IMGXYZ1109IMGZYXChina's rapid economic and military expansion has redefined how many countries in the region view it. A recent study led by Evan Medeiros, titled Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise, finds that although East Asian nations view China differently, they all share the desire for a continued American presence in the region.
Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment, Medeiros, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, was joined by Michael Green, a senior adviser and the Japan Chair at CSIS. The panel was moderated by Carnegie's Michael Swaine.
Questions and Methods
Medeiros said that the analysts at RAND were trying to answer three primary questions in their study. First, how are countries in Asia responding to China's rise? Second, what are the driving forces behind these reactions? Third, what are the implications of the regional responses for U.S. policy?
To answer these questions the RAND group used a wide array of sources across six nations, including public opinion data, economic data, and country case studies. The countries examined were Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. The responses were measured across four variables: domestic politics and public opinion, economic relations, foreign policy, and defense policy.
Regional Consensus
Although the responses of countries in East Asia varied in some aspects, there were a few clear conclusions that could be drawn from across the region. First, China has undoubtedly gained influence in Asia. Countries were more sensitive to China's preferences and China was increasingly viewed as important to the future prosperity of each nation.
Second, there was agreement in avoiding efforts to construct an "anti-China" movement or partake in a regional arms race. Instead, every country favored broadening engagement with the People's Republic. At the same time, countries were seeking to expand strategic partnerships and diversify their regional relationships.
Third, and perhaps most importantly for the United States, no country wanted a regional Chinese hegemon. Therefore, all six nations desired a continued and enhanced American role in Asia.
Implications for the U.S.
Based on the climate of East Asia, the consequences for America are apparent. The U.S. is well-positioned to achieve its core regional objectives because there is broad support for its continued presence as a stabilizing influence.
Foreign policymakers in Washington must pursue an Asian policy that strikes a balance between competition and abandonment. A strongly competitive approach runs the risk of alienating regional allies. Likewise, a lack of U.S. presence could intensify regional fears of an overly dominant China, which raises the likelihood of either conflict or acquiescence – neither of which serves the American interest.
Questions and Answers
Michael Green praised the RAND study, asserting that it was further evidence that China’s soft power is not as expansive as many claim. Furthermore, the investigation agreed with a recent report by CSIS, in which Asian regional elites expressed the centrality of the U.S. as a security guarantor in the next 10 years.
Green also offered minor critiques of the study. First, among Japanese elites Sino-Japanese relations are viewed as more positive than the perception of the Japanese public. The negative Japanese views of China found in the RAND research may be missing an important difference. Second, it may be useful to obtain the views of other Asian nations, such as Vietnam or Mongolia.
Medeiros said that the perception of Russia and India to the People Liberation Army’s modernization was positive. Russia, who sells China weapons, is party to the PLA modernization and does not perceive China as a threat. India has developed warmer relations with the PRC and an arms race between the two nations seems unlikely.
In reference to the role of multilateralism in East Asia, Green said that there is overwhelming support for organizations like the East Asian Summit. But according to elites, in 10 years, no country would go first to a regional IGO in the case of a crisis or problem. Instead, they would go to the UN or allies. Elites did not view multilateralism as an effective way to minimize a U.S.-China rivalry.
