Nathalie Tocci

Professor of the Practice, Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe

Europe remains highly dependent on the United States, and yet it makes no sense to placate U.S. President Donald Trump—both statements can be true at the same time. European leaders spent the first year of his second administration flattering the president, hoping to leverage his evident narcissism. But they also bowed to him, accepting humiliating deals such as the 2025 Turnberry agreement on trade, which clearly failed to reflect the relative economic weight of both sides of the Atlantic.

When they felt they could, European leaders backed the Trump administration, even when this meant implicitly condoning egregious violations of international law, including the military strikes on Venezuela and Iran. And they constantly sought to keep Trump himself close, even when this meant entertaining one-sided plans for Ukraine’s capitulation, or tragically farcical initiatives like the Board of Peace for Gaza.

That approach has failed. Europeans began waking up to reality over the Greenland crisis and the Iran war. No amount of knee bending will soften or diminish Trump’s betrayal of Europe. The more Europeans focus their energies on quietly reducing their dependence on the United States and the less they humiliate themselves by fruitlessly seeking to placate him, the better they will serve the citizens they are meant to represent.

Linas Kojala

CEO, Geopolitics and Security Studies Center

European countries should remember former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt’s principle: Speak softly and carry a big stick. Public rhetoric is not an end in itself. It is only a tool in pursuit of a broader goal: security.

A war of words with Donald Trump has few upsides. The U.S. president often turns personal irritation into real-world decisions. Allies should choose their battles carefully. There is a wide space between placating Trump and picking a public fight with him.

This is not naive. It is realism to adjust tactics to the current politics—especially as we are mostly at fault for becoming so dependent on the United States. Europe should ensure that burden-shifting inside NATO happens because we understand the need to do more, not because America demands it.

Picking a public fight with Trump may feel righteous, but it does not produce a single additional military brigade. It only shifts the focus. If the choice is between sharp words and no military capability or calm rhetoric and additional capability, I would certainly choose the latter.

In many ways, Germany is becoming an example, given the trajectory of its defense spending. But not all European countries are moving at the same pace. Europe should not confuse talking tough with becoming strong.

Kristi Raik

Director, International Centre for Defence and Security

Europe has no choice but to take responsibility and leadership in matters of its own security, since the United States is evidently no longer doing so. The best Europeans can do at this point is to focus on building up their own strength, including on defense capabilities in areas where dependence on Washington is most critical, such as intelligence, air defense, and long-range strike capability. The worst European leaders can do is to take pride in confronting Trump while failing to build up a defense that will not collapse if the United States withdraws.

A degree of placation may still be useful, but with clear red lines: It must not mean supporting Trump’s actions or positions when these are contrary to Europe’s interests. It is not in Europe’s interest to support ill-planned wars of choice, demands to acquire Greenland, or pressure on Ukraine to cede territory to Russia. However, increasing European defense spending to the level required by Trump remains a good way of placating him while helping to pursue a managed burden-shifting process. But it’s best to keep expectations vis-à-vis the United States low and focus on what Europe can do for itself.

Pierre Vimont

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Are Europeans truly placating Trump? In reality, Europe seems to be navigating an uncomfortable path. In peppering an attitude of complacency with bouts of criticism that are rapidly overturned under the pressure of the president’s digital outbursts, Europeans lack a consistent political line. An open policy of placation would at least be perceived as providing clarity, even if it could be criticized. From that perspective, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s overt and constant policy of appeasing Trump is a case in point.

But there is no such policy on the European side. In truth, Europe has so far failed to find an adequate response to the stream of contradictory initiatives coming out of Washington. It has been unable either to keep a low profile, openly enduring all of Trump’s whims and waiting for better days, or to be more robust, which would lead to possible retaliation. Europe could have chosen the flexible approach, more nimbly reacting depending on whether U.S. announcements deserve to be contested or simply ignored. No such choice has been made for good reason: Europe still hesitates to admit that the ongoing transformation in the transatlantic partnership is irreversible. Lack of strategic foresight is rarely productive and usually leads to miscalculation, if not irrelevance.

Armida van Rij

Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform

A year and change into President Trump’s second term, it has become abundantly clear that appeasement only leads to short-term wins. Flattery did not prevent threats to the sovereignty of NATO allies, nor did it prevent trade tariffs being imposed, nor did it mean deals made under the alliance’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List initiative were honored. On the rare occasion where European heads of government drew a line, as with the Greenland crisis, it paid off—but only temporarily.

Europe has to prioritize building up its own capabilities to be able to act autonomously without U.S. dependencies. But until then, those dependencies mean Europe—including Ukraine—will have to wheel and deal with Trump. As much as Europeans may—however quietly or loudly—lament it, acquiescing is sometimes needed to obtain those short-term wins, for example to secure particular weapon systems for Kyiv.

In those cases, European governments need to have a much stronger cost-benefit assessment. Essentially, the question becomes: What is the minimum cost required to achieve an outcome that is good enough? And they need to be clear-eyed that the outcome will only be sustained until the next Trump-induced crisis comes along. In this world, Europeans have to minimize their costs for maximum gain—even if just temporarily.

Thorsten Benner

Director, Global Public Policy Institute

It is still very much worth having European leaders with a decent working relationship with Trump.

It is not in Europe’s interest for all leaders to behave like Pedro Sánchez, who gets a lot of domestic mileage out of his status as an anti-Trump ultra. But leaders need to be able to confront the U.S. president forcefully where necessary, as they did in the case of Greenland.

For the rest, the game needs to squarely be about building Europe’s own capabilities and reducing dependencies that limit the continent’s freedom of action. Mark Rutte’s cardinal sin is not sucking up to Trump, but opposing Europeans proposals for a clear timetable for taking critical enablers for defense over from Washington. Such a timetable, which Europeans should propose at the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, would focus minds and stop Europeans from continuing to dither on joint procurement.

Investing in strength at home would also mean European leaders would finally come up with a realistic approach to managing dependence on the United States with regard to the AI revolution and implementing the Draghi report. It would also mean finally getting serious about tackling European dependency on China for critical raw materials and the China trade shock hitting core industries.