Source: Carnegie

That North Korea is capable of building nuclear weapons is no longer in doubt. What remains unknown and what must be addressed is the willingness of North Korea to negotiate a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons program. Despite more than 10 years of direct and indirect negotiations, threats, confrontations, and analysis, the United States still does not know with any certainty the answer to the question: Will North Korea verifiably eliminate all of its nuclear capabilities if the terms are right?

There is clear and compelling evidence to support speculation on both sides, but neither case is conclusive. Yes, North Korea cheated on the its agreements in the 1990s to freeze its nuclear activities, but it is equally true that during the 1990s the United States abandoned its efforts to normalize relations and improve ties with the North. The debate is not whether North Korea can be trusted; it clearly cannot. But can Pyongyang be motivated to abandon its nuclear program under effective inspections and, if not, what can outside states can do about it?

When North Korea's nuclear program was still in its infancy, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others could afford to wait to answer these questions. Now that the North's program has come of age, they cannot. In a worst-case scenario, North Korea could produce more than 100 nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. Such an arsenal not only threatens U.S. allies and troops in the region, but given North Korea's economic strains, it is conceivable that it could sell nuclear materials to other states or even terrorist groups if the price is right. Such a scenario is so grave that U.S. policymakers could soon face a truly appalling choice between accepting its realization or plunging into a full-fledged war on the Korean peninsula. By comparison, many negotiated settlements-no matter how distasteful-become attractive.

It is time for the United States to get serious about negotiations with the North. The postponement of talks originally slated for this month are the latest sign that the Bush administration's approach to this critical issue has failed and that a new policy is needed. President George W. Bush's October statement that he is willing to consider some form of security guarantees for North Korea was a positive step in this direction, but the refusal to consider possible incentives for the North's abandonment of its program continues to sabotage any real progress. There is enough collective experience in the United States after 10 years of efforts to know how the North negotiates and how to make progress. At a minimum, it takes time and a complex mixture of resolve and open respect for the negotiations themselves. Any mixed messages, public or otherwise, can quickly derail progress and undercut efforts at negotiations.

To test whether North Korea is prepared to eliminate its program under effective verification, the United States needs to:

• Establish a full-time and ongoing negotiating mechanism based on the six-party talks. They should be continuous and establish a timeline for conclusion.
• Appoint higher-level representation for the talks, including a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must speak directly for the President, lead the negotiations and be prepared and empowered to make serious progress.
• Ensure continued presidential engagement with the negotiating process and effectively impose a coordinated position in the administration (no loose statements or diatribes).
• Maintain a common US, Japan, and South Korea position on the talks.
• Continue to encourage Chinese engagement, with the awareness of the limits of Chinese influence over North Korea.

Lastly, the Bush administration needs to determine what, if anything, it is prepared to offer North Korea if they terminate their nuclear program and eliminate, under effective verification, its nuclear capability. This can involve a broad mix of political, diplomatic, economic, and symbolic steps including establishment of diplomatic relations and the provision of considerable agricultural assistance. Even if the administration is now prepared to test North's Korea's willingness to give up its program, as long as the debate over possible inducments continues progress will be all but impossible to the detriment of US security.

Moreover, the United States should be prepared to offer more to get more. The nuclear issue is so pressing, however, that it should not become hostage to issues related to ballistic missiles, conventional force deployments, chemical and biological weapon programs, and human rights. The United States should work to resolve those issues but only once the nuclear question is answered.

President Bush has moved from a wholesale rejection of negotiations with the North to the verge of a new set of real talks. To make progress, he must take the next step: test North Korea directly and conclusively. If a positive result materializes, the president must be willing to invest his personal prestige domestically and abroad to make the deal stick. If the result is negative, having tried the alternative, punitive options will remain viable, and he will have created broader support for confronting North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Joseph Cirincione is the director and Jon Wolfsthal the deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.