Since 1999, when Indian and Pakistani forces briefly fought in the Kargil area of Kashmir, India and Pakistan have experienced extremely strained relations. Tensions got particularly high during 2001–2002, when the two countries deployed a million or more troops along their common border; elements of the two massed forces frequently exchanged artillery fire in Kashmir. The specter of nuclear war haunts any armed conflict between India and Pakistan; India first demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998. Even when the two states manage to avoid war, their mutual hostility impedes economic development and gives a reactive cast to their internal politics. Further complicating the situation, Pakistan and India are, in different ways, frontline states in the struggle against terrorism. Thus, when Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf met, with little advance notice, at a regional summit in Pakistan in early January 2004, it behooved U.S. policy makers and other informed Americans to take note of this breakthrough and explore whether and how the United States could enhance the chances of further diplomatic progress.
In the following discussion, Haqqani and Tellis highlight key issues they raised in their respective visits. Both were particularly interested in assessing whether this latest diplomatic engagement would lead to lasting peace, or simply be another in a long string of disappointments.

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About the Authors
Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. He is also a leading journalist and diplomat, and a former adviser to Pakistani prime ministers, as well as a syndicated columnist for the Indian Express, Gulf News, and The Nation (Pakistan). He is the author of Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. Previously, he served as senior adviser to the ambassador at the embassy of the United States in India. He also served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia. Before his government service, he was for eight years a senior policy analyst at RAND and professor of policy analysis at the RAND graduate school. He is the author of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture and co-author of Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy. He has co-edited Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power and Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty.