

It is precisely the rupture with the West, however, that make outreach to the East even more relevant. Russia faces the need to craft a closer and more productive relationship with China, the biggest economy outside the US-led coalition that has sanctioned Russia for its policies in Ukraine.

The way to break through the bureaucratic inertia remains Kremlin leadership. In the next few months, Putin will be seeing Chinese President Xi Jinping three times: in Moscow in May, in Ufa in July, and in Beijing in September. Accords which may follow from these summits would stimulate bureaucratic activism.

New accords, in turn, require new ideas. Russia needs to look at the reasons why its pet infrastructure projects such as upgrading the Transsiberian and the Baikal-Amur railroads have yet to take off.

Meanwhile, it should respond to those that the Chinese have already announced and begun to implement. One that clearly stands out is building a high-speed rail link between Beijing and Moscow with a connection to Europe - Berlin and Helsinki - would open immense economic opportunities.

Speeding up the passage of freight traffic between China and Europe is another area of potential collaboration. The sections of the road that pass through Kazakhstan and Belarus would tie in Russia's closest partners in Eurasia. Rather than competing against each other, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road economic belt can find synergies. 

Russia itself should take the lead in opening the Northern Sea Route for international navigation. China is known to have a major interest in the matter. Creating infrastructure along the Arctic and Pacific coast of Russia would open up the country's northern façade, spurring economic and social development from Kamchatka to Kola.

Moscow has growing concerns about the security of its High North territories, and economic development of these areas in cooperation with China would bolster its position there. Having agreed in principle to allow China access to its energy deposits, Moscow now needs to lay down the ground rules for expanded energy partnership with Beijing.

Other ideas that have been floated, but not yet acted upon include expanding food production in southern Siberia for the Asian market; engaging with Asian countries in scientific and technological cooperation; and internationalizing Russia's educational system through closer links to Asian universities.

When it is finished, Russia's new space center in the Far East, Vostochny, can serve the needs of the region. Bureaucracy alone cannot do this. The Kremlin has to unchain the energies of the Russian business community, and support scientists, farmers and college professors and students.

Other activities, however, have to be reined in. The recent arrest of Alexander Khoroshavin, the governor of Sakhalin accused of corruption, illustrates the salient issue of criminality in the Russian Far East, which is reputed to be exceptionally bad even by Russian standards.

The arrest, however, just scratches the surface. Without cleansing the bureaucratic corps and its eventual restructuring on a meritocratic basis, Russia's governance will remain exceedingly dysfunctional.

The same goes for the courts system. These are, of course, fundamental issues, but without addressing them there can be no way forward for Russia as a whole and for its relations with its Asian neighbors in particular.

For the foreseeable future, China is likely to be Russia's main foreign partner, and the economic and political importance of Asia to Russia will rise, even as Europe's will continue to recede. It is time for Moscow elites to begin taking this new situation more seriously.

This article originally appeared in Global Times.

About the Author

Dmitri Trenin

Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space

      Dmitri Trenin

  • Commentary
    What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed

      Dmitri Trenin

Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
EconomyTradeForeign PolicyEast AsiaChinaRussia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • Xi walking into a room with people standing and applauding around him
    Commentary
    Emissary
    The Xi Doctrine Zeros in on “High-Quality Development” for China’s Economic Future

    In the latest Five-Year Plan, the Chinese president cements the shift to an innovation-driven economy over a consumption-driven one.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Commentary
    Malaysia’s Year as ASEAN Chair: Managing Disorder

    Malaysia’s chairmanship sought to fend off short-term challenges while laying the groundwork for minimizing ASEAN’s longer-term exposure to external stresses.

      Elina Noor

  • Commentary
    When It Comes to Superpower Geopolitics, Malaysia Is Staunchly Nonpartisan

    For Malaysia, the conjunction that works is “and” not “or” when it comes to the United States and China.

      Elina Noor

  • Commentary
    ASEAN-China Digital Cooperation: Deeper but Clear-Eyed Engagement

    ASEAN needs to determine how to balance perpetuating the benefits of technology cooperation with China while mitigating the risks of getting caught in the crosshairs of U.S.-China gamesmanship.

      Elina Noor

  • Commentary
    Neither Comrade nor Ally: Decoding Vietnam’s First Army Drill with China

    In July 2025, Vietnam and China held their first joint army drill, a modest but symbolic move reflecting Hanoi’s strategic hedging amid U.S.–China rivalry.

      • Nguyen-khac-giang

      Nguyễn Khắc Giang

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.