Pivotal States: Is a Deeper Alliance With Saudi Arabia Worth It?

Event Transcript

Note: this is a rush transcript and may contain errors.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Good morning, here from Washington. This is Pivotal States, and I’m Chris Chivvis, the director of the American Statecraft Program here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the defining relationships of America’s role in the Middle East. As the world’s top producer of oil and a powerful force in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia has long played an important role in regional and global politics. It’s also one of the most challenging and controversial relationships for the United States, not only in the Middle East, but also globally. Saudi Arabia’s young leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has been pursuing an activist foreign policy, reaching out to U.S. allies and adversaries alike. MBS, as he’s usually called, is also pursuing liberalizing domestic reforms that some consider revolutionary for this arch-conservative Islamist regime. And he wants to retool the Saudi economy to make it less dependent on hydrocarbons.

Yet Saudi Arabia’s human rights record remains very problematic by most standards, and MBS is widely believed to have ordered the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2019. So, the Biden administration came to office with the intent of taking a tougher stance on Saudi Arabia on account of these human rights issues, and due to mounting criticism about Saudi’s military intervention in Yemen. But after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Biden administration grew concerned about keeping gas prices down in America and energy prices stable globally. And as a result, reversed course in its approach to Riyadh. At the center of the administration’s new policy is a proposed defense treaty that would tie America even more deeply to Saudi Arabia in hope of improving Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel and reducing China’s influence in the region. Here with me today to unpack this relationship and talk about this agreement are three of the world’s top experts on Saudi Arabia and on the Middle East.

Joining us from the region is Kim Ghattas, who is a writer for The Atlantic and the Financial Times, and the author of Black Wave, which is a fantastic book about Saudi Iran relations. Sitting immediately to my right is Dennis Ross, who’s a former top US diplomat with deep expertise on the Middle East, and to my far right, Aaron David Miller, a longstanding Middle East watcher, and my colleague here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thanks to all three of you for being here on this episode of Pivotal States.

I always start these conversations, as people who have followed Pivotal States before know, with a basic question about America’s interests. In this case, we’re obviously talking about Saudi Arabia, so where I want to begin our discussion is by talking a little bit about what America’s main interests are when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Aaron, I wonder if you could maybe get us started on this. What are your thoughts about that?

Aaron David Miller: Well, first of all, Chris, thanks for organizing, and it’s great to be with Dennis in person. I spent more time with Dennis over a period of years than I did with my own family, and it’s great to see you, Kim, virtually. I know you were here at Carnegie as a non-resident, 2018, 2019. US interests, it’s an often sort of casually dismissed concept, but I think it’s really important because policy essentially is an effort to further US interests. So, if you define interest too narrowly, you can miss opportunities. If you define interest too broadly, you can get yourself into big trouble.

My view here, and I take a risk averse, prudent, cautious approach when it comes to defining US interest in Middle East, is that I divide interest into what I call the must haves as opposed to the would be nice to haves. With respect to Saudi Arabia, I think our interests in some respects follow the broad outlines of US interests in the Middle East. First of all, this counter-terrorism, protecting the homeland, and our interests abroad. Saudis have had a very complicated, problematic history in that regard, but they can be a useful partner.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Complicated, because obviously Al-Qaeda originally was born from Saudi Arabia.

Aaron David Miller: Right. And it contributes mightily, I think, to the negative perceptions of Saudi Arabia in the United States. Second is maintaining access to Arab hydrocarbons, not because we need them, but because the rest of the world does and oil trades in a single market. So, we can be affected even though we may be energy independent. And third is preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon with a nuclear weapon. I would put those in the category of must haves. They all pertain to American security and prosperity. I would like to add a fourth when it comes to Saudi Arabia, which is the pursuit of human rights, but in some respects, I know better.

No administration I ever worked for put human rights, made it the organizing principle of American foreign policy and the Biden administration with Saudi, I think has, well, they moved from pariah during the campaign in 2021 to more than partner. And just to conclude, and hopefully we’ll get into this by the end of the convo, Saudi Arabia is a very problematic partner for the United States, and I think we need to acknowledge that and be very honest and sober about the nature and the extent of our relationship.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Absolutely. And one of the key questions that I want to explore is whether or not we’ve got the balance right between how much we are investing in Saudi Arabia and how much the United States is getting out of that relationship, especially in the areas that you’ve just mentioned. But Kim, let me turn to you and ask you for your thoughts. I mean, if you were to define America’s core interests in Saudi Arabia, and especially the ones that are really important, obviously the United States has many interests in many countries around the world, but what are the ones that are most vital from your perspective when it comes to the Middle East and Saudi Arabia in particular?

Kim Ghattas: I agree with how Aaron put it. I think there are definite must haves, and he listed those, whether it’s the flow of oil, whether it’s counter-terrorism, whether it’s stability in the region. Very simply, it’s much better to have Saudi Arabia on your side as an ally that you can work with rather than having an antagonistic relationship. As we saw a little bit towards the end of the Obama administration where the Saudis were very upset by how the administration had gone into the nuclear deal with Iran, the JCPOA, and that led to some petulant behavior by the new crown prince at the time, Mohammad bin Salman, who went to war in Yemen and then imposed an embargo on Qatar and various other behaviors. And of course, the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. And it’s that relationship that is so hard to manage where you want to keep them close, but not too dependent.

You have other interests in the region, and that can make the Saudis a little bit insecure as well, which is I think what we saw happen in 2015, 2017, they thought that they could just show America what they were capable of on their own. And I think they’ve sobered up on that front. But the other angle to this, of course, is China and whether Saudi Arabia is a partner with the US to try to not push back China, but limit the influence it can have in the Middle East. And of course, the thing that everybody’s discussing right now and which we will get to at the moment, it’s the regional architecture that you want to put in place that can allow for some long-term stability.

That brings us and will discuss it of course, to the potential normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But also I’m looking at the détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a somewhat stabilizing element that is to the benefit of the United States. Initially when it was signed and announced in Beijing, there were some raised eyebrows, but it has proven to have its benefits at a time of instability in the region. Can you imagine what we would be discussing at the moment post October 7th, if the Iranians and the Saudis did not have lines of communication? It’s often difficult to prove a negative, but I think that we’d be in a much worse place than we already are.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Let me ask a question. I mean, just to come back to you for one second. I mean, you agree with Aaron’s fundamental assertion that key US interests include counter-terrorism, hydrocarbons, and regional stability. I mean, those three interests are interests the United States has had in the region for decades. Certainly counter-terrorism became more important after 9/11, but it’s been a longstanding US interest. I think some people at least might argue that when you think about hydrocarbons and you think about counter-terrorism, the intensity or the salience of those interests has declined to some degree because we’re in a different geopolitical environment right now.

And I think that was basically one of the ideas behind the Biden administration’s effort to relax or rightsize the US role in the Middle East as a whole when they came into office three and a half years ago. So, however, you also noted the rise of China, and that’s a new factor that people are thinking about. I mean, does the rise of China offset the declining importance of those other interests? I mean, can you give us a little bit more thinking about globally, how the United States should be balancing its changing interests because they are shifting to some degree or at least in intensity with the amount of investment that it’s going to make in this relationship?

Kim Ghattas: I do want to go back to the point also that Aaron made about human rights because it is something that in this region of course, we are very concerned about when we see how much the United States invests in relationships with problematic governments, whether it’s Saudi Arabia or Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt or others in the region. And that balance has never worked out somehow. I mean, values and interests don’t always align and they certainly don’t align here, and it is something that I would like to mention that it is worth continuing to make that effort. However, I’m also pragmatic that there are interests, and when it comes to America’s posture in the Middle East, the US constantly thinks that it can decrease that posture and leave the Middle East and pivot to Asia. And every time the Middle East proves that you simply cannot walk away from this region, because who would’ve expected that because of the war in Ukraine, you had to cozy up to Saudi Arabia again, and because of an unexpected event like October 7th as well, you need the Saudis on board as well.

I think it’s always about finding the balance and not getting too close, because we’ve seen in the past how getting too close to the Saudis and too cozy is also to the detriment of American interests in the region where you’re so cozy with them that it upsets the balance of the region as well. And I found that American administrations often going from one to the other, from being very cozy to Saudi Arabia to trying to pull back the Obama administration trying to find a balance by engaging with Iran, and then the Trump administration came in and swung back all the way.

And I do think that the Biden administration has managed that balance a little bit better, but I think it does run the risk now of getting too close again with this Defense Pact or strategic alliance agreement, whatever it’s going to be called, because you want to make sure that the Saudis deliver that it’s not a one-way street that similarly to the criticism that NATO gets sometimes that they don’t invest enough, that they don’t spend enough on defense. You don’t want to give the Saudis the impression that no matter what, America will be there for you. They need to step up and deliver and build capacity themselves.

Christopher S. Chivvis: I think that’s a really interesting point. Dennis, let me turn to you and ask you, I mean, how should the United States think about balancing the investments that it makes in this relationship with what it’s getting out of them? I mean, there are clearly interests here, but obviously those interests aren’t, they aren’t at the very, very top of America’s foreign policy interests right now, so we have to get the balance right. I mean, how should we go about doing that?

Dennis Ross: Well, I think the term balance that Kim uses is a good one. I think most administrations strive to produce it, but they don’t always succeed in doing it. There’s the issue of balance between values and interests. Aaron said it before, I’m not aware of any administration where the balance was tilted in the relationship with Saudi Arabia towards values. Go back to Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter was known for prioritizing [inaudible 00:13:58]-

Christopher S. Chivvis:  [inaudible 00:13:58]. Yeah, right.

Dennis Ross: And yet his approach for Saudi Arabia, he never raised it with him. So, why? Because he looked at a set of interests, he was worried about another oil embargo, and therefore that was his preoccupation. Now the issue of balance, I think Kim is right to raise it. From the standpoint this needs to be a two-way street. It is important for us, I think, to have a good strong relationship with Saudi Arabia right now for a lot of reasons we can get into. It is fair for us to ask if we’re going to do something like provide a defense treaty to them. I don’t think we’ve had a bilateral defense treaty that we’ve concluded for 60 years. So, it’s not something that we do very often. So, it is legitimate to ask what is it that we’re going to get out of it? I think the administration is looking at it from several standpoints, and I think it’s fair.

One is a normalization deal, the possibility of normalization with Israel, which you need to put in the context not only of clearly it now will have a Palestinian component that prior to October 7th it would not have had, or at least it wouldn’t have had to the same extent that’s likely if it’s going to take place. That has implications for the region because it means the Palestinian issue is actually going to be addressed. Two, you put it in the larger context of what is a broader regional competition. It is interesting that, and this is probably one point where I might slightly disagree with Kim, the notion of détente between the Saudis and the Iranians, it’s a purely tactical one.

Having communication lines between the two of them is fair. I can tell you, having spoken to, having spent a lot of time in Saudi Arabia, one of the things I’m always struck by is how low their expectations are that this détente is anything that can last or is really is something that can be translated into something more meaningful. The reality is that the Saudis are looking to the US for a defense treaty because their preoccupation is vision 2030. If you ask MBS what his priorities are, he’ll say Vision 2030, turning it into a reality. That’s my first priority, my second priority, my third priority, and he wants the defense treaty with the United States to ensure that there’s deterrence against Iran.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Don’t we reduce pressure on Riyadh to actually pursue a better relationship with Iran by offering this kind of deeper commitment? I mean, doesn’t that take some of the pressure off of them?

Dennis Ross: Well, it does, but the question is, if you believe that Iran has actually good intentions towards Saudi Arabia and the rest of the region, then you want the Saudis to be doing more with the Iranians. But if you doubt what the Iranian intentions are, and if you look at what their behavior is with all of their proxies right now, it’s pretty hard to say that their intentions towards the region are positive. Then your attitude, I think towards what the Saudis do with the Iranians might be a little different. I don’t object to them having lines of communication, that makes sense. But the reason that they are seeking a defense treaty with us is precisely because they don’t trust what Iran is prepared to do towards them. The reason they had, and Kim referred to this, the reason they had a problem with the Obama administration because when they heard President Obama talking about how in a sense that the Saudis had to adjust their behavior towards Iran, that made them very uneasy.

And if we are talking about a normalization deal, I think it’s fair to say that the Iranian attitudes towards a normalization deal are not very positive. If you pay attention now to what the Houthis are suddenly saying about threatening Saudi Arabia, again, I suspect that has a relationship to the possibility of a normalization deal. So, I think there are elements here. I want to go back just to what I think is really the third piece of this, and that’s Kim was referring to, and it is China, the Biden administration when it came in was building an imagery that we were at a fulcrum. We were at a transformational point in terms of competition between democracy and authoritarianism. Now, I think they’ve actually moved on that. I think they look at this now as there is a geopolitical competition that is basically between those who favor certain norms internationally and those who don’t.

They look at Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as being a broad coalition, and we therefore need a broad coalition to be able to compete with that. Now, do you want the Saudis leaning towards that Russian China coalition, or would you like them to be supportive of the US especially given all of their resources? And I think what has moved the Biden administration, it’s true, it started with Ukraine and started with Ukraine largely because of oil. But it was also at a time when the administration was trying to ensure that Russia could not continue to gain all of its resources from selling oil and natural gas. So, it looked to create some alternatives, but it was putting this in a larger competition. I think that was the first step towards looking at Saudi Arabia, not just because of oil, but at this larger competition that we were going to face.

So, now you’re looking at a broader competition geopolitically on the world stage. So, I look at this in terms of what can we do to affect the region? What can we do to try to deal with the broader international reality? And you have an administration that has put the premium on building this relationship with Saudi Arabia because of the region and internationally. Having said all that, I think it is right to ask the question. Okay, so what will the Saudis specifically contribute to us? Will it just be that they will guarantee that oil will always be based on a dollar denomination buying it? Will it be that there are areas of high-tech where they will exclude their competition with the Chinese? Will it be that AI, they will lean more towards the United States and not towards China? I mean, there are a series of questions I think that are legitimate to ask, and I think they fall into those categories.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Okay, [inaudible 00:20:15]-

Kim Ghattas: Chris?

Christopher S. Chivvis: Yeah, please. Kim, you want to make a point on this?

Kim Ghattas: If I may just clarify that, I don’t mean to say that the Saudi Iran détente was a change in the relationship, sort of a deep change in the relationship or that it denotes a change in Iranian attitude to the region. I looked at it from the very beginning as a tactical move by the Saudis to try to diffuse tension in the region, even at the time because tensions were increasing at a rapid pace between them, and it was tactical also for the Iranians. But what I was trying to say is that it has proven to be useful at a time when the Saudis precisely feel that they could be targeted by the Iranians because of the axis that we’re seeing develop in the region, and that they’re simply hugging their enemy in a way closer than, as they say, hug your friends, hug your friends close and hug your enemies closer.

But that makes it a useful balancing act that the Saudis are carrying out in the region between their détente with Iran and their continued openness to normalization with Israel when there’s a lot of popular pressure to come out against that. And that balancing act, I think shows a certain maturing in Saudi point policy behavior. And I think that that is of value to the US.

Christopher S. Chivvis: I mean, certainly I think everyone has agreed, one of the main US interests here is regional stability. So, it seems to me that if Saudi Iranian détente helps regional stability at least one, it’s not going to solve it in and of itself. But if that’s helpful to regional stability, then it should also be in the US interest, notwithstanding the fact that Iran is our adversary. Yeah, no, that’s great.

Kim Ghattas: It helps contain it. Yeah.

Christopher S. Chivvis: We’ve already started talking about the proposed defense treaty, which is a really important issue, one that requires I think some real serious discussion here in Washington. Look, what we’re talking about is basically cementing the US relationship with Saudi Arabia and turning it into something like the relationship the United States has with Japan. Obviously, Japan and Saudi Arabia are different countries, they have different economies. But the model for the treaty, as I understand it, is the US Japan Alliance. This is a very, very deep commitment that the United States has made to Japan decades ago in the early 1960s.

So, what we are discussing is making a similar kind of a commitment to Saudi Arabia now for an indefinite period of time. I mean, one that would last a hundred years potentially. It is a long-term commitment. It’s one that requires a very serious thought. And so I think it would be helpful to ... and everyone seems to agree here, that okay, it might make sense, but it depends upon what the United States is going to get out of it. And that’s really the key question. So, I think it’s important that we define what kinds of things would make it worthwhile for the United States to make that deep of a commitment, and how much confidence can we have that Saudi Arabia can deliver those things. Aaron, please.

Aaron David Miller: I mean there’s another element here that I think we need to focus on, and that is Saudi Arabia’s own agency. This is not the Saudi Arabia of its former kings. It’s not the Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz and Saud, of King Fahd Abdula. It is a Saudi Arabia that is pursuing what I would call a 360 degree foreign policy as the late Saud Faisal said to my former colleague at the Wilson Center, David Ottaway, we want a, this is in 2004, we want a Muslim marriage with the United States. We don’t want a Catholic divorce, but we want a Muslim [inaudible 00:24:03] ... we want more than one partner. And the reality is what MBS has demonstrated seems to me is that he ... And let’s be clear, he’s 38 years old. By my reckoning, he could see if there are succession of one term presidents, he could see eight or nine US presidents come and go during his tenure.

That’s point number one. Number two is the geography is destiny proposition. Saudi Arabia, in my judgment, has no intention of becoming the tip of the American spear in the face of an aggressive Iran. Geography is destiny. The Emirates have reached this conclusion, and as long as Iran continues to be a bad actor in terms of wanting to spread its influence, seems to me that Mohammed bin Salman has to make a calculation. He’s vulnerable and there’s a certain amount of dependency, but he also has to be extremely careful. So, in my mind, and again, just one last comment on the issue of agency, full disclosure, Jamal Khashoggi was a friend of mine. He was supposed to come to the Wilson Center several months before he was murdered at the best of Mohammed bin Salman. We need to take a very, I think, sober look at Saudi Arabia’s own motivations here.

I mean, if you are going to sign a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia, which we have not done since the revision of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty, which we have with a handful of countries, which will be subject to Senate ratification and will attain the force of law, we have to be pretty sure about what we’re getting into. And this raises the question of how to define US Ally. I would argue that a US ally, there are three elements, a high coincidence of interests, a high coincidence of values and in a democracy, a strong and sustainable basis of domestic support. And I would argue that today, Saudi Arabia, there is very little coincidence of values. There is almost no constituency in this country for a exclusive relationship with Saudi Arabia. And as far as interests are concerned, it’s episodic. Oil pricing, not necessarily. Relations with Russia and China, not necessarily. Human rights, not necessarily. I love Israeli Saudi normalization is a wonderful thing and sounds-

Christopher S. Chivvis: Hard to disagree that Israeli Saudi [inaudible 00:26:55]-

Aaron David Miller: I hope [inaudible 00:26:56]-

Christopher S. Chivvis: The question is, how far should we go to [inaudible 00:26:58]-

Aaron David Miller: But my one question, and I don’t have an answer, I have a negative answer and annoyingly negative answer, which is not helpful and not constructive. The question is what does the United States, or should the United States pay for Israeli Saudi normalization? If you didn’t have Israeli Saudi normalization, there would be zero chance of getting anything like what we are considering through the Congress, which I know for some administrations becomes a sort of impediment, but in a democracy, it is a part of the foreign policy process. So, that’s the question seems to me.

Dennis Ross: Can I just-

Christopher S. Chivvis: Let me just ask you, so if we were going to boil it down to the key things that the United States is looking to get out of this proposed defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, they would be Israeli Saudi normalization. And I want to talk about these in turn so that we can be a little bit organized here. Israeli Saudi normalization, pushback against China and some kind of help with Iran. Is that, would you say, Dennis, those are the three basic things, or am I leaving any out?

Dennis Ross: No, I think I would put the last one in the context of the idea of developing a regional coalition where you have integrated air defense, missile defense, integrated early warning, and we saw that on the night of April 13th. So, it’s not just an abstraction. And the Saudis actually did play a role in terms of that. You’re right, they’re not going to be the point of the spear, but in a sense, you’re not necessarily asking them to be the point of the spear. And I do think the three elements you said are right, but Aaron knows because not only did we spend more time with each other than we did with our families, how much time did we spend on assurances for every deal that we were concluding?

So, the idea that the Saudis will make peace with Israel and we won’t be providing fundamental assurances is a kind of contradiction in terms. Of course we will. And it will be to Israel and it’ll be to the Saudis, and if the price of a peace treaty between the two of them and normalization is, for me anyway, if the price is that there’s going to be a defense treaty. If it’s the difference between having this deal and not having it, I say, then you go ahead with it.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Okay, I want to talk about the normalization dimension to it because an important one, but I also want to talk about China. So, let’s start there and then we can go to normalization. Kim, you’re the one who raised China at the start, and this is obviously a huge part of American foreign policy right now. It really shapes the way that the US foreign policy apparatus looks at the world. So, if you put China into the equation in any mix, instantly you sort of have this instant argument for something being a good idea. And I think that’s part of what we’ve seen here with the proposed defense treaty is you say, well, if I feel as though it’s going to help regional things, it’s going to help to make regional stability, higher chance of regional stability, but we need a little bit more.

What about China? Is there a China angle? And can we use that also to make the case for this defense treaty? I suspect that there may be a little bit of that going on, but what do you think, I mean, how much can the United States expect to get in terms of Saudi Arabia’s policy toward China if it signs this defense treaty? I mean, will it really make a big difference in how Saudi Arabia approaches China?

Kim Ghattas: I think that it could, but I’m not a hundred percent sure because I think that, as Aaron mentioned as well, and I love to agree with Aaron, my former colleague at Carnegie, the Saudis have been looking at multiple alliances and making sure they hedge their bets as well. And I guess that for them, this defense pact is a way of getting into a Catholic marriage with the United States, but they have their interests as well, and their interests don’t all align with having an exclusive relationship with the United States. But I don’t think that necessarily then stands in the way of a closer defense partnership with Saudi Arabia, between Saudi Arabia and the United States. My concerns are that it feels like too much too soon. Now, it’s maybe a question of timing because we are where we are, and if there wasn’t the issue of normalization with Israel, probably very few people would be bringing up a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, but it feels like too much too soon.

It is, as Aaron said, the first time in 60 years that the US would consider that it would become law. It would weigh, I think, on the United States in ways that do not when it comes to a country like Japan. And it would be the first such pact with an authoritarian country, which is something to consider as well. And the final point I would make here is that it has other elements like civilian nuclear energy, for example, which I know we want to get into as well.

But this region is not one where we’re having traditional warfare. Yes, we had the episode in April where Iran launched missiles and drones at Israel and the reverse and Saudi Arabia participated in the coordination of the response because it is to its benefit as well, and it wants to demonstrate that it is a reliable partner, but we’re dealing with a lot of non-state actors. And I would like to know how the defense pact, if it goes forward, would address the issue of non-state actors, which is really how Iran operates in the region, lays the law and controls geography from Lebanon all the way to Yemen.

Christopher S. Chivvis: It’s a critical question because even if the treaty is supposed to focus on state actors, the reality is, as you say, that if Saudi Arabia were attacked by a non-state actor, the question would be raised whether or not the United States needs to come to Saudi Arabia’s defense, whether or not American forces would be involved in what way? So, it’s something that absolutely cannot be avoided. I completely agree. We’re here on an episode of Pivotal States talking about Saudi Arabia with Ambassador Dennis Ross, my colleague, Aaron David Miller and Kim Ghattas. And we’re going to go to questions from our viewers in a little bit, but I want to talk a little bit more about what the United States would really need to get out of Saudi Arabia in order to make this kind of a commitment worthwhile.

We’ve talked a little bit about China. I want to turn back Aaron and Dennis to you and get your thoughts on how much of a difference would a treaty like this really make in terms of Saudi’s relationship with China? And then I want to talk about normalization. Let’s start with China first though, Aaron, would it really make a big difference? I mean, after all, China is a major market for Saudi Arabia, and that’s not going to change in terms of oil exports, right?

Aaron David Miller: Well, I mean, it’s one of the crueler ironies I think of contemporary politics in the Gulf. But the US Navy already is providing CENTCOM, is providing the greatest guarantee for free flow from Saudi to China of the one commodity China needs the most. So, I mean, it raises the question, Chris, I think what does China want out of the Middle East? I mean, is it interested? Is it the hawkish school part of their strategy to take over the world? Do they want a security presence? Are they looking to use their predatory loans and their economic power in order to create relationships? I mean, that’s an unanswered question.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Well, let’s just be realistic about capability as opposed to intent.

Aaron David Miller: I mean, as part of any mutual defense pact, their would have to be, and we even gotten to the issue of the nuclear piece of this, which I think is highly contentious since the Saudis apparently want us to construct a enrichment facility on Saudi soil, which will allow them to control the fuel cycle, which would just undermine our proliferation policies. But what in essence, what is the threat to Saudi Arabia that in an effect needs a mutual defense back with the United States? If Kim is right that we’re talking on unmanned platforms, drones, cruise missiles, then why not simply continue the pattern of creating the sort of umbrella air defense system that was tested and worked so well on April 13, 14? Why do we need to commit ourselves to ... and I gather this would be short of an Article five commitment, what you would do about non-state actors, and again, a 38-year-old crown prince who will rule Saudi Arabia for a long time.

There was a compelling argument before Mohammad bin Salman sort of imposed order in Saudi Arabia that the greatest of Saudi Arabia was internal stability and that actually offer the Iranians and other non-state actors a point of leverage in order to pursue this asymmetrical sort of confrontation. I mean, that question needs to be answered. Is this symbolic? Does MBS need this? Oh, I know what I was going to say. It’s the exclusionary clauses that would have to be part of any MDA, any mutual defense agreement, that would restrict what the Saudis were able to do on the intel side, on the security side, and ultimately on the nuclear side.

Christopher S. Chivvis: When it comes to China.

Aaron David Miller: When it comes to China.

Christopher S. Chivvis: So, you’d have restrictions.

Aaron David Miller: To determine you’d have to black box all of these things.

Christopher S. Chivvis: But in a sense, those are necessary because we would be deepening our own relationship with China. So, I don’t totally see that, but okay. I think there’s a number of interesting points here. I want to hear Dennis, what you say about the China piece of this, and then I want to talk about Israeli normalization. There is also a question about do we need to do this now? What’s the rush I think that both Kim and Aaron have raised, so please, of those three, give us your thoughts.

Dennis Ross: I’ll come to why do we need to do it now. I mean, what’s driving it now as opposed to why do we need to do it now. Look on the issue of Saudi Arabia and China, what both Aaron and Kim have said, which is right, is that the Saudis have been pursuing a kind of general hedging strategy. That ends when they do a defense treaty with us. I mean, the relationship they have with China when it comes to China being a big market, we don’t care about that. We care about, okay, who’s going to do the next generation of telecommunications?

We care about AI. That will be excluded because that will unquestionably, I’m saying this unquestionably, there should be within this defense treaty, these black block areas that relate specifically to intelligence. It would be hard to believe that we would conclude a defense treaty without that in it. Now that by itself carves out a series of areas where Saudis will not be cooperating with China, and that’s clearly in our interest as part of the competition. A point that Kim made about the character of conflict right now is completely right. And by the way, this is a topic for another one of your conversations.

There needs to be a whole different approach to the question of international humanitarian law. When you’re dealing with those who embed themselves in highly populated areas and not only use human shields, but they’re prepared to make their public martyrs, even though they never asked their publics if they want to be martyrs. There needs to be some serious review of how do we think about international humanitarian law? It’s a different topic, as I said, but I raise it for a specific reason. You can’t really address what Kim was saying in terms of this defense treaty. But for example, the attack on Abqaiq was not done by a proxy. It was done directly by Iran.

They didn’t admit it, but we knew it. The Saudis knew it. And this is designed to prevent these kinds of direct attacks. One other point, even Article five doesn’t automatically commit us to force, it commits us to a consultation in the aftermath of an attack. The same is true at a slightly lower standard in the case of Japan. So, here again, let’s keep in mind what this commits us to and what it doesn’t commit us to. Why is it being pushed now? For very simple reason. There is no way to get a defense treaty through the Senate with 67 votes unless you have a Democratic president. If Donald Trump is the President, there’s no way -

Christopher S. Chivvis: So, there’s obviously-

Dennis Ross: [inaudible 00:40:25] support.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Obviously US domestic politics, but even if you were, we can’t put that aside obviously, but it’s more US domestic politics than that’s driving the timing than some kind of a reality on the ground, which I think is an important thing to recognize. Kim, let me ask you about normalization, because this is obviously one of the main objectives of the administration here. Administration believes that by this defense treaty will deliver Saudi Israeli normalization. This will have very positive economic effects for Israel as well as for Saudi Arabia. It will help to build a sort of a stronger counterweight to Iran in the region. But again, some people would say that normalization might happen anyway. I was certainly under discussion before we started talking about having a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia. So, in your view, is that enough to justify the kind of commitment that we’re talking about here?

Kim Ghattas: As I said just previously, I do think it’s too much too soon. I understand the timing of the fact that there’s a democratic president. I think the timing also has to do with the current conjecture in the region. It would be if this could go forward, including normalization and steps towards a Palestinian state to put this region on a different trajectory than the rather awful one that we’re all on today with nine months of war in Gaza after the massacre of October 7th, tens of thousands dead and the potential of war in Lebanon. And that’s what the Biden administration has been trying to do to push the idea of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel at this point, to also give Israelis a different vision of what their future could be like in the region rather than the dark tunnel that they’re in right now where they feel so surrounded and unable to imagine what the future could look like in a more integrated regional way.

And that’s the case that the Biden administration has been making to the Israelis, but Dennis will know much more about this, but I don’t think Prime Minister Netanyahu is interested at the moment because the price he has to pay what the Saudis want out of it is credible, irreversible steps towards a Palestinian state. And that price has definitely gone up since October 7th. I think the Saudis were more than happy to give a few limited crumbs to the Palestinians in exchange for going ahead with a normalization deal with the Israelis. That is not an option today. It might be an option again in a few years depending on how things evolve. But right now, the Saudis will not move forward with a normalization deal unless they get credible steps towards a Palestinian state from the Israelis. And Netanyahu is just not interested. He’s always been interested in normalization with Saudi Arabia, but right now the price is too high.

And if you consider that there is no way that this defense pact goes through the Senate, if there isn’t attached to it or normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, then the conversation is a little bit a moot point at the moment because we’re stuck at several levels. So, I think part of the issue today is how do you get the Israelis on board with the bigger package? And I think the timing is important, not just because of the November elections, but because this region feels like it could go into an endless sort of months long of continued conflict and wars of attrition from Gaza to southern Lebanon.

Christopher S. Chivvis: We have a question, Kim, from our audience here that I’d like to ask you. And someone wants to know how this sort of grand bargain between Saudi Arabia and Israel at least, or that dimension of the proposed treaty could affect human rights in Saudi Arabia and the broader region. I mean, if we sign a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, are we going to have more influence over human rights or could we actually end with less?

Kim Ghattas: I think it’s almost irrelevant in the global geopolitical scheme of things, unfortunately, and I say this with much regret. I think Saudi Arabia has changed tremendously over the last few years under Mohammed bin Salman. I think we need to recognize that it is great for a young generation of Saudis. 70% of Saudis are under 35. They’re living the kind of life that they could only dream of 10 years ago, even five years ago. And I think that in every discussion about human rights and about Jamal Khashoggi, who was also a friend of mine and a friend of Aaron, as he mentioned, it’s hard to balance the grayness of it because it was outrageous what happened to Jamal Khashoggi. And the word outrageous is even an understatement. And yet I don’t want to deny millions of young Saudis the possibilities that are within their reach at the moment, whether it’s women, whether it’s the young professionals.

It has changed tremendously, but it is also coming at a price, and that is increased authoritarianism. I mean, just a few days ago, a young filmmaker was arrested and put on trial, I believe, for a Netflix series that was judged a little bit too far out for the taste of the authorities at a time when the Saudis are promoting film production, et cetera, and having a red carpet with stars from all around the world coming to Saudi Arabia. So, it’s this battle between values and interests that is a constant struggle, and that unfortunately always takes a back seat to geopolitical interest. But that does not mean that we should not continue to push for these things. And I do think, yes, perhaps the US should make this a part of the discussion about a defense pact and what it expects from its ally that is getting this huge gift, if you will, as an authoritarian country versus a democratic country. But I suspect that that will not be put on the table. If I know a little bit about how American administration’s work, they don’t like to mix these things.

Christopher S. Chivvis: We have a question here from the audience about climate policy and the extent to which it could affect US Saudi relations going forward into the future. This is obviously sort of at an atmospheric level, something that’s very important for the relationship, and I don’t know who wants to take that, Aaron or Dennis? Dennis, please go ahead.

Dennis Ross: I’m happy to. Look, one of the interesting things is both the Saudis and the Emiratis want to see themselves in the forefront of renewable energy. The Saudis are making huge investments in green hydrogen, not blue hydrogen. Blue hydrogen depends upon natural gas, green hydrogen does not. They see themselves being leaders in delivery of non-fossil fuels over time. The part of the problem is you have a transition period between now and the point at which you get to that. That’s why oil in Saudi Arabia remains important to the world for the next 20 years. But the way the Saudis see themselves and certainly the way MBS sees it, he sees Saudi Arabia being not only in the cutting edge, but being a leader, not just regionally but internationally on this. And you will see that one of the things I think we are doing with the Saudis is doing more to collaborate in this area. So, this is actually an area where I think you’re going to see more convergence than divergence.

Christopher S. Chivvis: That’s interesting. Okay. We have another question here that is a scenario based question. Our audience is wondering, in the unfortunate event that there were to be an escalation of global instability, for example, that stresses US military commitments around the world, how important is the supply of Saudi oil right now to US logistics? This may be a very specific question, but I mean, to what extent does the United States really need access to Saudi oil? Are we okay with America’s own reserves, the imports that we get from Canada and Mexico? Is this something that should factor in a significant way or are we basically all right? Does anyone know the extent to which this is a factor?

Aaron David Miller: I think last year may have been the first year that there were net-zero imports of Saudi oil into the United States. As I mentioned before, energy independence makes sense if in fact oil didn’t trade at a single market and others weren’t dependent on oil, but I mean disruption of supply, 5% of their global supply of oil taken offline for a week or two in wake of Khurais Abqaiq attacks means potentially economic financial instability, which ultimately will find its way here. So, again, access to hydrocarbons, secure access, not necessarily for us, but because of the rest of the world and global stability and global growth depend on it.

Christopher S. Chivvis: But I mean, this is something that’s going to decline that we assume is going to decline-

Aaron David Miller: Over time.

Christopher S. Chivvis: As renewables come in and play a larger role. So, it’s again, the question of making a permanent commitment to Saudi Arabia in exchange for something that’s pressing now, but 10 or 20 years from now may not be as much of a concern.

Dennis Ross: But I don’t think that’s the driver of this. I mean, what we’ve been talking about, I think there are other factors that are driving this. China’s driving it. Normalization is driving it. Look, Kim said it, and all three of us know this. If the normalization deal wasn’t on the table, we would not be talking about a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia. That’s the only reason we’re talking about it.

Christopher S. Chivvis: But do you think it’s necessary to get normalization or do you think it’s enough to get normalization?

Dennis Ross: No, it’s not enough to get normalization because of the reasons that Kim said, the Saudis right now requires something on the Palestinians that allows MBS to say, we put this on a different track. It doesn’t look like Oslo. It’s not open-ended. It’s actually going to produce an outcome. It doesn’t necessarily have to be by a date certain, but in their mind, there has to be a time horizon here that allows them to say, this is different than anything we’ve seen before. The only thing I would add to this, I’ve raised this question with Saudis when I’ve been in the kingdom, I said, look, I understand why you want this to be something that has an assured quality to it, and it can’t be open-ended, but the idea that it’s time-bound irreversible steps, if that’s the case then, and there’s not a [inaudible 00:52:00], then Hamas could be the leader of that state.

I mean, what are the assurances? We need to come up with an approach on this that has rights. The Palestinians as a people have a right to self-determination, and we should recognize that, but rights come with responsibilities. So, you build benchmarks in to see that Palestinians are performing or have created for themselves a set of conditions that they want to meet before they have a state. And I’m not just talking about reform. I’m talking about is there a Palestinian identity now that reflects a commitment to coexistence and not resistance? If there’s a continuing commitment to resistance, how is that consistent with a Palestinian State?

Christopher S. Chivvis: How much influence do you think Riyadh has in bringing that sort of change about among Palestinians?

Dennis Ross: I think they have very limited influence on that, but I think if they’re signing up to something, they don’t want a Palestinian state to be led by Hamas. They don’t want a Palestinian state to be part of the axis of resistance, actually what I call the axis of misery. They don’t want a Palestinian state to be a source of instability. So, even if they’re not the ones creating these benchmarks or conditions, that should be what the American approach is all about. I say rights for the Palestinians, absolutely, but responsibilities for the Palestinians, just as there are responsibilities for the Israelis.

Aaron David Miller: Chris, it raises the whole question, ties Dennis’s point in with Kim that timing is a critical issue here. We don’t want to pay too much and not get enough in return. And right now, in the wake of the October 7th trauma and the Israeli response, it’s hard to believe that you could, assuming October 7th never happened, I suspect Mohammad bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu would’ve agreed on a formula that would’ve allowed the normalization process to go forward without anything remotely resembling time-bound and irreversible steps toward Palestinian statehood. That’s a given. Mohammad bin Salman may need something more now, but I think he’d still be willing to settle for something much less, and that would be a waste of the entire process. If we’re going to do this, particularly on the nuclear side with the Saudis, the Mutual Defense Pact, then the change needs to be transformative. If we were sitting advising the President, I suspect even with my aversion to being risk ready on behalf of Saudi Arabia, we’d be looking for some sort of counter trauma to the trauma that took place on October 7th and what’s been happening to Palestinians ever since.

And we’d be looking for some regional event to counter the trauma. Now, October 6th, 1973, the war was over in three weeks, Nixon and Kissinger then forwarding Kissinger through pressure and persuasion, created a pathway which provided, four years after the October war, Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. That was the counter trauma to what until now, was the greatest trauma that Israel had ever faced, intelligence, trauma, and in terms of the surprise attack. So, I mean, one might argue that what you really do, you need a second Biden administration and a change of leadership in Israel to take advantage of what opportunities. And I think there’s still-

Christopher S. Chivvis: And then you could have transformative change.

Aaron David Miller: Then I think you could begin, or if Joe Biden got on an airplane and flew to Riyadh and said to Mohammad bin Salman, get on the plane your Highness, we’re taking a trip, and the two of them go to Jerusalem and they address the Knesset, and the President says to the Knesset, if he wasn’t heckled.

Dennis Ross: He wouldn’t be under those circumstances.

Aaron David Miller: It’s not my hand that I’m offering you. It’s the Saudi hand, and with it comes X, Y, and Z with respect. I mean, whether that would be transformative, but we can’t waste the opportunity for a low budget Israeli Saudi deal that doesn’t take us to a different place.

Dennis Ross: You can’t possibly get there on a low budget deal. It’s just not going to happen without that.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Okay, Kim, what do you think? I mean, if we’re going to make this kind of extraordinary commitment to Saudi Arabia, it has to be transformative. Do you agree with that? And what does that transformative change look like?

I agree with that. I agree with that. I love Aaron’s term of counter trauma. I know there has been some discussion about less for less deal with, Saudi Arabia, if you don’t get normalization, you can’t go for the full pact. Can you give them something lesser? But if you turn it around and become very dreaming, idealistic like Aaron just was, which I love as well, and do something transformative and very daring. I’ve often ingest, told Saudi officials, why don’t you find, have a three way summit in Mecca with the Iranian president and Benjamin Netanyahu. I mean, let’s just sort this out, because we’re all very tired in this region. But if we can try to separate, perhaps, I’m just thinking out loud here actually. We’ve talked about the less for less on the Saudi defense side. Is there a way to push forward the normalization deal independently of a defense pact as well, to take a step on that front that provides momentum?

Because what I think the Biden administration has been trying to do hasn’t succeeded so far, including because there’s been no ceasefire in Gaza, is to create positive momentum to counter this ongoing trauma over the last nine months. And I think that is the art of diplomacy, and yes, it will require a Biden administration 2.0, because what Jared Kushner has suggested is that Gaza should be transformed into beachfront properties that could be sold for a great price and everybody could get in on the deal. I don’t want get too cynical. I do think, as Aaron said, that at some point later in time down the line, the Saudis might revise their request for credible non-reversible steps towards a Palestinian state because they’re also looking at their own interests. But a counter trauma move that could just push something forward in a positive way is sorely needed, and that’s an understatement.

Christopher S. Chivvis: As we’re coming to our last couple of minutes here, we haven’t even talked about the nuclear angle to this, which is we’ve focused on the proposed defense treaty, but obviously another part of this package is that the United States would offer Saudi Arabia a civilian nuclear program. Aaron, let’s start with you. I mean, what do you see as the pros and cons of that offer, especially in light of potential, obviously Iranian capability, but also nuclear capability of other actors in the region?

Aaron David Miller: I mean, I think we signed civil nuclear cooperation with countries all the time. We signed a gold standard with agreement 123. Comes from the Atomic Energy Act, section 123, which basically prohibits the export of American nuclear technology to states that don’t sign up to certain protocols and assurances and guarantees that they’re not allowed to control their own fuel cycle. They can’t enrich uranium and they can’t extract plutonium from spent fuel rods. The Saudis want to be able to enrich uranium on their own soil. And from what I understand that the latest proposal was to have the United States construct such a facility and had Mohammed bin Salman not made it unmistakably clear several times that if Iran weaponizes, then the Saudis are going to weaponize.

I mean, maybe it would’ve been possible to work out some arrangement, but that raises fundamental suspicions about what the Saudis intend by controlling their own enrichment. Bob Einhorn, a colleague of Dennis and mine, came up with a novel idea of a 10-year moratorium that you’d agree that enrichment is a possibility, but you revisit this a decade from now. I mean the South Koreans want to enrich too. If we do this for the Saudis, what are they going to say? So, I think we have to be extremely careful about this particular piece of the package.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Dennis, what do you think? Is it essential? What are the risks?

Dennis Ross: Well, one of the risks is that the Chinese will do it if we don’t do it. This has always been the problem for us during the Cold War. We were always concerned about the competition. If we don’t do it, they move to the Saudis. Now we have the reality that if we don’t do it, the Chinese will do it. And then that has all sorts of implications for what the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia will be. Foreign policy is all about making hard choices.

I can’t think of one time where we ever faced something and we said, gee, our choice is great, or it’s terrible. What you usually have is our choices are bad or they’re terrible, so we’ll take the least bad. I look at this in terms of I am not opposed to doing it. I’m in favor of doing it. I want to know what the assurances are that we will get from the Saudis as part of the process. We bring this back to where we started. Any defense treaty that is going to require a set of obligations and commitments by the United States should also require a set of commitments and obligations from the Saudis.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Kim, what do you think about the proposal for civil nuclear program?

Kim Ghattas: I can only concur with what Aaron and David said. I do think that it raises a lot of eyebrows in the region as well it’ll raise eyebrows with other allies who want the same, but I want to go back very briefly to close on the Saudi normalization, Saudi Israel normalization thing because part of it, of course, is the Iran angle, and I still believe that the best way to undercut Iran in the region and to pull the rug from under its feet is to move forward on a Palestinian state, because that is the cause that they have held up to promote themselves in the region over the last 40 years, funding groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

And that is their currency, and the best way to pull the rug from under their feet, at least on that front and cut them down to size somewhat, is to try to push forward with that. And I just wish that that’s something that Netanyahu or other Israeli leaders could really come to terms with. I’m not saying that if you have a Palestinian state, Iran’s nefarious activities in the region will disappear, but it’ll have a hard time selling what it’s been selling for the last 40 years.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Let me conclude by asking Dennis, just I’m going to ask each of you the same question, which is two years from now, will the United States have signed a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia?

Dennis Ross: You know what Yogi Bear has said about these kinds of predictions? The problem with these predictions is they’re always about the future. Look, do I think it’ll be done by that time? Do I hope it will be done? Yes. I hope it’ll be done because I think there would’ve been a normalization deal done. There will not be a defense treaty without a normalization deal, and I think that is so potentially transformative for the Middle East that I hope it happens. But that’s not answering your question. No, I don’t think it’ll have happened by that time.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Kim, what about you?

Kim Ghattas: I agree with Dennis. I don’t think it will have happened. I think we might find something sort of less for less progress to try to get some momentum forward, but I agree with Dennis. It won’t be passed in the Senate.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Aaron, how about you?

Aaron David Miller: I’d only say Middle East negotiations have two speeds. Slow and slower.

Dennis Ross: I thought you were going to say slow and paralysis, but okay.

Christopher S. Chivvis: Well, this has been fascinating. I feel though we could go on for another hour. I’d love to do it again perhaps in a few months as these issues continue to unfold. The extraordinary complexity of talking about any, well, most foreign policy issues are extraordinarily complex, but I think that the issues that we’ve talked about here are somehow even more so. It’s important that we continue this conversation so that Americans can make educated choices about what our foreign policy is likely to be. Thanks to all three of you for doing this for Pivotal States. Look forward to talking to you again sometime soon.