Article
China has showcased its engineering prowess with small modular reactor demonstration projects. But turning these technological achievements into commercial success will be a greater challenge.
Tong Zhao
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Source: Getty
In The Media
How Europe’s Big 3 Are Shifting on China
France has followed the U.K.’s lead, refusing to ratify an extradition treaty with Hong Kong and requiring local operators stop using Huawei by 2028. As for Germany, it finds itself as the last of the E3 and the ultimate decision maker on which way Europe could swing.
Published on Aug 14, 2020
Source: Diplomat
At a time when U.S.-China relations seemingly plunge to new successive lows every day, with Washington and Beijing exchanging tit-for-tat responses in shuttering consulates and with President Donald Trump pursuing an all-out assault on Chinese tech, the European theater in the emerging Cold War is reaching an equally escalatory albeit quieter inflection point.
In recent weeks, the United Kingdom has made substantial moves to shift its China policy, first by inviting Hong Kong British Overseas passport holders to apply for permanent residency, and second by excluding Huawei from its 5G networks from 2027 onwards. France has followed the U.K.’s lead on both accounts, refusing to ratify an extradition treaty with Hong Kong and requiring local operators stop using Huawei by 2028. As for Germany, it finds itself as the last of the E3 and the ultimate decision maker on which way Europe could swing.
About the Authors
Philippe Le Corre
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Program
Philippe Le Corre was a nonresident senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
John Ferguson
John Ferguson is a research assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School’s M-RCBG.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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